Skip to main content
Log in

Causal Overdetermination for Humeans?

Metaphysica

Abstract

The paper argues against systematic overdetermination being an acceptable solution to the problem of mental causation within a Humean counterfactual theory of causation. The truth-makers of the counterfactuals in question include laws of nature, and there are laws that support physical to physical counterfactuals, but no laws in the same sense that support mental to physical counterfactuals.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bennett, K. (2003). Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it. Noûs, 37, 471–497.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster, J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory (pp. 79–101). Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillet, C., & Rives, B. (2005). The non-existence of determinables: or, a world of absolute determinates as default hypothesis. Noûs, 39, 483–504.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, N. (2004). Two concepts of causation. In J. Collins, N. Hall, & L. A. Paul (Eds.), Causation and counterfactuals. Cambridge (Massachusetts): MIT Press, pp. 225–276.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harbecke, J. (2008). Mental causation. Investigating the mind’s powers in a natural world. Frankfurt (Main): Ontos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heil, J., & Mele, A. (Eds.) (1993). Mental causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a physical world. An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation. Cambridge (Massachusetts): MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (2007). Causation and mental causation. In B. P. McLaughlin, & J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind (pp. 227–242). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kroedel, T. (2008). Mental causation as multiple causation. Philosophical Studies, 139, 125–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, J. (2008). Structural realism and the relationship between the special sciences and physics. Philosophy of Science, 75, 744–755.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1966). An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy, 63, 17–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556–567.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986a). Philosophical papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986b). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (2004). Causation as influence. In J. Collins, N. Hall, L. A. Paul (Eds.), Causation and counterfactuals (pp. 75–106). Cambridge (Massachusetts): MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loewer, B. (2007a). Counterfactuals and the second law. In H. Price, & R. Corry (Eds.), Causation, physics, and the constitution of reality. Russell’s republic revisited (pp. 293–326). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loewer, B. (2007b). Mental causation, or something near enough. In B. P. McLaughlin, &J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind (pp. 243–264). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marras, A. (2007). Kim's supervenience argument and nonreductive physicalism. Erkenntnis, 66, 305–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McLaughlin, B. P. (2007). Mental causation and Shoemaker-realization. Erkenntnis, 67, 149–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Polger, T., & Shapiro, L. (2009). Understanding the dimensions of realization. Journal of Philosophy, 106, 213–222.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (2007). Physical realization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Yablo, S. (1992). Mental causation. Philosophical Review, 101, 245–280.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Esfeld.

About this article

Cite this article

Esfeld, M. Causal Overdetermination for Humeans?. Int Ontology Metaphysics 11, 99–104 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0061-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0061-3

Keywords

Navigation