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Analysis of Single Frequency GPS Receiver Under Delay and Combining Spoofing Algorithm

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Abstract

Global position system (GPS) has become a satellite based critical international navigation and timing system. Navigation has a significant effect in our daily life. Hence, such a commonly used system is an interesting goal for criminal utilizing. Trusting GPS navigation, need spacious knowledge to inadvertent and intentional interferences. The position deviation in GPS, which is subject to spoofing, is analyzed in this paper. Serious research into spoofing has been carried out in recent years. One of the basic requirements and major challenges in designing anti-spoofing methods and evaluating a successful GPS spoofing countermeasure is collection of actual spoofing data used to verify the proposed protection algorithm. Since actual spoofing data is acquired through an expensive spoofer-receiver device, preparing genuine spoofing data without expensive spoofing devices, including extra software or hardware, can be helpful in the development of anti-spoofing studies. In this paper, after providing a refined assessment of existing approaches, a new practical and low-cost technique is proposed that helps to generate a set of spoofing data only with the employment of software receiver and a set of real GPS measurements. In this way, a new kind of spoofing data is resulted by utilizing delay and mixing procedure. This data will be generated in victim receiver antenna, if a spoofer-receiver device is used in practice. After explanation of the spoofing algorithm, its influence on the GPS receiver is studied in details, and then validation of proposed method is proved by appropriate tests.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, 16846-13114, Narmak, Tehran, Iran

    A. R. Baziar, M. Moazedi & M. R. Mosavi

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  1. A. R. Baziar
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  2. M. Moazedi
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  3. M. R. Mosavi
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Correspondence to M. R. Mosavi.

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Baziar, A.R., Moazedi, M. & Mosavi, M.R. Analysis of Single Frequency GPS Receiver Under Delay and Combining Spoofing Algorithm. Wireless Pers Commun 83, 1955–1970 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-015-2497-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-015-2497-9

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