Abstract
This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of the soul’s cognitive powers of sense perception and discursive thought, with particular reference to the treatises 3. 6 [26], 4. 4 [28] and 5. 3 [49] of the Enneads. Part 1 of the paper discusses Plotinus’ direct realism in perception. Parts 2 and 3 focus on Plotinus’ account of knowledge in Enneads 5. 3 [49] 2–3. Plotinus there argues that we make judgements regarding how the external world is by means of discursive reasoning. This latter claim, however, is in tension with what Plotinus argues elsewhere regarding our perceptual apprehension of the external world (3. 6 [26] 1; 4. 4 [28] 23). This puzzle is addressed in Part 3 of the paper, which investigates Plotinus’ view that there exist some sense perceptions of which we are unaware. Finally, Part 4 looks at Plotinus’ understanding of Plato’s famous wax block analogy, in 5. 3 (49). The overall conclusion of the paper is that Plotinus’ account of knowledge is radically different from that of the Cartesian tradition.
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Notes
References to Plotinus’ treatises follow standard conventions and include: the number of the Ennead, the number of the treatise, its position according to the chronological order, the number of the chapter and the lines according to P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer’s Oxford edition (editio minor). Translations are generally taken from AH Armstrong’s Loeb edition (with some slight changes).
As in many other ancient and contemporary accounts, vision has a privileged status in Plotinus’ analysis of perception. However, his focus on vision is not completely exclusive: hearing, e.g., is briefly discussed in 4. 5 [29] 5.
As I see it, this expression should be used with caution, for Plotinus’ notion of “soul” is different from our post-Cartesian notion of “mind”, even though there are overlaps between the two: see below, n. 9.
On “undecidable representations”, see below, n. 26. One shouldn’t, however think, on the basis of the notion of “undecidable” introduced by Plotinus, that he is a sceptic; on the contrary, his answer to scepticism is close to that of Descartes. Magrin puts it in a nutshell thus: “It is because sensory reports are ‘undecidable’ that we are led to ‘turn inside’ and look for some a priori notions in the mind. And it is because these notions turn out to be ‘obscure’ in their own way that we have to proceed further until we reach Nous, in which every doubt is answered” (Magrin 2010, p. 294).
Significantly, Plotinus holds that no form of cognition is a mere affection of the soul: see 3. 6 [26] 1. 10–11; 4. 6 [41] 2; 6. 1 [42] 20. 26–32.
See Emilsson (1988, pp. 67–93).
Although it is clear that his sumpatheia theory plays a very important role in this theory: see 4. 5 [29] 2–3 (Emilsson 1988, pp. 47–61).
In this paper I generally refrain from using the word “mind”. Plotinus’ dualism between individual soul and body may indeed be compared in many respects to Descartes’ dualism between mind and extension (see Emilsson 1988, pp. 145–148), but prudence is advised (for further discussion see Chiaradonna 2012). For example, according to Plotinus our individual soul and the universal soul that acts as a cosmological principle are closely connected and this fact plays an important role in his theory of knowledge. Soul is not limited to human beings: according to Plotinus even stones are ensouled (see 6. 7 [38] 11. 24–31). These aspects of Plotinus’ theory are obviously as a different as can be from Descartes’ philosophical approach.
Plotinus’ analysis of perception is limited to human beings; hence, nowhere does he address the problem of how to conceive the cognitive power of perception in relation to irrational animals. For a possible Plotinian approach to this problem, see Emilsson (1988, pp. 137–138).
See the discussion in Fleet (1996, p. 97). The Greek text is hê de energeia estin ouk alloiôsis, all’hama prosêlthe pros ho echei tên ousian. Theiler (followed in Henry and Schwyzer’s editio minor) deleted the words words tên ousian as a wrongly inserted correction from the line above. In their first edition of Plotinus (editio maior) Henry and Schwyzer explained tên ousian as an accusative of respect. Fleet (1996, p. 7) retains this suggestion and translates as follows: “its actuality is not a change in character (since at one and the same time it approaches that to which it is essentially related […])”. According to this translation, Plotinus is simply claiming that sight is an energeia different from qualitative change (an obvious allusion to Aristotle, On the Soul 2. 5; see Kalligas 2004, p. 469).
Forms of artifacts are mentioned in two famous passages from Plato (see Republic 10. 596 c ff. and Cratylus 389 c), but ancient Platonists generally rejected their existence: see d’Hoine (2006).
Plotinus’ scanty remarks on the status of artifacts are discussed in Kalligas (2011, pp. 774–777).
More on this below, Part 3.
For further details on this famous (and controversial) theory see Kalligas (2011).
Magrin (2010) is perfectly right in claiming that here Plotinus “does not contrast the subjective affection an object produces on the sense-organs with the sensible object itself”. Her further conclusion that “this is not because he is not interested in skeptical issues, but because for him there is no sensible object that, qua sensible, could be such or such by itself” is, however unwarranted in my view, unless (by adopting a radically different perspective) one takes “by itself” to mean something else, namely that while sensible things have objective features such as colors and shapes, these do not define what a thing is in itself, since its essence is a formal intelligible principle.
As I see it, the same holds for the occurence of dokousa hupostasis in 5. 5 [32] 1.14–15, though the interpretation of this chapter is controversial: see n. 23.
In 2. 6 [17] 2. 20–26, Plotinus regards the essential constituent qualities of bodies as activities that stem from the intelligible forming principles. This passage, however, should be taken with prudence. It does not suggest that Plotinus endorsed any form of physical essentialism: see Chiaradonna (2006 and ForthcomingA).
The kanôn analogy obviously recalls Hellenistic debates on the criterion. However, prudence is advised: for this kind of vocabulary was of widespread use in late authors (see Striker 1996, p. 33: “traditional metaphor”) and the problem of the criterion plays no role in Plotinus’ account of knowledge (see Chiaradonna 2012). In 5. 3 [49] 3. 8 Plotinus designates with the word kanôn the inborn imprint of the good in us (see below, Part 3). This occurrence should not be used in order to clarify the metaphor in 4. 4 [28] 23, where the ruler analogy explains the role of a posteriori affections in the sense organs. Plotinus could well use the same traditional metaphor in different treatises and in different contexts, in order to convey different ideas.
His account of the form we receive through sense perception is actually similar to that of Alexander of Aphrodisias: see his On the Soul (83. 13–22 Bruns) and Emilsson (1988, p. 92).
Plotinus’ theory is closer to Aristotle’s views on perceptible forms than to Plato’s thesis that bodies have their perceptual qualities in virtue of the geometric shapes of their constituent particles (see Timaeus, 61d–62a). As we shall see below, Plotinus refers to Plato’s shapes in 3. 6 [26] 12, but this reference is not intended to explain how perception comes about. Obviously Plotinus does not aim to replace Plato with Aristotle. Significantly, the discussion of perception in 4. 4 [28] 23 opens with a clear echo of Timaeus 50 e, since Plotinus describes the soul’s reception of the sensible forms with the same verb (apomattein/apomattesthai) used by Plato when he claims that the receptacle is stamped with the copies of the forms (Magrin 2010, pp. 281–282). Plotinus’ account of visual transmission is closely dependent on that given in the Timaeus (Emilsson 1988, pp. 57–58) and Plotinus certainly regarded his views as an interpretation of Plato. Here as elsewhere, however, Plotinus uses concepts drawn from Aristotle’s theories in order to make sense of Plato’s general views: for further discussion on this, see Chiaradonna (2011a).
This might certainly strike us as an odd assumption, but it depends on Plotinus’ metaphysical premises. For Plotinus our soul is closely connected to the universal soul, which in turn is the principle that gives form to matter through the logoi. For Plotinus holds that in a sense all souls are one (see his treatise 4. 9 [8]). And all forms (both those in us and those in nature) ultimately depend on the Intellect (Nous), i.e. the second principle in Plotinus’ metaphysical hierarchy (Plotinus’ first and absolutely simple metaphysical principle, the One, is famously above thought and essence), which displays both the highest kind of reality and the highest kind of thought. Hence, the cosmological and cognitive function of forms are part of the same account of reality.
Hence I disagree with Emilsson (2007, p. 129), who sees these passages as problematic for his overall view and explains away the reference to sense perception in 1. 7 [53] 7. 9–12 as a generic one, which in fact includes memory and discursive thinking. As I see it, the representationalist account of perception in 5. 5 [32] 1 can easily be explained through the specific context of this passage, where Plotinus outlines the Intellect’s non discursive way of thinking by contrasting this kind of thought, whose objects are perfectly internal, to lower forms of cognition whose objects are external. Hence, he remarks that sense perception only grasps an “image” of the thing (1.18). Furthermore, it is at least possible that here “image” should be taken in its technical ontological sense (“reflection”, in the sense according to which an ontologically posterior item is said to be a reflection of an ontologically prior one) and not be rendered as “subjective appearance” (see Emilsson 1988, pp. 118–121). In 1. 1 [53] 7.9–12 Plotinus claims that the “soul’s power of sense perception need not be a perception of sense-objects, but rather it must be receptive of the impressions produced by sensation on the living being: these are already intelligible entities”. As I see it, these lines can well be read in a deflationary way that does not entail any strong representationalist conclusion: Plotinus may simply refer to the incorporeal mode of existence of perceptual forms in our soul, and this (despite the difference in emphasis) would be compatible with his account in 4. 4 [28] 23. For further details, see Chiaradonna 2012.
This reference was rightly noted by Kalligas (2004, p. 498). However, Plotinus’ most obvious reference in the chapter as a whole is Plato’s description of the receptacle in Tim. 50c–51b, where there is still no mention of the elementary triangles. See Fleet (1996, pp. 210–211).
At 12.13 I retain empsuchois with the MSS. Fleet’s emendation apsuchois is in my view unconvincing. As the parallel with Tim. 61d–62a suggests, here Plotinus focuses on the matter’s capacity to produce affections in perceivers. Accordingly, Plotinus argues that sensory qualities depend on the “shapes in matter”, which affect the perceiver but do not properly belong to matter in itself. Thus, it is only “by convention” that we ascribe these qualities to matter.
See Magrin (2010, p. 264): “Bracket the logoi, he [scil. Plotinus] suggests, and all there is around you is merely a subjective appearence, to which nothing corresponds in the world”. I should add that Plotinus’ talk of “undecidable representations” in 3. 6 [26] 4. 21 concerns the genesis of “fear” in the soul and has no immediate connection with the issue of the cognitive value of representations (rather, Plotinus takes issues with the Stoic theory of passions). Magrin’s parallel with Hellenistic epistemological debates is unpersuasive in my view (see Magrin 2010, p. 270).
“[…] we could not perceive things the way we do, unless we were somehow naturally predisposed towards them in certain ways by latent a priori notions” (Magrin 2010, p. 284).
See Magrin (2010, p. 263 n. 42).
Hence, Plotinus illustrates by his famous use of the mirror analogy in 3. 6 [26] 7 and 13 the way in which forms exist in matter without involving any affection on its part.
See Chiaradonna (ForthcomingB).
I should add that by referring to Democritus Plotinus is simply quoting a well known adagium and there is simply no indication that he made any use of Democritus’ theory of knowledge. Magrin’s conclusions on the Democritean background of 3. 6 [26] seem to me exaggerated. For example, at 3. 6 [26] 6 Plotinus claims that being is not “as most people believe”, namely sensible, since being is truly intelligible. Magrin (2010, pp. 265–266) notes: “In the light of his use of B 9/125 in 3. 6. 12, it is natural to suggest that his claim too reflects a Democritean influence”. This conclusion is unpersuasive, since the distinction between truth and what the polloi believe is an obvious Platonic commonplace.
The translation of to aisthêtikon and to logizomenon raises some slight problems. Unlike Armstrong, I prefer avoiding the word “part”, since Plotinus rejects the idea that soul can be divided into separate parts as if it were a body or a quantitative entity: see 4. 2 [4] 2. 4–11; 4. 3 [27] 2. 23–30. On Plotinus’ attitude towards Plato’s tripartition of the soul see Tieleman (1998).
Plotinus makes extensive use of the pronoun “we” (hêmeis) in order to designate a certain state of the soul, i.e. that state which we identify with (see Plato, Albiciades 128 e). Ordinarily, it is discursive soul that has this position and acts as the unifying centre of our faculties: see Chiaradonna (2008); Aubry (2008) (with different interpretations). See too Remes (2007). This, however, is not Plotinus’ last word on our cognitive identity, since the highest aspect of our soul exerts a non-discursive kind of thought. This thought activity is ordinarily unconscious, but in certain privileged conditions (which define the philosopher’s cognitive state) we can become aware of it. See below, the end of this contribution.
On logismos and cognate expressions in Plotinus, see Blumenthal (1971, pp. 100–105).
An alternative divisio textus is also possible: first Plotinus focuses on perception (5. 3 [49] 2. 2–6), then on the reasoning faculty (2. 7–11) and finally on recollection (2. 11–14). Something of the sort is found in Morel (2002, pp. 209–210). This division is indeed perfectly legitimate, but fails perhaps to lend adequate emphasis to Plotinus’ view that the reasoning faculty is receptive of both perceptual contents and contents that come from Intellect (see also 5. 3 [49] 2. 24–25; 3.26–40). The present division is intended to elucidate this double relation of discursive thought with perception (step [A]) and Intellect (step [B]).
Here I follow the account given by Emilsson (1988, pp. 110–111). Sensory judgements leave a representation of what has been perceived in the soul: representations are the objects of the representative faculty (phantasia). Thus, “representation is, so to speak, the perception of things that have been internalized by the soul”. Building on 4. 3 [27] 29, Emilsson suggests that the act of sense perception and the original apprehension of the image by the faculty of representation are simultaneous: perception is directed at an external object, but apprehends its object by means of a judgement that is itself simultaneously apprehended by the faculty of representation. On phantasia in Plotinus see also Remes (2007, pp. 111–119) and the in-depth discussion in King (2009, pp. 4–13 and passim). King argues that phantasia should be translated with “representation” (rather than “imagination”). He claims that Aristotle and Plotinus regard phantasia as a propositional and, thus, conceptual capacity, which cannot (merely) be equated with the preservation of images or pictures in the soul (on Plotinus, see King 2009, p. 183). As King himself recognizes, however, sometimes Plotinus comes very close to suggesting that representation is a kind of image of the thought: see 4. 3 [30] 30. 3–4.
The sketchy outline in 5. 3 [49] 2 has aptly been characterized as an “economical” version of the theory we find in the following chapter 5. 3 [49] 3 (see Morel 2002, p. 68).
This is a clear allusion to Plato’s dialectical methods as outlined in Phaedrus 266 b.
As argued by Remes (2007, pp. 145–146), the soul’s innate discursive capacity of combining and dividing is probably based on the intelligible notions of sameness and difference, which the soul draws from the Intellect (sameness and difference are actually two of the “supreme genera” that form the basic structure of Plotinus’ Intellect according to his exegesis of Plato’s Sophist: see 6. 2 [43] 8). This is a plausible suggestion, but the supreme genera are not mentioned in 5. 3 [49] 2 and 3.
If we were to use non-Plotinian terminology, we might say that discursive reason is an ectypal kind of intellect, whereas the non-discursive Intellect is archetypal. See on this Emilsson (2007, pp. 177–213, chapt. 4: Discursive and Non-discursive Thought).
See Ham (2000, p. 108).
See e.g. Ham (2000, p. 109). Gerson (1994, pp. 177–180) holds a different view: he does not think that discursive soul has access to forms independently of sense perception. In his view, Plotinus develops a quasi- abstractionist Aristotelianising account of the knowledge of essences (something which fits well with Gerson’s neo-thomist overall reading of Plotinus). Thus, Gerson claims that “old impressions” are derived from sense perception as well as new ones. This interpretation has repeatedly (and in my view convincingly) been criticized: see Lavaud (2006) and Remes (2007). For further details, see Chiaradonna (2010).
This is Emilsson’s rendering of koinê aisthêsis: see Emilsson (1988): “hê koinê aisthêsis here means ‘the perception of the common entity’, i.e. of the compound of soul and body’”.
Lavaud’s view corresponds not so much to that of Plotinus, as to that of the 2nd century AD Platonist philosopher Alcinous (Handbook of Platonism [Didaskalikos], 4. 155. 42–156. 5; 156. 8–10). The latter claimed that sense perception is only capable of discriminating single qualities (e.g. white), while their aggregate (athroisma—e.g. fire or honey) can only be judged by what Alcinous dubs doxastikos logos. Still, Plotinus’ view differs considerably from that of Alcinous.
Phantasia arguably plays a role in transmitting perceptual content from perception to discursive reason: see above n. 37. Significantly, Remes (2007, p. 144) paraphrases these lines as follows: “In perception, the perceptive faculty (together with phantasia) gives reason an image of a human being”.
I rely on the excellent discussion in Remes (2007, pp. 144–147).
One might want to characterize this intentional content as propositional. This is certainly a plausible suggestion, but I would recommend some prudence. The discursive soul through perception is actually directly acquainted with objects, i.e. forms and qualities instantiated in sensible things. Discursive soul unfolds the structure of these objects by making statements about them. Here a clear-cut distinction between objects and propositions may be somewhat misleading. It is worth quoting some very interesting remarks by David Sedley: “because Greek standardly uses the formulation ‘I know X, what it is’, the bare choice between acquaintance knowledge and propositional knowledge can easily mislead. For this typical case of Greek ‘knowing’ involves acquaintance (‘I know X’) but has an implicitly propositional content (‘what it is’) as well” (Sedley 2004, p. 121).
In addition to this passage, the parallel with Theaetetus, 189 e is also noteworthy. As we shall see below, the Theaetetus (and in particular its section with the wax block analogy) lies behind the whole outline of discursive soul in 5. 3 [49] 2–3.
As noted above, n. 13 this raises significant problems when we come to assess e.g. the status of concepts of artifacts, but Plotinus does not seem interested in tackling these questions. Building on 3. 7 [45] 1. 4 Van den Berg (2009) ingeniously argues that Plotinus accepts the existence of purely empirical concepts (e.g. the common notion of time used in everyday discourse). This suggestion is intriguing, but remains somewhat speculative. It is not clear to me that Plotinus’ passage lends itself to this reading. My interpretation is rather closer to the one offered by Phillips (1987). I hope to come back to this issue in future publications.
Significantly, it has been argued that Plato’s Theaetetus also lies behind the Stoic theory: see Ioppolo (1990) and Long (2006, pp. 223–235). This may well explain the Stoic echoes in these lines from Plotinus. A parallel has occasionally been drawn between 5. 3 [49] 2 and Plato’s Theaetetus: see Emilsson (1988); Aubry (2004, p. 217). For further discussion see now Van den Berg (2010). On Plotinus and the Theaetetus, see Bonazzi (2005).
This is indeed a very sketchy account. For further details I will only refer to two very influential accounts: Burnyeat (1990, pp. 90–105) and Sedley (2004, pp. 134–140). It is disputed whether according to the wax tablet analogy errors only include misidentifications or also false predicative judgements: see Sedley (2004, p. 136).
There is a vast debate on Plotinus’ theory of the undescended soul. I would only refer to Tornau Ch (2009), which includes an extensive discussion of previous scholarship.
As I see it, the same holds for what Plotinus dubs to psuchês theiotaton in 5. 3 [49] 9. 1.
In 5. 3 [49] 8. 37–57 Plotinus focuses on the transition between the mode of thought of the discursive soul directed towards Intellect and that of the soul which “becomes” Intellect: see Chiaradonna (2008).
On the two kinds of recollection, see Phillips (1987).
On this mode of knowledge, see Chiaradonna (2012 and ForthcomingC).
I develop this point in Chiaradonna (2012).
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Acknowledgments
I am very grateful to Sara Magrin and Anna Marmodoro for feedback and constructive criticism on the first draft of this paper.
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Chiaradonna, R. Plotinus’ Account of the Cognitive Powers of the Soul: Sense Perception and Discursive Thought. Topoi 31, 191–207 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-011-9114-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-011-9114-7