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Empirical evidence claims are a priori

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Abstract

This paper responds to Achinstein’s criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein’s objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, 8 Castle Peak Road, Tuen Mun, N.T., Hong Kong

    Darrell P. Rowbottom

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  1. Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Correspondence to Darrell P. Rowbottom.

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Rowbottom, D.P. Empirical evidence claims are a priori. Synthese 190, 2821–2834 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x

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