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Price-cap Regulation of Airports: Single-till Versus Dual-till

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This paper takes up the debate whether price-cap regulation of airports should take the form of single-till or dual-till regulation. The contribution is to model single- and dual-till regulation, evaluate their welfare implications, and compare them to Ramsey charges. We show that single-till regulation dominates dual-till regulation at non-congested airports with regard to welfare maximization. However, none of them provides an airport with incentives to implement Ramsey charges. A Ramsey optimal price-cap regulation, which achieves this goal, is also presented.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP), Berlin University of Technology, Strasse des 17. Juni 135, Secretariate H 33, 10623, Berlin, Germany

    Achim I. Czerny

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  1. Achim I. Czerny
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Correspondence to Achim I. Czerny.

Additional information

Thanks to Kay Mitusch, Pio Baake, and Sascha Lukac for very helpful comments.

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Czerny, A.I. Price-cap Regulation of Airports: Single-till Versus Dual-till. J Regul Econ 30, 85–97 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-0010-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-0010-9

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