Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Does the effective number of veto players in a political system explain the rate of government growth? Panel data analyses are conducted in order to test several measures of veto players against each other, and these results are compared with similar analyses of government fractionalization. The analyses indicate that veto players and especially government fractionalization exert a constraining effect on changes in the size of government, but also that the effect is not consistent over time: neither veto players in general nor fractionalization of government in particular exerted any constraining effect during the decades of rapid government growth due to welfare state creation and expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. The strength of government fractionalization vis-a-vis the veto player measures in explaining changes in the size of government suggest that the constellation of partisan veto players within coalition governments matters, while the effect of institutional veto players remains uncertain.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Acemoglu, D. (2005). Constitutions, politics, and economics: a review essay on Persson and Tabellini’s “The economic effects of constitutions”. Journal of Economic Literature, 43(4), 1025–1048.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A., & Drazen, A. (1991). Why are stabilizations delayed? A political economy model. The American Economic Review, 81, 1170–1188.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bawn, K., & Rosenbluth, F. (2006). Short versus long coalitions: electoral accountability and the size of the public sector. American Journal of Political Science, 50(2), 251–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., & Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in comparative political economy: the database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review, 15(1), 165–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blume, L., Müller, J., Voigt, S., & Wolf, C. (2009). The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini. Public Choice, 139(1), 197–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bradbury, J. C., & Crain, W. M. (2002). Bicameral legislatures and fiscal policy. Southern Economic Journal, 68(3), 646–659.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. The selected works of Gordon Tullock: Vol. 2. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cameron, D. R. (1978). The expansion of the public economy: a comparative analysis. American Political Science Review, 72, 1243–1261.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crepaz, M. M. L. (1998). Inclusion versus exclusion: political institutions and welfare expenditures. Comparative Politics, 31(1), 61–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crepaz, M. M. L., & Moser, A. W. (2004). The impact of collective veto points on public expenditures in the global age. Comparative Political Studies, 37(3), 259–285.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • de Haan, J., Sturm, J., & Beekhuis, G. (1999). The weak government thesis: some new evidence. Public Choice, 101, 163–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, R., & McMenamin, I. (2008). Political fragmentation, fiscal deficits and political institutionalisation. Public Choice, 136, 255–267.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franzese, R. J. (2002). Macroeconomic policies of developed democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ha, E. (2008). Globalization, veto players, and welfare spending. Comparative Political Studies, 41(6), 783–813.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hallerberg, M., & J. von Hagen (1999). Electoral institutions, cabinet negotiations, and budget deficits within the European Union. In J. M. Poterba & J. von Hagen (Eds.), Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance (pp. 209–232). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hausken, K., Martin, C. W., & Plümper, T. (2004). Government spending and taxation in democracies and autocracies. Constitutional Political Economy, 15(3), 239–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heller, W. B. (1997). Bicameralism and budget deficits: the effect of parliamentary structure on government spending. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(4), 485–516.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henisz, W. J. (2002). The institutional environment for infrastructure investment. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(2), 355–389.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henisz, W. J. (2010). The political constraints index (POLCON) database, 2010 release. Available at author’s homepage: http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/.

  • Heston, A., Summers, R., & Aten, B. (2009). Penn World Table version 6.3. Center for International Comparisons of Production. Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.

  • International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2011). International IDEA Voter Turnout Data. Available at: http://www.idea.int/vt/.

  • Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2006). Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: why some democracies redistribute more than others. American Political Science Review, 100(2), 165–181.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kontopoulos, Y., & Perotti, R. (1999). Government fragmentation and fiscal policy outcomes: evidence from OECD countries. In J. M. Poterba & J. von Hagen (Eds.), Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance (pp. 81–102). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2003). Frihedens forfatning: Velstand, regulering og skatter i konstitutionelt Perspektiv. Ökonomi & Politik, 76(2), 8–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levmore, S. (1992). Bicameralism: when are two decisions better than one? International Review of Law and Economics, 12, 145–162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2010). Polity IV Project: political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2010. Polity IV Project website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

  • Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2007). Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2, 155–188.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2003). The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricciuti, R. (2004). Political fragmentation and fiscal outcomes. Public Choice, 118, 365–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rodrik, D. (1998). Why do more open economies have bigger governments? Journal of Political Economy, 106(5), 997–1032.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roubini, N., & Sachs, J. (1989a). Government spending and budget deficits in the industrialized countries. Economic Policy, 8, 99–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roubini, N., & Sachs, J. (1989b). Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies. European Economic Review, 33, 903–933.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spolaore, E. (1993). Macroeconomic policy, institutions and efficiency. Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University.

  • Tanzi, V. (2005). The economic role of the state in the 21st century. The Cato Journal, 25(3), 617–638.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi, V., & Schuknecht, L. (1997). Reconsidering the fiscal role of government: the international perspective. The American Economic Review, 87(2), 164–168.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi, V., & Schuknecht, L. (2000). Public spending in the 20th century: a global perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Teorell, J., Samanni, M., Holmberg, S., & Rothstein, B. (2011). The quality of government dataset, version 6. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.

  • Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision-making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289–325.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, G. (1999). Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: an empirical analysis. American Political Science Review, 93(3), 591–608.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: how political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, G. (2008). Veto players data. Available at author’s homepage: http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/.

  • Tsebelis, G., & Chang, E. C. C. (2004). Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries. European Journal of Political Research, 43, 449–476.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Volkerink, B., & de Haan, J. (2001). Fragmented government effects on fiscal policy: new evidence. Public Choice, 109, 221–242.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • World Bank (2011). World development indicators. Online database: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

Download references

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to a number of people who contributed to improve this paper and its analyses considerably: Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, my Ph.D. supervisor, along with Niclas Berggren, Yosef Bhatti, Christian Bjørnskov, Jacob Gerner Hariri, Randall Holcombe, Mogens K. Justesen, Nils Karlson, Robert Klemmensen, Peter Nedergaard, Martin Paldam, Niklas Potrafke, Donald Wittman, the editors of this journal and three anonymous reviewers all provided most helpful comments. I also thank seminar participants at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, the Danish Public Choice Society and the Public Choice Society for constructive comments. Finally, I thank the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, for financial support. All remaining errors are mine.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Rymarksvej 109, 3. tv., 2900, Hellerup, Denmark

    Casper Hunnerup Dahl

Authors
  1. Casper Hunnerup Dahl
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Casper Hunnerup Dahl.

Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 7 and 8

Table 7 Control variables, data sources
Full size table
Table 8 Descriptive statistics
Full size table

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hunnerup Dahl, C. Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government. Public Choice 159, 415–433 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0104-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0104-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation