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Counterterrorism strategies in the lab

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Abstract

We conduct experiments to test the collective action dilemmas associated with defensive and proactive counterterror strategies. Defensive policies are associated with creating public ‘bads' (e.g., a commons) whereas proactive policies are akin to the voluntary provision of public goods. When combined, the inefficiency of collective action is exacerbated, resulting in a situation known as a Prisoner’s Dilemma squared (PD2). Deterministic versus probabilistic equivalent versions of the associated externalities are compared within a laboratory setting. Experimental results reveal that the collective action problem associated with counterterror strategies is deepened in uncertain environments, and is indeed a robust regularity that is not easily overcome; as individuals gain more experience, they become even more self-interested.

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Arce, D.G., Bakshi, S., Croson, R.T.A. et al. Counterterrorism strategies in the lab. Public Choice 149, 465 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9884-x

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