Abstract
In a wage bargaining model, a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages. Therefore, the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility, raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process. We consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support. Our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right-wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential. Using panel data for 19 OECD countries, we find support for these theoretical predictions. Moreover, we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Agell, J. (2002). On the determinants of labour market institutions: rent-seeking vs. social insurance. German Economic Review, 2(2), 107–135.
Anesi, V., & De Donder, P. (2009). A positive theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection. CEPR discussion paper No. 7333.
Armingeon, K., Gerber, M., Leimgruber, P., & Beyeler, M. (2008). Comparative political data set 1960–2006. Institute of Political Science, University of Bern.
Atkinson, A. B. (1990). Income maintenance for the unemployed in Britain and the response to high unemployment. Ethics, 100(3), 569–585.
Atkinson, A. B., & Micklewright, J. (1989). Turning the screw: benefits for the unemployed 1979–88. In A. Dilnot & I. Walker (Eds.), The economics of social security (pp. 17–51). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric analysis of panel data. New York: Wiley.
Beck, N. (2007). From statistical nuisances to serious modeling: changing how we think about the analysis of time-series–cross-section data. Political Analysis, 15(2), 97–100.
Beissinger, T., & Egger, H. (2004). Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(3), 437–460.
Blanchard, O., & Tirole, J. (2008). The joint design of unemployment insurance and employment protection: a first pass. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(1), 45–77.
Boeri, T., Conde-Ruiz, J., & Galasso, V. (2003). Protecting against labour market risk: employment protection or unemployment benefits. IZA discussion paper No. 834.
Boeri, T., Conde-Ruiz, J., & Galasso, V. (2004). Cross-skill redistribution and the trade-off between unemployment benefits and employment protection. IZA discussion paper No. 1371.
Boeri, T., Conde-Ruiz, J., & Galasso, V. (2006), The political economy of flexicurity. FEDEA discussion paper 2006-15.
Booth, A. L. (1995). The economics of the trade union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Botero, J., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, A. (2004). The regulation of labor. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1339–1382.
Boulhol, H. (2009). Do capital market and trade liberalization trigger labor market deregulation? Journal of International Economics, 77(2), 223–233.
Cusack, T. R. (1999). Some political data for 20 OECD countries. Berlin: WZB.
Disney, R. (2004). Are contributions to public pensions programmes a tax on employment? Economic Policy, 39, 267–311.
Di Tella, R., & MacCulloch, R. (2002). The determination of unemployment benefits. Journal of Labor Economics, 20(2), 404–434.
Du Caju, P., Gautier, E., Momferatou, D., & Ward-Warmedinger, M. (2008). Institutional features of wage bargaining in 23 European countries, the US and Japan. IZA discussion paper No. 3867.
Dur, R. (2001). Wage-setting institutions, unemployment, and voters’ demand for redistribution policy. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 48(5), 517–531.
Eichhorst, W., Grienberger-Zingerle, M., & Konle-Seidl, R. (2006). Activation policies in Germany: from status protection to basic income support. IZA discussion paper No. 2514.
European Commission (2008). Industrial relations in Europe 2008, Brussels.
Gaston, N., & Nelson, D. (2004). Structural change and the labor-market effects of globalization. Review of International Economics, 12(5), 769–792.
Gaston, N., & Rajaguru, G. (2008). The rise (and fall) of labour market programmes: domestic vs. global factors. Oxford Economic Papers, 60(4), 619–648.
Goerke, L. (2001). Bismarck versus Beveridge. Finanzarchiv, 57(3), 243–260.
Goerke, L., & Madsen, J. B. (2003). Earnings-related unemployment benefits and unemployment. Economic Systems, 27(1), 41–62.
Golden, M., & Wallerstein, M. (2004). Union centralization among advanced industrial societies: update to 1995/2000, Version 3.1, 7/28/2004.
Hassler, J.M., Rodríguez, J. V., Kietil, S., & Zilibotti, F. (2005). A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance. International Economic Review, 46(1), 263–303.
Heer, B. (2006). Should unemployment benefits be related to previous earnings? Finanzarchiv, 62(4), 530–550.
Heer, B., & Morgenstern, A. (2005). The labor market effects of indexing unemployment benefits to previous earnings. Public Finance Review, 33(3), 385–402.
Howell, D. R., & Rehm, M. (2009). Unemployment compensation and high European unemployment: a reassessment with new benefit indicators. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25(1), 60–93.
Lingens, J., & Wälde, K. (2009). Pareto-improving unemployment policies. FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis, 65(2), 220–245.
Martin, J. P. (1996). Measures of replacement rates for the purpose of international comparisons: a note. OECD Economic Studies, 26, 99–115.
Neugart, M. (2005). Unemployment insurance: the role of electoral systems and regional labor markets. European Journal of Political Economy, 21(4), 815–829.
Neugart, M. (2008). The choice of insurance in the labor market. Public Choice, 134(3–4), 445–462.
Nickell, S. J., & Nunziata, L. (2001). Labour market institutions database (LMIDB), Version 2.0.
OECD (2004). Wage setting institutions and outcomes. In Employment outlook (pp. 127–181). Paris.
OECD (2007). Benefits and wages 2007—OECD indicators. Paris.
Oswald, A. J. (1982). The microeconomic theory of trade unions. The Economic Journal, 92(367), 576–595.
Oswald, A. J. (1993). Efficient contracts are on the labour demand curve: theory and evidence. Labour Economics, 1(1), 85–113.
Pallage, S., & Zimmermann, C. (2001). Voting on unemployment insurance. International Economic Review, 42(4), 903–923.
Pencavel, J. H. (1991). Labor markets under trade unionism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Plümper, T., & Troeger, V. E. (2007). Efficient estimation of time-invariant and rarely changing variables in finite sample panel analyses with unit fixed effects. Political Analysis, 15(2), 124–139.
Potrafke, N. (2009). Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries. Review of World Economics (forthcoming).
Rothschild, K. W. (1986). ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ in ‘Federal Europe’. Kyklos, 39, 359–376.
Saint-Paul, G. (1996). Exploring the political economy of labour market institutions. Economic Policy, 11, 265–315.
Uusitalo, R., & Verho, J. (2007). The effects of unemployment benefits on re-employment rates: evidence from the Finnish UI-benefit reform. IFAU working paper 21.
Vaubel, R. (2008). The political economy of labor market regulation by the European union. Review of International Organizations, 3(4), 435–465.
Vijlbrief, H., & van de Wijngaert, R. (1995). Unemployment insurance policy and union wage formation. Labour, 9(2), 233–251.
Visser, J. (2009). The ICTWSS database, Amsterdam. http://www.uva-aias.net/207.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wright, R. (1986). The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting. Journal of Public Economics, 31(3), 377–399.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Goerke, L., Pannenberg, M. & Ursprung, H.W. A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits. Public Choice 145, 137–163 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0