Racial Revolution: Understanding the Resurgence of Ethnic Minority Identity in Modern China

Abstract

Chinese ethnic minorities are enjoying an era of resurgence, as their share of the population has risen by 50% from 1964 to 2010. Demographic forces alone cannot account for the rise. In this paper, we describe trends in ethnic minority identification and explore the determinants of identity with emphasis on the One-Child Policy, which raises the incentives to identify as a minority. Using nationally representative census data, we find that the policy significantly increases minority identity. The effects are especially large for persons in households with low socioeconomic status. This paper contributes to research on the history and demography of Chinese ethnic minorities, the impact of fertility policies, and the social construction of ethnoracial identity.

Appendices

Appendix 1

See Table 9.

Table 9 Robustness exercises

Appendix 2: Bounds on Potential Migration-Driven Effects

It is possible to calculate bounds on potential migration-driven effects with a simple mathematical exercise. We assume that there are two time periods, one before migration occurs (time 0) and another after migration occurs (time 1). We assume that there are two regions, one that sends minority migrants (the provinces that do not make policy exemptions for minorities) and another that receives minority migrants (the provinces that do make policy exemptions for minorities). We assume that ethnic identity is fixed across the population; the only change between periods is the migration that occurs from the sending region to the receiving region.

Based on hypothetical data on the initial number of Han (H) and minorities (M) in the two regions as well as the number of minority migrants (X), it is possible to run a regression model that mirrors the basic model in the paper when the effect of “time” is analogous to the effect of “fine.” In particular, the model is the following:

$$ y = \beta_{1} F + \beta_{2} FE + \gamma + \varepsilon, $$

where y is minority identity; F is an indicator for time 1; E is an indicator for the receiving region; and $\gamma$ are region fixed effects. To illustrate, consider some examples.

Example Suppose that the regions have an equal population size and an equal (initial) proportion of minorities:

H_sending	50
M_sending	50
H_receiving	50
M_receiving	50
X	25

Then, $\beta_{1} = - \;0.1667$, while $\beta_{2} = 0.2667$. The ratio of the coefficients is 1.60.

Example Suppose that the receiving region has double the population size and an equal (initial) proportion of minorities:

H_sending	50
M_sending	50
H_receiving	100
M_receiving	100
X	25

Then, $\beta_{1} = - \;0.1667$, while $\beta_{2} = 0.2222$. The ratio of the coefficients is 1.33.

Example Suppose that the receiving region has double the population size and a greater (initial) proportion of minorities:

H_sending	50
M_sending	50
H_receiving	50
M_receiving	150
X	25

Then, $\beta_{1} = - \;0.1667$, while $\beta_{2} = 0.1944$. The ratio of the coefficients is 1.17.

General insights emerge from the analysis. Algebraically, the ratio of the coefficients is equal to the following:

$$ 1 + \frac{{\theta_{\text{receiving}} \left( {P_{\text{sending}} - X} \right)}}{{\theta_{\text{sending}} \left( {P_{\text{receiving}} + X} \right)}} , $$

where $\theta$ is the initial fraction of Han, and P is the initial total population. One implication is that the impact of migration on receiving-provinces is limited by the extent to which the population size is larger in receiving-provinces than sending-provinces, i.e., the ratio decreases when the total population in the receiving region increases. Another implication is that the impact of migration on receiving-provinces is limited by the extent to which the proportion of minorities is higher in receiving-provinces than sending-provinces, i.e., the ratio decreases when the fraction of minorities in the receiving region increases.

Furthermore, it is useful to do an example which is more reflective of statistics about the regions. Relative to the sending region (provinces that do not make policy exemptions for minorities), the receiving region (provinces that make exemptions for minorities) had a population six times larger and a proportion of minorities four times larger.

H_sending	98
M_sending	2
H_receiving	552
M_receiving	48
X	1

Then, $\beta_{1} = - \;0.0099$, while $\beta_{2} = 0.0114$. The ratio of the coefficients is 1.15.

Appendix 3

See Table 10.

Table 10 Estimated effects of mother’s education on identification among children with minority mother and Han father