Abstract
A hybrid theory is any moral theory according to which different classes of individuals ought to be treated according to different principles. We argue that some hybrid theories are able to meet standards of psychological plausibility, by which we mean that it’s feasible for ordinary human beings to understand and act in accord with them. Insofar as psychological plausibility is a theoretical virtue, then, such hybrid theories deserve more serious consideration. To make the case for this view, we explain what psychological plausibility is and why we might value it, why the human/animal divide appears to be an entrenched feature of human psychology, and why Robert Nozick’s hybrid theory doesn’t go far enough. Finally, we make the case that a more promising psychologically plausible hybrid theory, with respect to humans and animals, will be (at least) at tribrid theory—that is, positing three domains rather than two.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
As this definition suggests, hybrid theories are hybrid with respect to normative principles, not necessarily the values they recognize as fundamental. A form of consequentialism that says we ought to maximize both well-being and justice is committed to value pluralism, but it isn’t a hybrid theory in our sense of that term: there is only one normative principle. We’ll contrast hybrid theories with uniform theories (a single normative principle), rather than monist theories (a single fundamental value), to keep the theory / value distinction clear in what follows. Finally, we should note that some people also talk about hybrid theories in the context of role ethics, defending adoption of different normative principles based on the role you’re currently occupying; see, e.g., Stone (1988). We don’t discuss that conception here.
Nozick may have recognized this in suggesting his hybrid view, but either way, and as we’ll discuss, we don’t think that Nozick’s hybrid view goes far enough in terms of psychological plausibility. This is no criticism of Nozick, as he didn’t actually endorse utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people. He dismissed the view as inadequate almost as soon as he introduced it.
As Ingold (2000) and other anthropologists have argued, some cultures’ perceptions of animals diverge from the majority views expressed in the kinds of psychological studies discussed here. Though beliefs about human superiority can be found across a wide variety of cultures, there is also significant diversity in those beliefs. The results discussed here should be understood as being particularly pronounced in industrialized cultures.
We won’t say much here about the grounds for moral ambition, other than that, in the cases we’re concerned about, it shouldn’t be terribly controversial. Practically all moral theories, including various contemporary forms of Kantianism and some kinds of contractarianism, agree that certain ways of treating animals are morally unacceptable; there is, for instance, no real debate about the moral merits of many of the practices that constitute intensive animal agriculture. Where we have that kind of agreement, we can plausibly say that the aim of moral ambition is theoretically neutral.
It’s probably true, though, that people value consistency with respect to human beings much more than they value consistency with respect to animals. So, egalitarian views may be more psychologically plausible for humans than across species. Since we are able to stay more motivated to invest in change that makes the world more egalitarian for human beings, we can have more ambitious ideals for humans; since we are unable to stay as motivated to invest in in change that makes the world more egalitarian for animals, we can't have as ambitious ideals.
References
Angulo, E., & Courchamp, F. (2009). Rare species are valued big time. PLoS ONE, 4(4), e5215. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0005215
Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Radke, H. (2012). Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 247–256.
Bleske-Rechek, A., Nelson, L. A., Baker, J. P., & Brandt, S. J. (2010). Evolution and the trolley problem: People save five over one unless the one is young, genetically related, or a romantic partner. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 4, 115–127.
Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. MIT Press.
Caviola, L., Everett, J. A. C., & Faber, N. S. (2019). The moral standing of animals: Towards a psychology of speciesism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 116, 1011–1029.
Cohen, S. (2002). Can pets function as family members? Western Journal of Nursing, 24(6), 621–638.
Costello, K., & Hodson, G. (2014). Lay beliefs about the causes of and solutions to dehumanization and prejudice: Do nonexperts recognize the role of human-animal relations? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 44, 278–288.
Courchamp, F., Angulo, E., Rivalan, P., et al. (2006). Rarity value and species extinction: The anthropogenic Allee effect. PLoS Biology, 4(12), e415. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.0040415
De Groot, M., Drenthen, M., & de Groot, W. T. (2011). Public visions of the human/nature relationship and their implications for environmental ethics. Environmental Ethics, 33, 25–44.
Dhont, K., & Hodson, G. (2014). Why do right-wing adherents engage in more animal exploitation and meat consumption? Personality and Individual Differences, 64, 12–17.
Donaldson, S., & Kymlicka, W. (2011). Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights. Oxford University Press.
Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gruen, L (Ed.). (2014). Dignity, captivity, and an ethics of sight. In L. Gruen (Ed.), The ethics of captivity (pp. 231–247). New York: Oxford University Press.
Hamlin, A., & Stemplowska, Z. (2012). Theory, ideal theory and the theory of ideals. Political Studies Review, 10, 48–62.
Haslam, N., & Loughnan, S. (2014). Dehumanization and infrahumanization. Annual Review of Psychology, 65, 399–423.
Hecht, J., & Horowitz, A. (2015). Seeing dogs: Human preferences for dog physical attributes. Anthrozoös, 28(1), 153–163.
Herrmann, P., Medin, D. L., & Waxman, S. R. (2012). When humans become animals: Development of the animal category in early childhood. Cognition, 122, 74–79.
Herzog, H. (2010). Some we love, some we hate, some we eat. New York: Harper Perennial.
Holyoak, K. J., & Powell, D. (2016). Deontological coherence: A framework for commonsense moral reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 142, 1179–1203.
Horowitz, A. C., & Bekoff, M. (2007). Naturalizing anthropomorphism: Behavioral prompts to our humanizing of animals. Anthrozoös, 20(1), 23–35.
Horta, O. (2016). Animal suffering in nature: The case for intervention. Environmental Ethics, 39(3), 261–279.
Ingold, T. (2000). The perception of the environment. Routledge.
Ipsos MORI (2018). Public attitudes to animal research. Available at https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-05/18-040753-01_ols_public_attitudes_to_animal_research_report_v3_191118_public.pdf
Kasperbauer, T. J. (2017a). Mentalizing animals: Implications for moral psychology and animal ethics. Philosophical Studies, 174, 465–484.
Kasperbauer, T. J. (2017b). Subhuman: The moral psychology of human attitudes to animals. New York: Oxford University Press.
Killoren, D., & Streiffer, R. (2020). Utilitarianism about animals and the moral significance of use. Philosophical Studies, 177(4), 1043–1063.
Leddon, E., Waxman, S.R., Medin, D.L, Bang, M., & Washinawatok, K. (2012). One animal among many? Children’s understanding of the relation between humans and nonhuman animals. In G. Hayes & M. Bryant (Eds.), Psychology of culture (pp. 105–126). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Leyens, J.-P., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Rodriguez-Perez, A., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M., Vaes, J., & Demoulin, S. (2001). Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 81, 395–411.
Lew, D. K. (2015). Willingness to pay for threatened and endangered marine species: A review of the literature and prospects for policy use. Frontiers in Marine Science. https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2015.00096
Manfredo, M. J., et al. (2020). The changing sociocultural context of wildlife conservation. Conservation Biology, 34(6), 1549–1559.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state and utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Phillips, C. J. C., & McCulloch, S. (2005). Student attitudes on animal sentience and use of animals in society. Journal of Biological Education, 40, 17–24.
Phillips, C. J. C., Izmirli, S., Aldavood, S. J., Alonso, M., Choe, B. I., Hanlon, A., Handziska, A., Illmann, G., Keeling, L., Kennedy, M., Lee, G. H., Lund, V., Mejdell, C., Pelagic, V. R., & Rehn, T. (2012). Students’ attitudes to animal welfare and rights in Europe and Asia. Animal Welfare, 21, 87–100.
Power, E. (2008). Furry families: Making a human-dog family through home. Social and Cultural Geography, 9(5), 535–555.
Rottman, J. (2014). Breaking down biocentrism: Two distinct forms of moral concern for nature. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 905.
Rottman, J., Kelemen, D., & Young, L. (2015). Hindering harm and preserving purity: How can moral psychology save the planet? Philosophy Compass, 10, 134–144.
Sevillano, V., & Fiske, S. T. (2016). Warmth and competence in animals. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 46, 276–293.
Stone, C. (1988). Earth and other ethics. Oxford University Press.
Swann, W. B., Gómez, A., Dovidio, J. F., Hart, S., & Jetten, J. (2010). Dying and killing for one’s group: Identity fusion moderates responses to intergroup versions of the trolley problem. Psychological Science, 21, 1176–1183.
Valentini, L. (2012). Ideal vs. non-ideal theory: A conceptual map. Philosophy Compass, 7, 654–664.
Wainger, L. A., Helcoski, R., Farge, K. W., Espinola, B. A., & Green, G. T. (2018). Evidence of a shared value for nature. Ecological Economics, 154, 107–116.
Wallach, A. D., Bekoff, M., Nelson, M. P., & Ramp, D. (2015). Promoting predators and compassionate conservation. Conservation Biology, 29, 1481–1484.
Waytz, A., Iyer, R., Young, L., et al. (2019). Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle. Nature Communications, 10, 4389.
Wallmo, K., & Lew, D. K. (2012). Public willingness to Pay for recovering and downlisting threatened and endangered marine species. Conservation Biology, 26(5), 830–839.
Wiens, D. (2013). Demands of justice, feasible alternatives, and the need for causal analysis. Ethical Theory & Moral Practice, 16, 325–338.
Wilks, M., Caviola, L., & Kahane, G. (2021). Children prioritize humans over animals less than adults do. Psychological Science, 32(1), 27–38.
Funding
No funding was received to assist with the preparation of this manuscript.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Fischer, B., Palmer, C. & Kasperbauer, T.J. Hybrid theories, psychological plausibility, and the human/animal divide. Philos Stud 180, 1105–1123 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01743-9
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01743-9