Abstract
I compare two prominent approaches to knowledge of metaphysical modality, the more traditional approach via conceiving viz. imagining a scenario and a more recent approach via counterfactual reasoning. In particular, Timothy Williamson has claimed that the proper context for a modal exercise of imagination is a counterfactual supposition. I critically assess this claim, arguing that a purely conceivability/imaginability-based approach has a key advantage compared to a counterfactual-based one. It can take on board Williamson’s insights about the structure of modal imagination while avoiding aspects of counterfactual reasoning which are orthogonal to figuring out metaphysical modality. In assessing whether A is possible, we creatively devise test scenarios, psychologically and metaphysically apt A-scenarios, which manifest the relevant metaphysical requirements and test them for their compatibility with A. In this exercise, imagination is subject to implicit constraints as Williamson has it, but it is not bound to drawing consequences from minimally altering actuality such as to make room for A.
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Notes
The alternative is that there are non-vacuous counterpossibles (cf. Berto et al. 2018; Jago forthcoming). It may be a further advantage of a conceivability-based account that the alternative does not have to bother us.
The process should not be described either as a byproduct of considering one arbitrary counterfactual A□ → C (Kroedel 2012, 6). I do not see how this could lead us to methodically checking for contradictions.
It may even provide resources for an internalist justification, raising a reflective awareness of why imagining is suitably constrained (cf. Vaidya and Wallner forthcoming).
This objection was raised by an anonymous referee.
Of course there are other ways of settling such mundane issues, for instance induction from comparable situations in which a piano had to be hauled upstairs.
Priest (2017, 191) gives the example of grasping an indefinitely long sentence.
One may object that this just is Williamson’s account as interpreted by Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri (2018, 314). However, the result is that CC drop out of the picture. They do not have to play any role either in formulating the account or reasoning according to it. We get just the old conceivability-based approach.
Some concern remains: how can we be confident that no scenario that reconciles A with the pertinent constraints can be found if we have to concentrate on the easily accessible ones? This concern also applies to Williamson’s original requirement of robustness. It is accommodated by the proviso that our judgement is defeasible.
Deviant realizations are also a challenge for Kroedel’s (2012, 11; 2017, 191) suggestion to replace Williamson’s equivalences by one particular might-counterfactual, using the equivalence ◊A ≡ ∃B(B◊ → A). Kroedel (2012, 9–11, 2017, 190–191) also discusses whether to use the equivalence □A ≡ ∀B(B□ → A) instead of Williamson’s, perhaps restricted to possible B. However, surveying all possible B seems overdemanding.
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I would like to thank two anonymous referees for encouraging and helpful comments.
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Dohrn, D. Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge. Philos Stud 177, 3637–3659 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01386-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01386-x