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Semantic intuitions, conceptual analysis, and cross-cultural variation

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Abstract

While philosophers of language have traditionally relied upon their intuitions about cases when developing theories of reference, this methodology has recently been attacked on the grounds that intuitions about reference, far from being universal, show significant cultural variation, thus undermining their relevance for semantic theory. I’ll attempt to demonstrate that (1) such criticisms do not, in fact, undermine the traditional philosophical methodology, and (2) our underlying intuitions about the nature of reference may be more universal than these critics suppose.

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Notes

  1. Capppelan and Winblad (1999). (For a response to this line of attack, see Jackman 2005).

  2. Machery et al. (2004).

  3. MMNS do not go into much detail about just what they take “intuitions” to be, and a similar lack of concern will be shown here. The question we are all focusing on is whether philosophers judgments about various thought experiments (the so-called “method of cases”) should be allowed to play a central role in philosophical inquiry. Whether such judgments are properly seen as part of a psycholocially/epistemically natural kind that is properly called “intuition” is a less central concern. (Indeed, I suspect that “intuition” does not pick out such a unified or relevant kind).

  4. MMNS, pp. B2–B3.

  5. See Kripke (1972/1980, pp. 83–84).

  6. MMNS, p. B3. They give as examples of this, Evans (1973, 1982) and Jackson (1998). For another instance of this, see Searle (1983).

  7. MMNS, p. B4.

  8. See Nisbett et al (2001), Nisbett (2003), Norenzayan et al. (2002) and Watanabe (1998, 1999).

  9. MMNS, p. B5 (italics theirs, but contractions for “Westerner” and “East Asian” removed).

  10. They note: “The University of Hong Kong is an English speaking university in Hong Kong, and the participants were all fluent speakers of English. A standard demographics instrument was used to determine whether participants were Western or Chinese.” (MMNS, p. B6).

  11. One of the Gödel probes was closely modeled on Kripke’s own example, and ran as follows:

    Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who proved an important mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arithmetic. John is quite good at mathematics and he can give an accurate statement of the incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as the discoverer. But this is the only thing that he has heard about Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel was not the author of this theorem. A man called “Schmidt” whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work, which was thereafter attributed to Gödel. Thus he has been known as the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Most people who have heard the name “Gödel” are like John; the claim that Gödel discovered the incompleteness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel. When John uses the name “Gödel,” is he talking about:

    • (A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic?

    or

    • (B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work? (MMNS, p. B6).

  12. MMNS, p. B4.

  13. For an example of such an approach, MMNS cite Segal (2001).

  14. And it does seem that it is precisely such a ‘formal’ question that is the focus of Segal (2001).

  15. One might, of course, question the type of externalism upon which this assumption is based, but I think that the general point that what we actually apply our words to and what they actually refer to may not be the same does not rest on any externalist assumptions. Rather, externalism rests on this more basic assumption.

  16. See, for instance, Putnam (1981). For Lewis’s reply to Putnam’s related criticism that aspects of his theory of intentionality were “spooky” and “medieval-sounding”, see Lewis (1984, p. 67).

  17. See, for instance, Searle (1983).

  18. The performance/competence distinction provides some wiggle room, but not of the sort that I will argue can be found with semantic theories of the second and third type.

  19. Capppelan and Winblad (1999, p. 205). They are discussing, but not endorsing the assumption in question. Cappelan and Winblad’s views are discussed in more detail in Jackman (2005).

  20. This analogy has been recently defended Miscevic (2000), and for a criticism of this defense, see DePaul (2000). See also Ramsey (1998, p. 165) for an unusually clear exposition of the psychological picture purportedly presupposed by classical conceptual analysis.

  21. And I think that there are good reasons for thinking that we are rationally committed to viewing our concepts in this way (see Jackman 2004, 2006a).

  22. For a discussion of this, see Lakoff (1987) and Rosch (1975).

  23. For a possible example of this approach to analysis, see the discussion of “knowledge” in Williams 2001. For a discussion of how the empirical data on the role of prototypes in classification makes conceptual analysis as traditionally understood difficult, see Ramsey (1998).

  24. One might think that this is simply to replace conceptual analysis with something like Carnap’s notion of ‘explication’ (Carnap 1950). Indeed, Ramsey (1998) seems to suggest that a move to something like explication is the most plausible way to continue with something like conceptual analysis when our concepts are prototype driven. However, while Carnap takes the explicative process to be one of replacing older ‘confused’ concepts with new and improved ones, I’m more inclined to view the constructive process as often (though certainly not always) one of getting clear on what our concepts have committed us to all along. (see, Jackman 1999, 2004, 2006a).

  25. Rawls (1971). For an instance of this approach to semantics, see, for instance, Devitt (1994, 1996).

  26. Also, as in ethics, but unlike syntax, type-3 semantic intuitions can carry some weight.

  27. Further, if a syntactic intuition represents a “performance error” there should be an account of what interfered with the underlying competence, while ‘incorrect’ semantic intuitions may be no more ‘polluted’ than the correct ones, They just may turn out to be outweighed by other intuitions or fit badly with the actual environment.

  28. MMNS, p. B8.

  29. For something like this defense of philosophical intuitions, see Hales (2006, chap. 4) (esp. pp. 171–172).

  30. Though given the view ultimately defended, it might be somewhat misleading to say that I take philosophers’ intuitions to be a “reliable indicator of the correct theory of reference”, since such “indicator” talk suggests that intuitions are tracking something which is independent of them.

  31. As the earlier comparison with Rawls should make clear.

  32. MMNS suggest as much themselves (p. B9). For a similar suggestion about our epistemic intuitions, see Cummins (1998).

  33. Or, more commonly in the case of names, no unique person at all.

  34. As MMNS note on p. B7.

  35. The Jonah case is presented by MMNS as follows:

    In high school, German students learn that Attila founded Germany in the second century A.D. They are taught that Attila was the king of a nomadic tribe that migrated from the east to settle in what would become Germany. Germans also believe that Attila was a merciless warrior and leader who expelled the Romans from Germany, and that after his victory against the Romans, Attila organized a large and prosperous kingdom.

    Now suppose that none of this is true. No merciless warrior expelled the Romans from Germany, and Germany was not founded by a single individual. Actually, the facts are the following. In the fourth century A.D., a nobleman of low rank, called “Raditra”, ruled a small and peaceful area in what today is Poland, several hundred miles from Germany. Raditra was a wise and gentle man who managed to preserve the peace in the small land he was ruling. For this reason, he quickly became the main character of many stories and legends. These stories were passed on from one generation of peasants to the next. But often when the story was passed on the peasants would embellish it, adding imaginary details and dropping some true facts to make the story more exciting. From a peaceful nobleman of low rank, Raditra was gradually transformed into a warrior fighting for his land. When the legend reached Germany, it told of a merciless warrior who was victorious against the Romans. By the 8th century A.D., the story told of an Eastern king who expelled the Romans and founded Germany. By that time, not a single true fact remained in the story.

    Meanwhile, as the story was told and retold, the name “Raditra” was slowly altered: it was successively replaced by “Aditra”, then by “Arritrak” in the sixth century, by “Arrita” and “Arrila” in the seventh and finally by “Attila”. The story about the glorious life of Attila was written down in the 8th century by a scrupulous Catholic monk, from whom all our beliefs are derived. Of course, Germans know nothing about these real events. They believe a story about a merciless Eastern king who expelled the Romans and founded Germany.

    When a contemporary German high school student says “Attila was the king who drove the Romans from Germany,” is he actually talking about the wise and gentle nobleman, Raditra, who is the original source of the Attila legend, or is he talking about a fictional person, someone who does not really exist?

    • (A) He is talking about Raditra

    • (B) He is talking about a fictional person who does not really exist.

  36. Unless, of course, MMNS are following Rorty (1979) in making a strong distinction between “referring” and “talking about”. I’d be surprised if that was the case, especially since, if the distinction was intended, it wouldn’t be clear why cultural variation in our intuitions about “talking about” should be relevant to the question of whether philosopher’s intuitions about reference were representative.

  37. See Kripke (1972, p. 85).

  38. Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979). This line of thought could ultimately be taken to include the contribution of future use as well, and Jackman (1999) outlines quite clearly how these commitments in one of these areas make taking on similar commitments in others much less conceptually costly.

  39. Indeed, Nisbitt 2003 describes how the intuitions of both Easterners and Westerners can be ‘primed’ to run in a characteristically Eastern or characteristically Western fashion, and having an awareness of the reference-failure cases may ‘prime’ ones intuitions about the misidentification cases towards the causal account.

  40. By contrast, see MMNS, p. B3, note 3.

  41. For a discussion of the possibility that this may be the norm in metaphysical and meta-semantic debates, see Lynch (1998) and Jackman (1996). The pessimism about intuitions would thus ultimately stem from a semantic analog of something like the “epistemological realism” criticized in Williams (1991, 2001). For a dissenting view about the possibility of such pluralism, see Kornblith (1998).

  42. While it might be easier to view ourselves as being able to switch between the two sorts of assertional practice without undermining the objectivity of either than it would be to make a similar move with our ethical practices, it should be stressed that this is not the view that the type-3 pluralist seems committed to. He is committed to the stronger view that we can always be justly evaluated in terms of either practice. This would point to a type of indeterminacy, and thus a skepticism about meaning and truth.

  43. So, for instance, we would have to, in the Schmidt scenario, treat Easterner’s “Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic” utterances as false even when they became appraised of all the non-semantic facts and still insisted that Schmidt is the proper reference for “Gödel”.

  44. For a much more detailed presentation and defense of the principle, see Jackman (2003).

  45. For a discussion of this see Evans (1982).

  46. One should also note that such variations occur within the members of a culture, and quite possibly within a single person as they shift from context to context. This might also help explain some of the intra cultural variation in the reported data. How this sort of contextually sensitive weighting of commitments plays out is described in Jackman (2006b).

  47. While we have very few of what Evan’s refers to as “descriptive names” (Evans 1982), they might have many.

  48. Since they may approach the question of thinking what they would be referring to if they were in John’s position.

  49. Compare this to the need for a proposed universal syntactic theory to explain why some languages allow various kinds of movement, while others do not. The conflicting intuitions about, say, the applicability of dropping PRO don’t require either that we treat one of the linguistic communities as mistaken or simply give up the idea of there being a universal grammar that they both share. (Still, the analogy here shouldn’t be pushed too hard, since in the semantic case, there may be more room to dismiss certain intuitions given the normative nature of the enterprise).

  50. MMNS, p. B9.

  51. Though MMNS’s studies suggest that sufficient sensitivity to the variation that exists within our culture could play a similar role.

  52. Actually, I doubt that the ‘Western’ data leaves this underdetermined (especially given the intra-cultural variation MMNS point to).

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Jonathan Weinberg, Catherine Wearing, Eduard Machery, Dan Gaskill, and Tedla Gebreyesus for comments on an earlier version of this paper. As well as audience members at York University, the 2005 Mid South Philosophy Conference, and the 2005 Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association.

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    Henry Jackman

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Jackman, H. Semantic intuitions, conceptual analysis, and cross-cultural variation. Philos Stud 146, 159–177 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9249-6

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