Abstract
Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counter-example to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to superficially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke’s examples cannot be extended to mine. If Intentionalism fails, it is impossible to reduce the phenomenology of an experience to its content.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Block N. (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. In: Villanueva, E. (eds) Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, pp 19–49. Ridgeview Press, Atascadero, CA.
Byrne A. (2001). Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review 110(2): 199–240.
Byrne, A. (2005): ‘Inverted Qualia’, in E.N. Zalta (ed)., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/qualia-inverted/.
Chalmers D.J. (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In: Leiter, B. (eds) The Future for Philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York.
Dretske F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA .
Evans G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press, Oxford .
Fodor J.A. (1994). A Theory of Content and other Essays. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 89–136.
Frege G. (1997). On Sense and Reference. In: (eds) The Frege Reader, pp 151–172. Blackwell, Oxford .
Harman G. (1999). Reasoning, Meaning and Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 244–261 .
Heck R.G. (2000). Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”. The Philosophical Review 109(4): 485–523 .
Lewis D.K. (1983). Attitudes De Dicto and De Se Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press, New York, 133–159 .
Lycan W. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA .
Mack A. and Rock I. (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press, Cambridge .
McDowell J. (1994). Mind and World. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA .
Nida-Räumelin M. (1996). Pseudonormal Vision: An actual Case of Qualia Inversion?. Philosophical Studies 82(2): 145–157 .
Palmer S. (1999). Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Peacocke C. (1983). Sense and Content. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Peacocke C. (1992). A Study of Concepts. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Peacocke C. (2001). Does Perception have a Nonconceptual Content?. The Journal of Philosophy 98(5): 239–264.
Russell B. (1912/1977). The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, London.
Searle J.R. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Shoemaker S. (1982). The Inverted Spectrum. The Journal of Philosophy 79(7): 357–381.
Shoemaker S. (1994a). Phenomenal Character. Noûs 28(1): 21–38.
Shoemaker S. (1994b). Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense: Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(2): 291–314.
Siewert C.P. (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Stalnaker R.C. (1984). Inquiry. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Stalnaker R.C. (1998). What might Non-Conceptual Content be?. In: Villanueva, E. (eds) Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, pp 339–352. Atascadero, Ridgeview.
Stalnaker R.C. (2003). Ways a World might be. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 219–238.
Thau M. (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Travis C. (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind 113(449): 57–94 .
Tye M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Tye M. (2000). Consciousness, Color and Content. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA .
Tye M. (2005). Nonconceptual Content, Richness and Fineness of Grain. In: Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds) Perceptual Experience, pp. Oxford University Press, Oxford .
Wittgenstein L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations, Trans. Anscombe. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Nickel, B. Against intentionalism. Philos Stud 136, 279–304 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2013-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2013-2