Abstract
This paper is a critique of the radical enactivism of Daniel Hutto, Erik Myin, and their collaborators, insofar as their approach pertains to the hard problem of consciousness. I argue that their valiant attempt to discard the hard problem is ultimately unsuccessful. More specifically, I argue that the hard problem of consciousness is best construed as a transcendental challenge and that no phenomeno-physical identity theory (however embodied and situated), and no “logic of identity”, successfully eliminate this challenge. Finally, I argue that the theoretical stance adopted by Hutto, Myin, and their colleagues is inherently unstable in that it inadvertently blends strong deflationary currents with an implicit commitment to substantive metaphysical revisionism. Since deflationism and revisionism are discordant partners their forced union results in a position whose overall coherence is compromised. Such disequilibrium, I believe, is a general characteristic of radical enactivist approaches to consciousness, of which the position discussed on the present occasion is one prominent representative.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
It goes without saying that theories of consciousness that avoid the hard problem may nevertheless suffer from major theoretical afflictions of their own. The point, however, is that whatever challenges such theories may face the hard problem (understood as per above) is not one of them.
The variety of postulated relations — strict identity, grounding, supervenience, causation, etc. — reflects differences of opinion as to how strong (or weak) is the link between the physical and the phenomenal. But in each case a certain compresence or union is postulated, bringing the two together; and it is this togetherness, however articulated, which must be rendered intelligible.
I use this specific example (based on the work of Logothetis and his colleagues as cited in Koch 2004) for illustrative purposes only. As far as this paper is concerned, other examples of candidate NCC — from thalamo-cortical activated EEG to high-frequency activity patterns in the posterior “hot zone” and beyond — could have served the purpose equally well (for a recent review see Koch et al. 2016). Moreover, nor am I assuming that psychophysical identity claims must limit Φ (the physical side of the identity) to intracranial neural processes alone. As far as I can see, none of these details significantly affects the point made in the text.
Strictly speaking, this latter formulation is preferable since it prevents the evident objection that the actuality of the identity entails its possibility. The point is that the presumed actuality of the identity still leaves us in the dark regarding its metaphysical viability. Having clarified the issue, I shall, for simplicity’s sake, continue to talk about possibility from now own.
Proponents of the identity solution distinguish only two types of questions: the sensible question why should we believe in a given identity relation R; and the nonsensical question why does R hold (see Papineau 1998; Myin and Zahnoun 2018). I argue that there is a legitimate tertium quid, consisting in the sensible question how is it possible (metaphysically speaking) for R to hold.
Whether such conditions must nevertheless bestow upon X a necessity of a different sort is something which I leave to the side on the present occasion.
Some (e.g., Goff 2019, 128–130) dream of a future science of consciousness capable of accommodating experience and the intrinsic nature of the physical, but the point is that such “science” emphatically transcends our contemporary understanding, and practice, of physical science.
Consider, for example, the thriving literature on Russellian monism, revisionist physicalism, and panpsychism; as well as the revived interest in idealism and neutral monism.
By ‘metaphysically revisionist view’ I mean a position on the nature of the mind-body problem which differs markedly from both orthodox materialism (or physicalism) and traditional forms of dualism. Mainstream philosophy of mind considers the mind-body problem as a battleground fought between physicalism and dualism; which is why other alternatives are, in this context, metaphysically revisionist.
While this is no extra ingredient in the sense of an independent metaphysical substance, or fundamental new laws, it certainly is an important addition to the general picture of the world provided us by science. It profoundly alters our conception of physical nature, adding to it a dimension wholly beyond the compass of objective science.
References
Alter, T., & Nagasawa, Y. (2012). What is Russellian monism? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(9–10), 67–95.
Bickle, J. (1998). Psychoneural reduction: The new wave. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–2019.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. NY: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2002). Consciousness and its place in nature. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings (pp. 247–271). NY: Oxford University Press.
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Churchland, P. M. (1985). Reduction, qualia, and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy, 82(1), 1–22.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little Brown.
Feigl, H. (1958). The "mental" and the "physical". In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell (Eds.), Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science vol. 2. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Frankish, K. (2016). Illusionism as a theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11–12), 11–39.
Goff, P. (2011). A posteriori Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(2), 191–209.
Goff, P. (2017). Consciousness and fundamental reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goff, P. (2019). Galileo's error: Foundations for a new science of consciousness. London: Rider.
Grondin, J. (2012). Introduction to metaphysics: From Parmenides to Levinas. NY: Columbia University Press.
Hooker, C.A. (1981), Towards a general theory of reduction. Part I: Historical and scientific setting. Part II: Identity in reduction. Part III: Cross-categorical reduction. Dialogue, 20, 38-59, 201-236, 496-529.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic minds without content. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving Enactivism: Basic minds meet content. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jackson, F. (1993). Armchair metaphysics. In J. O'Leary-Hawthorne & M. Michael (Eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
James, W. (1912/2003). Essays in radical empiricism. Mineola: Dover.
Kant, I. (1781/1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Politis, V. (Ed.) London: Everyman.
Kant, I. (1783/2004). Prolegomena to any future metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kemeney, J. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1956). On reduction. Philosophical Studies, 7(1–2), 6–19.
Kirchhoff, M., & Hutto, D. D. (2016). Never mind the gap: Neurophenomenology, radical Enactivism, and the hard problem of consciousness. Constructivist Foundations, 11(2), 302–309.
Koch, C. (2004). The quest for consciousness: A neurobiological approach. Englewood: Roberts and Company.
Koch, C., Massimini, M., Boly, M., & Tononi, G. (2016). Neural correlates of consciousness: Progress and problems. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 17, 307–321.
Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354–361.
Lockwood, M. (1989). Mind, brain, and the quantum: The compound 'I'. Oxford: Blackwell.
Myin, E., & Zahnoun, F. (2018). Reincarnating the identity theory. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044.
Nagel, E. (1961). The structure of science. NY: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Nöe, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Papineau, D. (1998). Mind the gap. Philosophical Perspectives, 12, 373–388.
Russell, B. (1927). Analysis of matter. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Schaffner, K. (1976) Reductionism in biology: Prospects and problems, in R.S. Cohen, et al. (eds), PSA 1974, 613–632. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Schlick, M. (1925/1974). General Theory of Knowledge. Albert, E. Blumenberg (Trans.). NY: Springer-Verlag.
Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, information, and Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 272–288.
Seager, W. (2016). Theories of consciousness: An introduction and assessment. Oxford: Routledge.
Shani, I. & Choi, S. (2013). Type-Identity Statements and the Explanatory Gap: An Argument for Compatibility. Dialectica, 67(4), 485–502.
Silberstein, M. (2009). Review essay: Why neutral monism is superior to Panpsychism. Mind and Matter, 7(2), 239–248.
Silberstein, M., & Chemero, A. (2012). Complexity and extended phenomenological systems. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4, 35–50.
Silberstein, M., & Chemero, A. (2015). Extending neutral monism to the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3-4, 181–194.
Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic monism: Why Physicalism entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13, 3–31.
Thompson, E. (2004). Life and mind: From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology. A Tribute to Francisco.
Tyndall, J. (1879). Fragments of science: A series of detached essays, addresses, and reviews. London: Longmans, Green and Co..
Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4), 330–349.
Acknowledgments
An early version of the paper was presented at the Third International Conference on Natural Cognition: Experience, Concepts, and Agency, hosted by the Philosophy and Religious Studies Program at the University of Macau (November 20-21, 2018); as well as at the Workshop on Philosophical Psychology in Shandong University, Jinan, China (December 22, 2018). I thank Nevia Dolcini (Macau), Ivan Ivanov (Shandong), and the participants and audiences in these events. In addition, I wish to thank two anonymous referees for this journal for their rigorous and helpful comments and for their fair and good spirited attitude.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Shani, I. Befuddling the mind: radical Enactivism (Hutto-Myin style) and the metaphysics of experience. Phenom Cogn Sci 20, 39–56 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09656-4
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09656-4