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International Capital Flows, Land Conversion and Wage Inequality in Poor Countries

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Abstract

Conversion of land from agricultural to industrial use has met with strong opposition in many developing countries in recent times. A number of relevant papers study welfare effects associated with willful conversion, no conversion or politically forced and manipulated conversion of land into other activities. No study, however, deals with the evolving skilled-unskilled wage gap consequent upon full or partial convertibility of land in the short and the long run. This paper shows that in a multiple-commodity world with land as a crucial input both for agriculture and industry, an influx of capital for supporting industrial production must widen the skilled-to-unskilled wage gap. If the rate of conversion of land exceeds a critical value in the short-run, the wage gap rises. Even in the long run, possibility of full conversion can raise the wage gap if agriculture is—as is indeed the case—labor-intensive in developing countries. Showing the dependence of wage inequality on the degree to which land is convertible into other uses is the paper’s unique contribution to the literature.

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Notes

  1. Marjit and Kar (2013), building on Marjit and Kar (2005), show how increasing capital flows could in some cases lead to vanishing industries and a rise in inequality in both the north and the south.

  2. For example, in India, various state governments have been struggling to acquire land for industries and a crucial land bill has been in abeyance for a long time in the parliament with critical political resistance to private and public acquisition of land (see Sarkar 2007; Marjit 2010; Ghatak and Ghosh 2011, and Roy Chowdhury 2013)

  3. The data also includes heavily indebted poor countries (HIC), Latin American countries (LATAM), least developed countries (Least), Fragile and conflict affected countries (Fragile), Sub-Saharan Africa (SUBSAH), etc. The land use and agricultural value added as share of GDPgap are similar for most of these countries.

  4. Model structure used in this paper is also related to earlier works of Gruen and Corden (1970), Jones and Marjit (1985), Marjit and Beladi (1999) and Marjit (2003), which use elaborate 3 commodities & 3 factor models.

  5. However, it should be kept in mind that in many developing countries where land acquisition continues to remain controversial the role of service sector has also been substantial. For example, India’s formidable growth rate over the last decade and a half owe a lot to the service sector, which hardly required massive stretches of land. IT (information technology) related service industry often located in vertical structures (or ‘parks’), are highly dependent on relatively skilled work force and not so much on land. These are also the largest recipients of foreign capital. The overall contribution of the service sector in the GDP has overshadowed moderate to low contribution of the industrial sector in India.

  6. λT1 + λT2 = 1; even though the land types vary and so do their per unit returns, the total availability of land in the country is fixed, so the physical share of land used in sector 1 and sector 2 must add up to 1. If land as a whole could be expanded, it would have resolved some of the problems as raised above.

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Correspondence to Saibal Kar.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

$$ \hat{w}{\theta}_{L1}+{\hat{R}}_1{\theta}_{T1}=0 $$
(19)
$$ \hat{w}{\theta}_{L2}+{\hat{R}}_2{\theta}_{T2}=-\hat{r}{\theta}_{K2} $$
(20)
$$ {\lambda}_{L1}{\hat{a}}_{L1}+{\lambda}_{L2}{\hat{a}}_{L2}-{\lambda}_{L1}{\hat{a}}_{T1}=0 $$
(21)

(21) follows from differentiation of eq. (6)

Note: \( {\hat{T}}_1={\hat{T}}_2=0 \), also \( {\hat{a}}_{T2}=0 \) (by prior assumption).

Therefore, \( {\lambda}_{L1}\left({\hat{a}}_{L1}-{\hat{a}}_{T1}\right)+{\lambda}_{L2}{\hat{a}}_{L2}=0. \)

or, \( -{\sigma}_1{\lambda}_{L1}\left(\hat{w}-{\hat{R}}_1\right)-{\lambda}_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}\left(\hat{w}-\hat{r}\right)=0 \)

$$ -\hat{w}\left({\sigma}_1{\lambda}_{L1}+{\lambda}_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}\right)+{\lambda}_{L1}{\sigma}_1{\hat{R}}_1=-{\lambda}_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}\hat{r} $$

Substituting from (19) and solving

$$ \hat{w}=\frac{\lambda_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}}{\left({\sigma}_1{\lambda}_{L1}+{\lambda}_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}\right)}\hat{r} $$
(22)

Note that, as

$$ \hat{r}<0,\hat{w}<0 $$
(23)

Appendix 2

With μ > 0 we can redo the calculations and get to (24).

$$ -\hat{w}\left(\frac{\sigma_1{\lambda}_{L1}}{\theta_{T1}}+{\lambda}_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}\right)-\left(\mu |\lambda |\frac{\theta_{L1}}{\theta_{T1}}-\mu |\lambda |\frac{\theta_{L2}}{\theta_{T2}}\right)=\hat{r}\left({\lambda}_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}+\mu |\lambda |\frac{\theta_{L2}}{\theta_{T2}}\right) $$

where, |λ| = (λL1λT2 − λT1λL2)

or,

$$ \hat{w}=\frac{\hat{r}\left[\mu \left|\lambda \right|\frac{\theta_{K2}}{\theta_{T2}}+{\lambda}_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}\right]}{\frac{\lambda_{L1}{\sigma}_1}{\theta_{T1}}+{\lambda}_{L2}{\sigma}_2\frac{\theta_{K2}}{1-{\theta}_{T2}}+\frac{\mu \left|\lambda \right|}{\theta_{T1}}\frac{\left|\theta \right|}{\theta_{T2}}} $$
(24)

Divide both numerator and denominator by μ.

Thus, when

$$ \mu \to \infty, \hat{w}=\hat{r}{\theta}_{K2}\frac{\theta_{T1}}{\mid \theta \mid }>\hat{r}{\theta}_{K2,\kern0.75em \mathrm{since}}\kern0.2em \hat{r}<0. $$
(25)
Fig. 2
figure 2

Graph Showing Agricultural Land as percentage of Land Area

Notations for Figures 2 and 3:

East Asia & Pacific (excluding high income) – EAP-XHY

Europe & Central Asia (excluding high income) – ECA-XHY

Fragile and conflict affected situations - Fragile

Heavily indebted poor countries - (HIPC)

Latin America & Caribbean (excluding high income) –LAC-XHY

Least developed countries: UN classification - LDC

Low income - LY

Lower middle income - LMY

Middle East & North Africa (excluding high income) MENA-XHY

Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high income) - SSA-XHY

Fig. 3
figure 3

Country Group-wise Agricultural Value added as percentage of GDP

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Marjit, S., Kar, S. International Capital Flows, Land Conversion and Wage Inequality in Poor Countries. Open Econ Rev 30, 933–945 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-019-09548-4

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