Abstract
The literature concerning the possibility and desirability of using new pharmacological and possible future genetic techniques to enhance human characteristics is well-established and the debates follow some well-known argumentative patterns. However, one argument in particular stands out and demands attention. This is the attempt to tie the moral necessity of moral enhancement to the hypothesised risks that allowing cognitive enhancement will bring. According to Persson and Savulescu, cognitive enhancement should occur only if the risks they think it to poses are mitigated by moral enhancement. By this they mean the compulsory and universal amplification of the disposition of altruism and the inflation of our sense of fairness, by chemical and/or genetic means. Their claim is important, intriguing and unsettling. This paper focuses on three central, but relatively neglected, features of their argument. First, there is a pernicious ambiguity in the language of ‘risk’ used by Persson and Savulescu where they tend to conflate ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’. Second, their use of the lottery analogy to render their position more plausible is unconvincing. It tends to distort rather than illuminate the relevant considerations. Third, Persson and Savulescu do not adequately take into account the social and individual benefits that enhancing cognition could have. If they did, it would be apparent that those benefits alone would outweigh the considerations used to justify accompanying CE with ME.
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Notes
For a survey of that general debate see Harris (2007). For a rather different treatment of many of the same issues see Häyry (2010). For a discussion of the argumentative patterns of the debate over cognitive enhancement see Gunson (2009). Objections to cognition enhancing techniques range from: the primary focus on safety; that they will become normalised and people will feel forced to use them; that they raise issues to do with social justice; that they are a distraction and waste of resources that could be better deployed elsewhere. On the other side are the supporters of genetic and pharmacological means to boosting cognition. The most common view being that the mixture of the demands of personal autonomy and the intrinsic benefits enhanced cognition can bring, far outweigh the negatives. See Harris (2007).
Since the original paper appeared there has been a lot written about this matter, and their arguments have been subject to a lot of critical scrutiny (Douglas 2011; Harris 2011, 2012). For example, they have been criticised for the diminished role of freewill (Harris) and the role of altering moral dispositions in all this, rather than enhancement in terms of better motives for action (Douglas). P&S’s position has also shifted in response to the discussions. However, one thing remains constant between the 2008 and 2010 papers: their wholesale championing of widespread –possibly globally compulsory moral enhancement. In their later paper they advance an argument that only partly relies on the argument of the 2008 paper. The earlier paper argued the case for moral enhancement mainly on the basis of it being a way of preventing mass murder. The later paper suggests that moral enhancement is still required for this reason, but also for other purposes such as allowing us to adapt to the social conditions of the 21st century, and also enhancing our ability to care for strangers. It is the connection between the cognitive and moral that we object to here; a connection that P&S still support.
Two such drugs are Ritalin and Modafinil. See Glannon (2006).
Connemann et al. (2003).
Guan et al. (2009).
See Farah et al. (2004).
Thus, on this account, there is equivalence between a low probability of a great harm and a high probability of a slight one (See Rid et al. (2010) for a discussion).
Rossi and Nelson (2012) raise the question: is there an objective way to compare research risks? They suggest that there are philosophical problems in answering the question in the affirmative. They write:
A large amount of psychological research going back decades illustrates that most persons' evaluations of risk are also sensitive to whether a risk is catastrophic in nature; voluntarily assumed or involuntarily imposed; dreaded or not; known or unknown; fairly or unfairly distributed. It has also been argued that risk involves an implication of moral responsibility and therefore that not all probabilities of harm ought to be considered risks. (p. 426)
For further discussion of the general issues raised, see Lewens (2007) especially pp. 1–35.
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Gunson, D., McLachlan, H. Risk, Russian-roulette and lotteries: Persson and Savulescu on moral enhancement. Med Health Care and Philos 16, 877–884 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-012-9461-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-012-9461-1