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Beyond intersubjectivism: common mind and the multipolar structure of sociality after Husserl

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Abstract

This article aims to examine sociality’s multipolar and intentional structure beyond an inter-subjectivist perspective; beyond the view that the social world consists of only subjects and their interaction.

The article is divided into four sections. First, I present Benoist’s critique of mainstream inter-subjectivist accounts of phenomenology. Second, I introduce Husserl’s concept of Gemeingeist and provide a preliminary definition of it as a “substrate of habits.” Third, I focus on the sociological and ontological sources of Benoist’s critique, specifically Descombes’ reassessment of Hartmann’s distinction between objective and objectified mind. Finally, I revise my preliminary Husserlian definition of “common mind” drawing both from the distinction between objective and objectified mind and Benoist’s account of habituation as a two-sided correlative phenomenon.

Although he often tends to phrase his account in intersubjectivist terms, Husserl’s phenomenology offers valuable tools to address the multipolar structure of sociality, which does not only consist of subjects in their interactions, but foremost, in the way the human mind is embedded in institutions and extended in a range of objects that bear social meaning and that guide and bind human life to an extent that is unique among social animals.

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Notes

  1. See Husserl (1973a 1973b 1973c) and Kjosavik, C. Beyer, C. Fricke (2019).

  2. See Depraz (1995); Steinbock (1995); Zahavi (1996a).

  3. It is important to stress that Gemeingeist (and not personhood or intersubjectivity) is the category that according to Husserl defines the ontological region of sociality and culture.

  4. Benoist (2001, p. 29).

  5. Benoist (2001, p. 26).

  6. Benoist (2001, p. 27).

  7. Sartre developed a dialectical perspective on the concept of the Third in his last work, see Sartre (2004).

  8. Benoist (2001, p. 26).

  9. Note that a similar critique of Husserl can also be found in Schütz, Kaufmann, and, more recently, Schmid (Schütz 1953, 1957; Kaufmann 1944; Schmid 2005, p. 136 f.), and in Hartmann against Scheler (Hartmann 1933, p. 263). Benoist’s critique of Husserl’s concept of “personality of higher order” does not conceal his fascination with the Meinongian formal ontology behind it (on this concept see Caminada 2011, 2016, and 2019a, pp. 281–284). Nevertheless, he contests its application to the social, whereby he misunderstands it as the general concept of Husserl’s social ontology. This concept actually delimits, for Husserl, only a subset domain of the general concept Gemeingeist.

  10. Benoist (2001, p. 27).

  11. See Benoist (2005, p. 237).

  12. See Benoist (2001, 28). Note that the final sentence allows for a more ontologically-laden translation: “il [le social] prend sa consistance propre” could be translated as “it gains its own consistency,” or even “its ontological thickness,” “weight,” or even “substance.”

  13. See Husserl (1952a), p. 236 ff.).

  14. Husserl (1952a), p. 197). English translation modified (Husserl 1998, p. 207).

  15. Husserl (1952a), p. 197). See Benoist (2001, 30). According to Descombes, even Merleau-Ponty, who is better acquainted with sociology, would tend to confuse “the objectivity ascribed to objective mind […] with the materiality of the equipment and tools that remain after the disappearance of those who used them.” Descombes (2014, p. 286 f.). I am quoting from the English translation of the French original (Descombes 1996) to which Benoist is referring.

  16. Descombes (2014, p. 287); Benoist (2001, p. 30).

  17. Surprisingly, neither Descombes nor Benoist refer to Berger’s and Luckmann’s seminal work The social construction of reality (1966), possibly because they consider it in the shadow of Alfred Schutz’s methodological individualism. It is striking that the German phenomenological tradition—with the exception of Scheler and the above-mentioned Berger and Luckmann–tends to overlook the sociological dimension and operates through the concept of “objective mind” in order to understand “historicity,” rather than society. On the contrary, French phenomenology—with the exception of Levinas—was keen to engage with (Marxist) sociology and (structuralist) anthropology from the outset (see Feron 2022). Renewed interest in this line of inquiry was ignited by Bernhard Waldenfels’ philosophical encounter with French phenomenology and by scholars who were inspired by his account (such as Thomas Bedorf, Iris Därmann, or Burkhard Liebsch). On the concept of the “third” in sociology see Fischer (2022).

  18. Benoist (2001, p. 31).

  19. Benoist (2001, p. 31). We should note that the orientating function of objects through their reproduction of social and power structures is–through Merleau-Ponty–one of the foci of contemporary critical phenomenology, e.g., Ahmed (2006).

  20. Similarly, Husserl advocates for the irreducibility of the signs of language to thought, an irreducible objectivity that is a necessary condition of communication, in the First Logical Investigation. Benoist (2001, p. 33).

  21. Merleau-Ponty (1964a), p. 113 fn).

  22. Merleau-Ponty (1960, pp. 140–141).

  23. Benoist (2005, p. 232).

  24. Perreau (2012, p. 361).

  25. Although the concept has been addressed by Schuhmann (1989) and Schmid (2005) I consider their egological, collectivistic and atomistic interpretation to be erroneous, see Caminada (2011a) 2016).

  26. See Caminada(2019a, Chapt. 7; 2019b).

  27. See Caminada(forthcoming).

  28. Husserl (1968, p. 539); see Zahavi (1996b).

  29. Caminada(2019a, p. 145 ff.).

  30. See Caminada(2019a, Chapt. 4 and 5).

  31. Husserl (1952b), p. 63).

  32. Husserl (1973, p. 218).

  33. Husserl (2008, p. 385).

  34. As we will see in detail in the following paragraph, there is a complex ontological dependence that we need to take into account. Cultural objects are dependent upon social subjects, but at the same time constituted personalities are constrained by cultural objectifications.

  35. Pettit (1996).

  36. As suggested by Bassenge (1930).

  37. Basic forms of intentionality may be theoretically possible without socialization, but this holds only for abstract, non-concrete forms of constitution, see Caminada (2022).

  38. Defining reason in close connection with evidence, I claim that the experience of evidence can only occur in individual minds, however socialized. I developed this argument inCaminada (2011b, 2016, 2019a, pp. 351–352).

  39. We might note that Husserl struggled with the distinction between intentional “act” and “hexis.” Husserl finally concludes that enduring opinions persist in the habitual unity of a thesis (Satz) even though he was initially reluctant to use the concept of habitus, fearing conflations between psychological dispositions ruled by association on the one hand, and personal convictions based on rational insights that establish a normative space of reason on the other, see Caminada (2019a), Chapt. 10, pp. 266–333) and Caminada (forthcoming).

  40. Against Schuhmann’s (1988) and Schmid’s (2005) interpretations.

  41. See Husserl (1973, p. 200).

  42. A personality of higher order is a normative, rational point of view, as Rovane would say (Rovane 1998, Caminada 2015), established by a unitary founding act of will or love on corresponding founding acts of individual subjects. Husserl’s concept of “personality of higher order” is a particular kind of complex “object of higher order.” An object of higher order is characterised by a bilateral unitary foundation between parts and wholes, and by the emergence of novel properties that are mutually founded upon the founding and the founded elements (cf. Caminada and Summa 2015, pp. 7–9). In the case of higher order personality, the founded level can only be a personality, never a person, because it does not have the capacity of actualisation on its own. It is not a “centre of acts,” but a space of reason founded by a unitary act, sedimented in a habit and based on such a habit of individuals and their, and only their, capacity to re-actualise this space of reason in new acts. The founding and re-actualising acts of the unitary will are only a part of the acts of the volitional sphere of the individuals and of the corresponding habits. On this concept, seeCaminada (2011a, b, 2016, 2019a, pp. 281–284).

  43. In my previous publications focused on the concept of Gemeingeist (2019a and 2019b), I have mainly focused on its subjective side.

  44. Aron (1961, p. 72).

  45. As we will see in the following section, Hartmann conflates Dilthey’s terminology and equates “common mind” with “objective mind.”

  46. Descombes (2014, pp. 293–294).

  47. Descombes (2014, p. 294). On the idea of the concrete presence of the social in the mind, see Rochat (2009) and Caminada (2014).

  48. Hartmann (1933, pp. 170–171).

  49. Hartmann (1933, p. 67).

  50. Hartmann (1933, p. 62).

  51. Hartmann (1933, p. 165).

  52. Hartmann (1933, p. 166).

  53. Hartmann (1933, p. 178).

  54. See Hartmann (1925) and Hartmann (1943).

  55. Hartmann (1933, p. 248).

  56. Hartmann (1933, p. 190).

  57. Hartmann (1933, p. 219).

  58. Hartmann (1933, p. 248).

  59. We might note that superposition’s dependence is a kind of unilateral foundation. In the case of the common mind, Hartmann tries to express a bilateral foundation by combining both forms of ontological dependence in a way that seems to approximate Husserl’s second kind of unitary foundation. On Husserl’s mostly overlooked definition of bilateral unitary foundation, see Caminada and Summa (2015). On the formalization of Husserl’s concept of common mind, according to his own account of bilateral unitary foundation, see Caminada (2016).

  60. Hartmann (1933, p. 262). Although he does not express it clearly, it seems that the person, as subjective mind, superforms the psychic category of consciousness.

  61. Hartmann (1933, p. 260).

  62. Hartmann (1933, p. 249).

  63. Hartmann (1933, p. 274).

  64. Hartmann (1933, p. 274).

  65. Hartmann (1933, p. 351).

  66. Hartmann (1933, p. 356).

  67. Hartmann (1933, p. 348).

  68. Hartmann (1933, p. 466). Merleau-Ponty claims that the philosophical relevance that Husserl attributes to Gemeingeist consists of the fact that “it gives to [the philosopher] the communication of subjects to think about.” Note that, the English translation’s “the problem of intersubjective communication” (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, p. 106) adds the terms “problem” and “intersubjective,” thereby giving an intersubjectivist interpretation to Merleau-Ponty’s “communication des sujets” (Merleau-Ponty 1960, p. 133).

  69. More provocatively, Bruno Latour has recently claimed that human sociality is not distinguished according to its intersubjective complexity, which is not superior to that of baboons, but in terms of its constitutive dependence upon meaningful material objects: “humans have organized their social relations by making the detour through matter” (Latour 2010, 61).

  70. Hartmann (1933, p. 178).

  71. Husserl (1952a)>, p. 333), see Caminada(2019a, 195 f.).

  72. See (Begout 2010, p. 265 ff.).

  73. Begout (2010, p. 271fn).

  74. Following Hartmann’s distinction: habitus corresponds to individual mind, habits to objective mind and habitualities to objectified mind.

  75. Habitūs, with a long “u” (ū) is the plural of the Latin term habitus.

  76. Begout (2010, p. 270).

  77. Begout 2010, p. 285).

  78. Begout (2010, p. 285).

  79. Begout (2010, p. 287).

  80. Husserl (1987, p. 63).

  81. Benoist (2005, p. 236).

  82. Both Begout (2005) and Ahmed (2006) independently resort to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of orientation to connect Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s insight in a phenomenological framework.

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    Emanuele Caminada

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Caminada, E. Beyond intersubjectivism: common mind and the multipolar structure of sociality after Husserl. Cont Philos Rev 56, 379–400 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-023-09616-0

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