Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Ownership concentration, contestability, family firms, and capital structure

  • Published:
Journal of Management & Governance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This study analyses the distribution of power among the several blockholders of a firm and the identity of those blockholders as a determinant of firm leverage. Using a sample of 694 firms from 12 Western European countries, our results support a negative relationship between ownership concentration in the hands of the main blockholder and firm leverage. Moreover, we detect that the presence of a second and third large shareholder (beyond the first blockholder) has a significant positive effect on the leverage ratio. In addition, the results show that contestability in family firms plays a more relevant role. Finally, we show that family firms do have significant impact on firm leverage level, and this impact varies depending on the legal framework and institutional environment. In our main sample the results show family firms negatively affect market leverage, supporting the theory that family firms are more averse to an increase in the debt level due to the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress as a result of having an under-diversified portfolio. In contrast, the opposite effect is found in the sample that excludes the United Kingdom. This last result cannot be explained by agency theory, given that family businesses are those that suffer less from Type I agency problems. This result suggests either some difficulty in financing their investments by issuing new equity or the need to use debt as a signal of the quality of its investments. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This relationship between dividends and leverage appears to be robust to different contexts (Michaely and Vincent 2012).

  2. A negative relation between debt and dividends indicates that both are used as substitute monitoring mechanisms (Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009).

  3. Specifically, “TOP 1.5 million module” of AMADEUS, which comprises the largest 1.5 million corporations that operate in the Eastern and Western European regions. The merits of this database as well as its complementary OSIRIS are measured by their increasing use in research of corporate governance (Lins et al. 2012, Franks et al., 2012, among others).

  4. The Ownership Database (AMADEUS) intends to track control relationships rather than patrimonial relationships. This is why, when there are two categories of shares split into Voting/Non-voting shares, the percentages that are recorded are those attached to the category of voting shares.

  5. The AMADEUS and OSIRIS data report the percentage of direct and/or indirect ownership of each shareholder. A direct link indicates that company ‘A’ owns a certain percentage of company ‘B’, while an indirect link means that company ‘A’ owns company ‘B’ through company ‘C’. AMADEUS traces control by first calculating voting rights but not cash-flow rights. A shareholder is defined as ‘large’ if direct and indirect voting rights sum to 10 % or more (Maury and Pajuste 2005; Laeven and Levine 2008; Jara-Bertin et al. 2008; Attig et al. 2009).

  6. After analyzing the univariate statistics of the voting rights for the latter group of observations we can affirm that there is a very large probability that they are not the ultimate owners (mean = 49.23, median = 47.10; first quartile = 34.10 and the fourth quartile = 62.50 %). Data not reported in any table.

  7. Because country analysis would produce biased results where there are significant differences in the number of observations by country, and following Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011) and Alves and Ferreira (2011), we decide to focus on groups of countries with the same legal system (Common-law origin; German origin; Scandinavian origin; French origin).

  8. As can be seen, our evidence does not confirm Margaritis and Psillaki’s (2010) results for French firms. Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) found that in general firms with more concentrated ownership carry more debt in their capital structure. We could speculate that as the OLS methodology does not consider the problems arising from reverse causality between ownership concentration and debt. It may just happen that the blockholder seek more indebted companies once the same level of participation provides greater control in managing them.

References

  • Agrawal, A., & Nasser, T. (2011). Corporate financial and investment policies in the presence of a Blockholder on the Board. Presented at the 2011 ALEA-Columbia.

  • Ali, A., Chen, T. Y., & Radhakrishnan, S. (2007). Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, 238–286.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alves, P. F., & Ferreira, M. A. (2011). Capital structure and law around the world. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 21, 119–150.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ampenberger, M., Schmid, T., Ann-Kristin, A., & Kaserer, C. (2011). Capital structure decisions in family firms—Empirical evidence from a bank-based economy. Review of Managerial Science. doi:10.1007/s11846-011-0077-2.

  • Anderson, R., Mansi, S., & Reeb, D. (2003). Founding family ownership and the agency costs of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 263–285.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003a). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301–1328.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003b). Founding-family ownership, corporate diversification, and firm leverage. Journal of Law and Economics, 46(2), 653–684.

    Google Scholar 

  • Andres, C. (2008). Large shareholders and firm performance: An empirical examination of founding-family ownership. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(4), 431–445.

    Google Scholar 

  • Antoniou, A., Guney, Y., & Paudyal, K. (2008). The determinants of capital structure: Capital market-oriented versus bank-oriented institutions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(1), 59–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application of employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error component models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aslan, H., & Kumar, P. (2012). Strategic ownership structure and the cost of debt. The Review of Financial Studies, 25(7), 2257–2299.

    Google Scholar 

  • Attig, N., El Ghoul, S., & Guedhami, O. (2009). Do multiple large shareholders play a corporate governance role? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Financial Research, 32(4), 395–422.

    Google Scholar 

  • Attig, N., Guedhami, O., & Mishra, D. (2008). Multiple large shareholders, control contests and implied cost of equity. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 721–737.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barclay, M. J., & Smith, C. W. (1995). The maturity structure of corporate debt. Journal of Finance, 50, 609–631.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barucci, E., & Mattesini, F. (2008). Bank shareholding and lending: Complementarity or substitution? Some evidence from a panel of large Italian firms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(10), 2237–2247.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennedsen, M., & Wolfenzon, D. (2000). The balance of power in closely held corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1–2), 113–139.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berger, P., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. (1997). Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. Journal of Finance, 52(4), 1411–1437.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berger, A., & Udell, G. (1998). The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(6/8), 613–673.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berkovitch, E., & Israel, R. (1996). The design of internal control and capital structure. Review of Financial Studies, 9(1), 209–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bloch, F., & Hege, U. (2001). Multiple large shareholders and control contests. Working Paper, Aix-Marseille University.

  • Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and comment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143.

    Google Scholar 

  • Booth, L., Varouj, A., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2001). Capital structures in developing countries. Journal of Finance, 56(1), 87–130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradley, M., Jarrel, G. A., & Kim, E. H. (1984). On the existence of an optimal capital structure: Theory and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 39(3), 857–880.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brailsford, T. J., Oliver, B. R., & Pua, S. L. (2002). On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 42(1), 1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bruslerie, H., & Latrous, I. (2012). Ownership structure and debt leverage: Empirical test of a trade-off hypothesis on French firms. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 22(4), 111–130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burkart, M., & Panunzi, F. (2006). Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 15, 1–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chittenden, F., Hall, G., & Hutchinson, P. (1996). Small firm growth access to capital markets and financial Structure: Review of issues and an empirical investigation. Journal of Small Business Economics, 8(1), 59–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1–2), 81–112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Croci, E., Doukas, J. A., & Gonenc, H. (2011). Family control and financing decisions. European Financial Management, 17(5), 860–897.

    Google Scholar 

  • D’Mello, R., & Miranda, M. (2010). Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34, 324–335.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Jong, A., Rezaul, K., & Nguyen, T. T. (2008). Capital structure around the world: The roles of firm-and country-specific determinants. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(9), 1954–1969.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeAngelo, H., & Masulis, R. (1980). Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, 8, 3–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeAngelo, H., & Roll, R. (2011). How stable are corporate capital structures? SSRN Working Paper.

  • Demirgüc-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (1996). Stock market development and financing choices of firms. World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 341–369.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, D. W. (1989). Reputation acquisition in debt markets. Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), 828–862.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doukas, J., & Pantzalis, C. (2003). Geographic diversification and agency costs of debt of multinational firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, 59–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 537–600.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edmans, A., & Manso, G. (2011). Governance through trading and intervention: A theory of multiple blockholders. Review of Financial Studies, 24(7), 2395–2428.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellul, A. (2011). Control motivations and capital structure decisions. The Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organizations (CGIO) academic conference, August 25th and 26th, NUS Business School, Singapore.

  • Elsas, R., & Florysiak, D. (2011). Heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. International Review of Finance, 11, 181–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Esperança, J. P., Ana, P. M. G., & Mohamed, A. G. (2003). Corporate debt policy of small firms: An empirical (re)examination. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 10(1), 62–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3), 365–395.

    Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., Lang, L. H., & Young, L. (2001). Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review, 91, 54–78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., Marchica, M. T., & Roberto Mura, R. (2011). Large shareholder diversification and corporate risk-taking. Review of Financial Studies, 24, 3601–3641.

    Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., & Masulis, R. (2005). The choice of financing methods in european mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1345–1388.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2002). Testing tradeoff and pecking order predictions about dividends and debt. The Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), 1–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. F., & Miller, M. (1972). The theory of finance. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flannery, M., & Rangan, K. (2006). Partial adjustment toward target capital structures. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(3), 469–506.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank, M., & Goyal, V. (2003). Testing the pecking order theory of capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 67, 217–248.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Capital structure decisions: Which factors are reliably important? Financial Management, 38(1), 1–37.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Volpin, P. (2012). The life cycle of family ownership: International evidence. Review of Financial Studies, 25(6), 1675–1712.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friend, I., & Lang, L. (1988). An empirical test of the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate capital structure. Journal of Finance, 43(2), 271–281.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaud, P., Jani, E., Hoesli, M., & Bender, A. (2005). The capital structure of Swiss companies: An empirical analysis using dynamic panel data. European Financial Management, 11(1), 51–69.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gomes, A., & Novaes, W. (2006). Sharing of control versus monitoring as corporate governance mechanisms. Washington University in St. Louis. Working paper.

  • Graham, J. R. (2000). How big are the tax benefits of debt? Journal of Finance, 55(5), 1901–1941.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gungoraydinoglu, A., & Öztekin, Ö. (2011). Firm-and country-level determinants of corporate leverage: Some new international evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1457–1474.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haas, R., & Peeters, M. (2006). The dynamic adjustment towards target capital structure of firms in transition economies. Economics of Transition, 14(1), 133–169.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanousek, J., & Shamshur, A. (2011). A stubborn persistence: Is the stability of leverage ratios determined by the stability of the economy? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1360–1376.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1990). Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt. Journal of Finance, 45(2), 321–349.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1991). The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance, 46, 297–356.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirsch, J., & Walz, U. (2011). Financing decisions along a firm’s life-cycle: Debt as a commitment device. European Financial Management, 17(5), 898–927.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jara-Bertin, M., López-Iturriaga, F. J., & López-de-Foronda, Ó. (2008). The contest to the control in European family companies: How other shareholders affect company value. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(3), 146–159.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2), 323–329.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jiao, Y. (2010). Stakeholder welfare and firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(10), 2549–2561.

    Google Scholar 

  • King, M. R., & Santor, E. (2008). Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital structure of Canadian firms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(11), 2423–2432.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klock, M. S., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2005). Does corporate governance matter to bondholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40(4), 693–719.

    Google Scholar 

  • Konijn, S., Kräussl, R., & Lucas, A. (2011). Blockholder dispersion and firm value. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), 1330–1339.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113–1150.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2008). Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. Review of Financial Studies, 21(2), 579–604.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leary, M., & Roberts, M. (2010). The pecking order, debt capacity, and information asymmetry. Journal of Financial Economics, 95(3), 332–355.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leland, H., & Pyle, H. (1977). Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371–387.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lemmon, M. L., Roberts, M. R., & Zender, J. F. (2008). Back to the beginning: Persistence and the cross-section of corporate capital structure. Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1575–1608.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., & Xuan, Y. (2011). Ownership structure and the cost of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(1), 1–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lins, K. V., Volpin, P., & Wagner, H. F. (2012). Does family control matter? International evidence from the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Working paper.

  • MacKay, P., & Phillips, G. (2005). How does industry affect firm financial structure? Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), 1432–1466.

    Google Scholar 

  • Margaritis, D., & Psillaki, M. (2010). Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(3), 621–632.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masulis, R., Pham, P., & Zein, J. (2011). Family business groups around the world: Costs and benefits of pyramids. Review of Financial Studies, 24(11), 3556–3600.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(2), 321–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maury, B., & Pajuste, A. (2005). Multiple controlling shareholders and firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(7), 1813–1834.

    Google Scholar 

  • Michaely, R., & Vincent, C. (2012). Do institutional investors influence capital structure decisions? SSRN working paper.

  • Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H., & Cannella, A. A. (2007). Are family firms really superior performers? Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 829–858.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mishra, D. R. (2011). Multiple large shareholders and corporate risk taking: Evidence from East Asia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(6), 507–528.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mishra, C. S., & McConaughy, D. L. (1999). Founding family control and capital structure: The risk of loss of control and the aversion to debt. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23(4), 53–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. American Economic Review, 48(3), 261–297.

    Google Scholar 

  • Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A correction. American economic Review, 53(3), 433–443.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moh’d, M., Perry, L., & Rimbey, J. (1998). The impact of ownership structure on corporate debt policy: A time-series cross-sectional analysis. Financial Review, 33(3), 85–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myers, S. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147–175.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myers, S. C. (1984). The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance, 39(3), 575–592.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myers, S. (2001). Capital structure. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 81–102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187–221.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pagano, M., & Roëll, A. (1998). The choice of stock ownership structure: Agency costs, monitoring, and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 187–225.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paligorova, T., & Xu, Z. (2012). Complex ownership and capital structure. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4), 701–716.

    Google Scholar 

  • Petersen, M., & Rajan, R. G. (1994). The benefits of lending relation-ships: Evidence from small business data. The Journal of Finance, 49(1), 3–37.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pindado, J., Requejo, I., & de la Torre, C. (2012). Do family firms use dividend policy as a governance mechanism? Evidence from the Euro zone. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(5), 413–431.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1–2), 237–265.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421–1460.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roodman, D. (2009). A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 71(1), 135–158.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rozeff, M. S., (1982). Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios. Journal of Financial Research, 5(3), 249–259.

    Google Scholar 

  • Santos, M. S., Moreira, A. C., & Vieira, E. S. (2012). Governance with complex structures: Evidence from Western European countries. Luso-Spanish Conference, University of Trás-os-Montes and Alto Douro, Vila Real, Portugal, 1 to 3 of February.

  • Schmid, T. (2013). Control considerations, creditor monitoring, and the capital structure of family firms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(2), 257–272.

    Google Scholar 

  • Setia-Atmaja, L., Tanewski, G. A., & Skully, M. (2009). The role of dividends, debt, and board structure in the governance of family controlled firms. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 36, 863–898.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461–488.

    Google Scholar 

  • Short, H., Keasey, K., & Duxbury, D. (2002). Capital structure, management ownership and large external shareholders: A UK analysis. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 9(3), 375–399.

    Google Scholar 

  • Silva, F., & Majluf, N. (2008). Does family ownership shape performance out-comes? Journal of Business Research, 61(6), 609–614.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, C. W., & Warner, J. B. (1979). On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2), 117–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, J. C. (1989). Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 655–669.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stulz, R. (1988). Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 25–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stulz, R. (2005). Limits of financial globalization. Journal of Finance, 60(4), 1595–1638.

    Google Scholar 

  • Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. Journal of Finance, 43(1), 1–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, management and control affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385–418.

    Google Scholar 

  • Windmeijer, F. (2005). A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126(1), 25–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and dynamics of corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105, 581–606.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winton, A. (1993). Limitation of liability and the ownership structure of the company. Journal of Finance, 48(2), 487–512.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zeckhauser, R. J., & Pound, J. (1990). Are large shareholders effective monitors? An investigation of share ownership and corporate performance. In R. G. Hubbard (Ed.), Asymmetric information, corporate finance and investment (pp. 149–180). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zwiebel, J. (1995). Block investment and partial benefits of corporate control. Review of Economic Studies, 62(2), 161–185.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IPC—Instituto Politécnico de Coimbra, Avenida Doutor Marnoco Sousa, 3000-252, Coimbra, Portugal

    Mário Sacramento Santos

  2. GOVCOPP, DEGEI, University of Aveiro, Campus Universitário de Santiago, Aveiro, 3810-193, Portugal

    António Carrizo Moreira

  3. GOVCOPP, ISCA, University of Aveiro, Campus Universitário de Santiago, 3810-193, Aveiro, Portugal

    Elisabete Simões Vieira

Authors
  1. Mário Sacramento Santos
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. António Carrizo Moreira
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Elisabete Simões Vieira
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to António Carrizo Moreira.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Santos, M.S., Moreira, A.C. & Vieira, E.S. Ownership concentration, contestability, family firms, and capital structure. J Manag Gov 18, 1063–1107 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-013-9272-7

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-013-9272-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation