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Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Acting on One’s Own

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Abstract

Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) have famously served as counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). The fine-grained version of the flicker defense has become one of the most popular responses to FSCs. Proponents of this defense argue that there is an alternative available to all agents in FSCs such that the cases do not show that PAP is false. Specifically, the agents could have done otherwise than decide on their own, and this available alternative is robust enough to ground moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that, when relying on definitions of ‘on one’s own’ within the literature on FSCs, a case can be constructed in which the agent could not have done otherwise than make a decision on his own. Insofar as this new case is successful, it will be able to avoid arguments about robustness while showing that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities of the type argued for by proponents of the fine-grained version of the flicker defense.

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Notes

  1. The term “flickers of freedom” originated from Fischer (1994: 137–147).

  2. See Widerker (1995), Kane (1996), and Ginet (1996) for this objection to prior sign Frankfurt cases.

  3. Capes and Swenson (2017: 968, fn. 1) focus on the Mele and Robb case because, as they say, “we think that they have the best chance of avoiding various difficulties often thought to plague other Frankfurt cases.”

  4. This type of objection originated from van Inwagen (1978: 224, fn. 24) and Naylor (1984).

  5. A few of the most recent examples can be found in O’Connor (2000), Speak (2002), Timpe (2006), Robinson (2012, 2019), Capes (2014), and Capes and Swenson (2017).

  6. This version is discussed by Timpe (2006), Robinson (2012, 2019), Capes (2014), and Capes and Swenson (2017).

  7. Capes and Swenson (2017: 969) and Mele (2006: 95) make similar points.

  8. Where Robinson differs with Capes and Swenson is that Robinson argues the agent in an FSC is basically responsible for deciding on her own and derivatively responsible for deciding, while Capes and Swenson argue that the agent is only responsible for deciding on her own and not responsible for deciding because she could have avoided the former but not the latter.

  9. Capes and Swenson (2017: 968) endorse a very similar version of PAP, though theirs is phrased in terms of avoiding the act. Mele (2006: 86) also proposes a version of PAP that is focused on direct responsibility in response to a drunk driver case.

  10. Robinson (2012: 189, 2019: 216) argues that this is the relevant ability to do otherwise.

  11. See Robinson (2012, 2019) and Capes and Swenson (2017) for a more detailed response to Fischer.

  12. Stump (1999: 317) suggests a case of this kind is possible.

  13. Though Gary’s case is a fictional one, there are types of biofeedback where patients can learn to control what would otherwise be involuntary functions in the body, such as their heart rate. In neurofeedback, a type of biofeedback, patients can learn to control certain brainwaves, and this is similar to what Gary can do to a fantastic degree. See Hammond (2007) for more on neurofeedback. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify how D is produced.

  14. The mechanism is intended to work the same as the mechanism in the Mele and Robb case. Just as P in the Mele and Robb case will cause Bob to decide at t2 to steal the car, unless Bob decides on his own at t2 to steal the car, D in the Gary case will cause him to decide at t2 to take his wife out to dinner, unless his decision is produced by his indeterministic deliberation at t2. See Mele and Robb (1998: 103–106) for a more detailed explanation of the mechanism.

  15. Since my case is modeled after the Mele and Robb (1998) case, it is susceptible to a few non-flicker related objections. Perhaps the most contentious point is whether it is possible for the indeterministic process to preempt the deterministic process if both were to hit a “decision node” in the brain simultaneously. They defend their case from this objection and others in Mele and Robb (2003). The same type of preemption they argue for is defended in Schaffer (2000) and Lewis (2000).

  16. Naylor (1984: 251), Fischer (1994: 139), and McKenna (1997: 75) discuss it in this manner.

  17. Capes and Swenson (2017: 969) offer a similar definition.

  18. The former example is from Mele (2006: 7), who also defends the idea that agents can have control in deterministic worlds, while the latter example is from Naylor (1984: 251–252).

  19. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify both Widerker’s position and my response.

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Acknowledgements

For helpful comments on this paper, I want to thank Al Mele, Sam Sims, Jay Spitzley, and an anonymous referee for this journal.

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Correspondence to Bradford Stockdale.

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Stockdale, B. Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Acting on One’s Own. J Ethics 26, 27–40 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-020-09353-z

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