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When Do We Share Moral Norms?

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Notes

  1. See Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concepts and Contexts (Peterborough, Canada: Broadview Press, 2002), pp. 156–161; see also Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), ch. 3.

  2. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), ch. 4; see also Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999), ch. 10.

  3. See Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 285; see also Hans Küng, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (London: SCM Press, 1997), and Sissela Bok, Common Values (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1995).

  4. See Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); see also Bernard Gert, Common Morality: Deciding What to Do (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

  5. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000); see also, Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 9, no. 3, 1980; Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Walzer, “Nation and Universe,” in Grethe B. Peterson, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 11 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990); Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994); “Response,” in David Miller and Walzer, eds., Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Walzer, “Beyond Humanitarian Intervention – Human Rights in Global Society,” in Walzer, Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, ed. Miller (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007).

  6. Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 6.

  7. See Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism.

  8. Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 3.

  9. See John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 14, no. 3, 1985; see also Rawls, “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,” New York University Law Review vol. 64, no. 2, 1989; Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies vol. 7, no. 1, 1987; Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).

  10. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 32.

  11. See Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly vol. 29, no. 2, 2007.

  12. See Neil Levy, “Descriptive Relativism: Assessing the Evidence,” Journal of Value Inquiry vol. 37, no. 2, 2003.

  13. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, op. cit., p. 171.

  14. See Sen, op. cit., pp. 231–238; see also James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 139; Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, pp. 94–98; and Barry, op. cit., p. 285.

  15. See Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit., pp. 16–19 & 388.

  16. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 32.

  17. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 13.

  18. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, op. cit., p. 193.

  19. Ibid., p. 194.

  20. Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” p. 19.

  21. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 141.

  22. See ibid., p. xviii.

  23. Ibid., p. 145.

  24. Ibid.

  25. Ibid., p. 146.

  26. See Walzer, Thick and Thin, pp. 9–10.

  27. Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 47, 1973–1974.

  28. I would like to thank Bo Petersson and Lena Halldenius for constructive comments on an early draft of this article. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees and Thomas Magnell, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry, for helpful comments and suggestions.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Kungshuset, Lundagård, 222 22, Lund, Sweden

    Marcus Agnafors

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Agnafors, M. When Do We Share Moral Norms?. J Value Inquiry 46, 303–315 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9343-z

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