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Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality

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Abstract

Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of attentionality and intentionality can benefit both approaches to attention. After reviewing Husserl’s position on attentionality and intentionality, this paper examines multistable phenomena, redefines the attentional transformation called restructuring, discusses disciplinary perspectives on attention and gives an example using common ground.

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Notes

  1. Sokolowski (1981) credits phenomenology with “critically reestablishing” the connectedness, designated by the concept of intentionality, that ancient philosophy took for granted and modern philosophy disrupted. In addition, a number of contemporary scholars have continued a tradition of commentary from early and mid-twentieth century interpreters of Husserl, articulating intentionality with additional precision and relevance.

  2. In 1929, Gurwitsch (1966: 202, 205, 218, 222, 266) was one of the first to critique this spotlight metaphor of attention. It is still a popular metaphor among attention researchers, along with zoom-lens, window, and channel. See a contemporary critique in LaBerge (1995).

  3. Gurwitsch wants to restrict the role of the ego in attending more than Husserl does in his post-Logical Investigations works. For the ego as central and permanent see, for example, Husserl, Ideas I (1982: §§57, 80, 122) and Experience and Judgment (1973: §17). For critique, see Gurwitsch (1966: 215; 288–289), and Gurwitsch (1980: 17–18). For more in-depth comparisons of Gurwitsch and Husserl see Arvidson (2006).

  4. Gurwitsch (1966: 179, 204, 214 f.) identifies theme and thematic context as correlates of Husserl’s differentiation between being “primarily concerned” with something versus being “incidentally concerned,” and correlates the temporal immediacy of Husserl’s “holding in grasp” (“im Griffe haben”) with the spatial immediacy of a theme presenting itself within a context (Husserl 1982: §35, §84), “maintaining in grasp” (“noch im Griffe behalten”) with thematic context (Gurwitsch 1966: 235), and “release from grasp” (“aus dem Griff entlassen”) with the margin for Gurwitsch (1964: 350 f.).

  5. See also Marder (2009), Steinbock (2004), Waldenfels (2004), Ryan (1977).

  6. In this study we are concerned with attention along the noematic line of intentional analysis in order to make the most of common ground between phenomenology and psychology of attention, and so noetic non-attentional intentionality is not emphasized.

  7. See Depraz et al. (2003).

  8. In contrast to Husserl’s Ideas I (1982: §44, 96) concept of a distinctive or “normal” appearance among the multiple adumbrations of an identical thing, Gurwitsch has in mind a distinction within each appearance. “We, however, have in view here privileged constituents of every particular appearance. Every appearance, even if it is itself not a characteristic one, has constituents which are characteristic of it” (1966: 190, footnote). Gurwitsch’s distinction between formed and formative constituents is not a distinction, for example, between how a house characteristically appears, with a façade and a back, but between privileged constituents and less emphasized constituents in any appearance of the house.

  9. Repko (2012: 101) defines disciplinary perspective as “a discipline’s view of reality in a general sense which embraces and in turn reflects the ensemble of its defining elements that include phenomena, epistemology, assumptions, concepts, theory, and methods”.

  10. “The thematic field is the horizon opened up with respect to the theme” (Gurwitsch 1966: 210).

  11. In articulating the thematic field, Gurwitsch is inspired by James’s ideas of fringe, object of thought, and experience of context (Gurwitsch 1964: 7, 307–325). Within this narrative, Gurwitsch’s example for introducing the positional index is a proposition “Columbus discovered America in 1492” drawn from James’s Principles of Psychology. An anonymous referee has encouraged noting this difference between the visual index discussed in psychology and Gurwitsch’s propositional example. Although Gurwitsch does not use a visual example for positional index, he extends the notion to account for any theme in a thematic field: “In other words, what we call positional index proves to have noematic status: it concerns what is experienced rather than the fact of its actually being experienced. Above (1964: 179) we noted Husserl’s distinction between the central noematic nucleus and noematic characters, and we mentioned his insistence upon the invariance of the noematic nucleus in the face of variations occurring in the characters. Husserl’s distinction has been extended to apply to contextual characters of propositions as well (1964: 327). We may still further extend and apply it to every case in which a theme appears in a thematic field. Taken for what it is in itself, the theme falls under Husserl’s concept of the central noematic nucleus, whereas whatever orientation and perspective the theme derives from its context, briefly, that comprised under the term positional index, proves to be a noematic character” (1964: 363; emphasis added). Because Gurwitsch uses a propositional example, he is not therefore restricted to propositions. Gurwitsch also shows that attentional transformations between theme and context are dynamic (e.g., 1966: 229–233), as would be the case in multiple object tracking. His various statements about positional index and theme are very broad, and in the widest range, a positional index becomes an existential index (1964: 381). The extension just quoted and the expansion to existential index shows Gurwitsch is concerned with more than just reasoning or conceptual understanding.

  12. In a related way, Gurwitsch follows the positional index section with one on field potentialities, describing how thematic field and margin present “potential themes” (1964: 365–370).

  13. Sharps and Martin (2002), Rawson and Kintsch (2002), Kambe et al. (2001); Repp and Thompson (2010).

  14. Compare Gurwitsch with Husserl (2001: 180) and Rensink (2001).

  15. For more on common ground, see Gallagher and Sørensen (2006). See also Repko (2012) for a general discussion of techniques for achieving common ground and integrating insights from disparate disciplines.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Seattle University, 901 12th Ave., Seattle, WA, 98122, USA

    P. Sven Arvidson

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Arvidson, P.S. Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality. Hum Stud 36, 199–216 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-012-9250-0

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