Abstract
This paper argues that morality is objective in a specific sense that accords with a broadly expressivist stance in metaethics. The paper also explains that although there is a kind of subjectivity in moral inquiry, the same holds for other kinds of normative inquiry, including epistemic and even scientific inquiry, and moreover that this kind of subjectivity is no threat to morality’s objectivity. The argument for the objectivity of morality draws strong parallels between ethics, epistemology, and science, but does not depend on equally strong parallels between ethics and mathematics. I argue that there is more to learn from a comparison between ethics and mathematics than I used to think, but the difference between the issues that come up in thinking about objectivity in ethics and those that come up in thinking about objectivity in mathematics is substantial, and we cannot carry over results from the philosophy of mathematics to the case of morality.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I was influenced to say this by Howard Nye, and in my view, it solves the problem of how to explain morality as a special province of normativity in general, a problem for which I had previously had only messy attempts at a solution. Nye himself, however, doesn’t think this solution is right without qualification.
Harsanyi’s classic articles in this vein are “Cardinal Utility” (1953) and “Cardinal Welfare” (1955). John Broome, in his commentary in Reconciling Our Aims on my argument, says the point I am making is different, and depends on a theorem that was familiar long before Harsanyi. I argue that my use of it is in the spirit of Harsanyi. In any case, my point remains that requirements of consistency can give us strong reasons to accept conclusions that initially seem implausible.
Scanlon (2014, Lecture 3), discusses expressivism and the tie between believed reasons and motivation in a way that allows one not to prefer what one concludes is preferable
References
Blackburn S (1985) Errors and the Phenomenology of Value. In: Honderich P (ed) Morality and Objectivity. Routledge, London
Brandt R (1954) Hopi Ethics. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL
D’Arms J, Jacobsen D (2000) Sentiment and Value. Ethics 110:722–748
Davidson D (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Ewing AC (1939) A Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good. Mind 48:1–22
Gibbard A (1982) Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice. In: French PA, Uehling Jr. TE, Wettstein HK (eds) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7:31-46
Gibbard A (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
Gibbard A (2007) Rational Credence and the Value of Truth. In: Gendler TS, Hawthorne J (eds) Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gibbard A (2008a) Reconciling Our Aims. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gibbard A (2008b) Horwich on Meaning. Mind 117:141–166
Gibbard A (2009) Evolving Moral Knowledge. The University of Kansas, Lawrence KS
Gibbard A (2012) Meaning and Normativity. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Glymour C, Scheines R, Spirtes P, Kelly K (1987) Discovering Causal Structure. Academic Press, New York
Harsanyi JC (1953) Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking. Journal of Political Economy 61:434–435
Harsanyi JC (1955) Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. Journal of Political Economy 63:309–321
Horwich P (1990) Truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Pearle J (2000) Causality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Quine WVO (1960) Word and Object. MIT Press, Cambridge MA
Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
Scanlon TM (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
Scanlon TM (2014) Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Sellars W (1963) Science, Perception, and Reality. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Schervish M (1989) A General Method for Comparing Probability Assessors. Annals of Statistics 17(4):1856–1879
Spencer H (1896) Principles of Ethics. D Appleton, New York
Tappenden J (2012) Fruitfulness as a Theme in the Philosophy of Mathematics. The Journal of Philosophy 109(1/2):204–219
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gibbard, A. Ethics and Science: Is Plausibility in the Eye of the Beholder?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 20, 737–749 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9818-x
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9818-x