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Horror Films and the Argument from Reactive Attitudes

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Abstract

Are horror films immoral? Gianluca Di Muzio argues that horror films of a certain kind are immoral because they undermine the reactive attitudes that are responsible for human agents being disposed to respond compassionately to instances of victimization. I begin with this argument as one instance of what I call the Argument from Reactive Attitudes (ARA), and I argue that Di Muzio’s attempt to identify what is morally suspect about horror films must be revised to provide the most persuasive interpretation of the ARA. I then argue that the ARA provides a compelling standard for evaluating the moral permissibility of creating and viewing horror films, yet I note that it is an exceedingly difficult practical task evaluating the risk that these films create for our reactive attitudes. My conclusion is that the ARA provides a useful way or orienting ourselves to the complicated details of evaluating the moral status of horror films.

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Notes

  1. Prominent work on pornography and degradation includes: (Longino 1980), (Dworkin 1981), (Hill 1987), (Langton 1993), and (MacKinnon 1993).

  2. See (Molitor and Sapolsky 1993) and (Welsh 2009). Philosophical analyses of misogyny in horror films include: (Freeland 1996a) and (Williams 1996).

  3. Examples I have in mind here include Saw (2004), Hostel (2005), Wolf Creek (2005), Frontier(s) (2007), Martyrs (2008) and The Human Centipede (2009). One might dispute that these films are genuinely more sadistic than some of their predecessors, like The Last House on the Left (1972), but it is clear that some kind of more recent trend is playing itself out when the term “torture-porn” gains common usage. In this respect, I do not think I am alone in observing that recent horror films have pushed the limits of what is considered disturbing and morally questionable. To quote director Karyn Kusama, “I watch the original “Texas Chain Saw Massacre” and it feels like a political art film in comparison to some of the stuff we’re seeing right now.” Quoted in (Orange 2009).

  4. This expressivist objection and the ARA are linked insofar as a willingness to express insensitive attitudes will coincide with a diminishment of one’s sympathetic capacities, but the former argument is independent of claims regarding reactive attitudes. To see this, consider the fact that a pile of mannequin limbs doused in ketchup may not damage our reactive attitudes if left on the doorstep as a campy Halloween decoration, yet it might still express an objectionable insensitivity toward those who have been affected by the kind of atrocity being simulated. I thank Margaret Cameron for this example.

  5. For arguments that viciousness need only involve taking pleasure in suffering without any further link to the generation of bad consequences, see (Slote 2001), (Hurka 2001) and (Calder 2007).

  6. I focus, for the sake of brevity, on sympathetic reactive attitudes, but horror films could affect others as well, e.g. appropriate resentment of perpetrators of violence, abstention from complacency in the face of violence against innocents, etc.

  7. This is not to deny the enduring controversy regarding the role of reactive attitudes in determining moral responsibility. To scratch the surface of this topic, see (McKenna and Russell 2008).

  8. Di Muzio notes this feature of his argument (2006: 284), but it is worth pointing out that it applies to the ARA more generally.

  9. I should note that not everyone considers this a safe assumption. In his discussion of Di Muzio, S. Evan Kreider (2008) objects to the claim that all ethical theories generate an interest in preventing the degradation of our sympathetic attitudes. He claims instead that contractarians will not be concerned with damaging their own capacity to respond sympathetically to suffering, that consequentialists cannot object to changes in reactive attitudes that do not influence behaviour, and that Kantians will consider feelings to be irrelevant as long as agents act out of respect for the moral law. Kreider, however, is not fairly assessing the emphasis advocates of these theories place on their practical application in realistic contexts. See for example: (Diggs 1981), (Railton 1984) and (Louden 1986).

  10. Di Muzio (2006: 291–2) notes that greater efforts should be made to limit children’s access to these films (though he is appropriately pessimistic about the practicality of this goal given the way they are distributed, recent advances in file sharing technology, etc.), but this is hardly a contentious recommendation.

  11. If the empirical hypothesis underwriting this precautionary attitude seems tenuous, consider the parallel presumption against viewing violent, degrading pornography. Imagine, for example, that an acquaintance casually mentions to you how often he takes pleasure in viewing overtly misogynist pornography in which women are subjected to sexual violence and routinely referred to as ‘sluts’, ‘bitches’, etc. You point out to this acquaintance that other types of sexually explicit material exist in which participants indulge in every fantasy imaginable within contexts of mutual respect rather than violent subordination. You even provide him with a (rather unusual) care package to make your point. The acquaintance, however, sees no point in even sampling these alternatives upon finding that your package contains no decisive empirical evidence that taking pleasure in misogynist pornography affects one’s attitudes toward women. You suggest that if these alternative options are available then it is not worth taking the risk that his attitudes toward women will be corrupted, but he maintains that decisive evidence would be required to establish that any such risk exists in the first place—that even if he would enjoy the alternatives, there is no reason to accept even the slightest burden of proof against taking pleasure in misogynist pornography until he has decisive evidence to the contrary. The resulting stalemate will divide readers according to the degree of certainty they require for a precautionary approach to be warranted, yet I hope it reveals that provisionally adopting a cautious approach to the impact of media on our reactive attitudes is at least not manifestly unreasonable.

  12. See, for example, (Sharrett 1984).

  13. For especially interesting accounts of the redeeming qualities found in horror films, see: (Nickel 2010) and (Walker 2010).

  14. This point is noted by Kreider (2008: 152).

  15. As it happens, I agree with Di Muzio that The Texas Chain Saw Massacre is morally objectionable, but I do not think this follows from the mere fact that it can be classified as a slasher film. In the social context of its initial release, the film’s notably detached depiction of such horrific, inexplicable violence carried the potential for reflection about the social acceptance of violence (and the widespread denial of the gratuitous violence occurring in South East Asia). It is therefore overly simplistic to write it off as a mere slasher film in Di Muzio’s terms. At the same time, the final dinner scenes invite viewers to take pleasure in the torture inflicted on Sally to such an extent that I think the film is, on the whole, irredeemable.

  16. I thank Anjan Chakravartty for a helpful discussion on this point.

  17. For the most influential discussion of the paradox of tragedy, see (Hume 1965: 29–37).

  18. See, for example, (Feagin 1992), (Neill 1992), (Gaut 1993), (Freeland 1995), (Shaw 1997), (Joyce 2000), (Hills 2003), and (Coplan 2004).

  19. In fact, as Robert Yanal (1991) argues, Hume’s original solution to the paradox is best interpreted as being grounded in compensation rather than a conversion from negative to positive sentiment.

  20. Interpretations of horror films grounded in psychoanalysis include: (Mulvey 1975), (Wood 2003) and Steven Jay Schneider’s edited volume, Horror Film and Psychoanalysis: Freud’s Worst Nightmare (2004). For discussions of catharsis in dramatic fiction, see: (Aristotle 1981) and (Scheff 1979).

  21. As quoted in the documentary The American Nightmare (2000). The full quote is: “Kids, who are in a much more chaotic state of mind and life than most adults remember or realize; they can go into [horror films] as kind of boot camps for the psyche, as I have said. Strengthening their egos, strengthening their sense of fortitude; just as a soldier comes, you know, from momma’s arms into the drill instructor’s gaze and ends up hardened, but feeling like he can survive battle. I think that’s, in a sense, what goes on with kids that go to scary movies.”

  22. I take this to be an empirical question that remains pressing no matter what explanation one provides for the appeal of horror. To scratch the surface of the literature on the desensitizing effects of media violence, see: (Felson 1996) and (Richmond and Wilson 2008).

  23. As Smuts puts the point: “what we desire from such art is to have experiences on the cheap—not life experience on the cheap, as one theory puts it, but experiences of strong emotional reactions. Art safely provides us the opportunity to have rich emotional experiences that are either impossible or far too risky to have in our daily lives.” (2007: 74) A similar point is made in (Gaut 1993).

  24. See also (Eaton 1982).

  25. As quoted in (Wray 2007).

  26. For a contrasting view, see (Morris 2010).

  27. As Kreider points out, the distinction runs parallel to Longino’s distinction between moral realism and pornography, where only the latter endorses degradation and violence against women. (2008: 154–55)

  28. I speak here of identification only in a broad sense, because, as much as the term is a helpful placeholder, I share Carroll’s (1990: 88–96) reservations about its aptness. See also (Freeland 1996b), (Coplan 2004: 146–147) and (Plantinga 2009).

  29. For example, the impressive cinematography in films like The Shining (1980) or, more recently, Let the Right One In (2008) can be said to invite an aesthetic appreciation of the violence depicted in these films, yet it is plausible to think that the victim-oriented perspective of The Shining and the commentary on early adolescent angst in Let the Right One In make up for the moral risk that each film generates. For further thoughts on the aesthetic properties of horror violence, see (Schneider 2003).

  30. For related discussions of viewers intermittently identifying with villains, see (Pinedo 1997) and (Smith 1999).

  31. See (Strick and Houston 1972).

  32. Consider Tarantino’s views on the violence in A Clockwork Orange: “I always thought Kubrick was a hypocrite, because his party line was, I’m not making a movie about violence, I’m making a movie against violence. And it’s just, like, get the fuck off. I know and you know your dick was hard the entire time you were shooting those first twenty minutes, you couldn’t keep it in your pants the entire time you were editing it and scoring it. You liked the rest of the movie, but you put up with the rest of the movie. You did it for those first twenty minutes. And if you don’t say you did you’re a fucking liar.” From (MacFarquhar 2003).

  33. In the case of horror films, the slip between author intention and the implications of a finished product is usually less a matter of moralistic aims gone wrong as it is a matter of inattention to the moral implications of film violence. Consider, for example, the regret expressed by Sam Raimi regarding the notorious rape scene in The Evil Dead (1981). Raimi notes that at nineteen his judgment was improperly attuned to what is reasonably interpreted as gratuitous. See The Incredibly Strange Film Show (Sept 2, 1988).

  34. See, for example, (Johnston 1995).

  35. For example, minimizing suffering is a useful way of orienting ourselves to deciding whether or not to eat meat at a certain restaurant, but applying this principle is made difficult by uncertainty about whether consumption of this meat will affect future orders from the supplier, whether the supplier is acquiring meat from farms that cause gratuitous suffering to non-human animals and whether eliminating demand for this type of meat will make groups of animals better or worse off. Similarly, respect for autonomy is a useful way of orienting ourselves to deciding whether or not to buy clothing from a certain store, but applying this principle involves uncertainty about whether this store is acquiring clothing from a source that uses unjust labour practices and whether eliminating demand for this product makes employees better or worse off.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Jason Anderson, Michael Anthony, James Billingsley, Margaret Cameron, Anjan Chakravartty, Sam Cowling, Scott Howard, Klaus Jahn, Leonard Kahn, Colin Macleod, Cameron Potter and James Young for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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    Scott Woodcock

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Woodcock, S. Horror Films and the Argument from Reactive Attitudes. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 16, 309–324 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9338-7

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