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The Impact of the European Emission Trading Scheme on Multiple Measures of Economic Performance

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Abstract

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has introduced a price for carbon, thus generating an additional cost for companies that are regulated by the scheme. The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effect of the EU ETS on firm-level economic performance. There is a growing body of empirical literature that investigates the effects of the EU ETS on firm economic performance, with mixed results. Differently from the previous literature, we test the effect of the EU ETS on a larger set of indicators of economic performance: employment, average wages, turnover, value added, markup, investment, labour productivity, total factor productivity and ROI. Our results, based on a large panel of European firms, provide a broad picture of the economic impact of the EU ETS in its first and second phases of implementation. Contrarily to the expectations, the EU ETS did not affect economic performance negatively. Results suggest that firms have reacted to the EU ETS by passing-through costs to their customers on the one hand and improving labour productivity on the other hand.

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Notes

  1. An ETS works in the following way: the regulator, at the beginning of the compliance period, allocates a number of emission allowances (or permits) to the regulated installations, thus setting a maximum cap for emissions. The installations then can trade the allowances according to their pollution needs: installations that need to pollute more will buy permits, whereas installations that need to pollute less will sell permits. At the end of each compliance period, participants to the scheme are required to surrender as much permits as their verified emissions. See the Partnership for Market Readiness and International Carbon Action Partnership (2016) for a recent review.

  2. Annex I of the Directive 2003/87/CE reports sectors covered by the scheme: energy-intensive industry sectors including oil refineries, steel works and production of iron, aluminium, metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids and bulk organic chemicals production of nitric, adipic, glyoxilic and glyoxylic acids, aluminium production; power and heat generation. Commercial aviation has been introduced starting from the second phase.

  3. Sector-specific thresholds are reported in Annex I of the Directive 2003/87/EC (and subsequent amendments). We just report two examples of sector-specific thresholds, which is combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW (except hazardous or municipal waste installations) and installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or secondary fusion), including continuous casting, with a capacity exceeding 2.5 tonnes per hour.

  4. When the identifier of the parent firm in the EU Transaction Log is missing, we match companies to EU ETS installations by means of firms’ name and address.

  5. Due to changing firm identifiers, we had to exclude those firms for which information on financial accounts was not consistent between the two releases in the overlapping years. This check leads us to exclude about 4.8% of firms.

  6. Imagine that firm A is the direct owner of an installation covered by the EU ETS. Firm A is part of a broader group of firms. More specifically, firm A is owned by firm B (intermediate owner) that, in turn, is owned by firm C (head of the group, ultimate owner). We expect the ETS to have its most direct impact on firm A. However, firm B and C may be indirectly influenced and may respond to the ETS as they control firm A. In our analysis, firm A is the treated firm, while firm B and C are removed from the analysis as they are not suitable counterfactual, being at least indirectly treated.

  7. Three EU countries entered the EU ETS after 2005: Bulgaria (2007), Romania (2007) and Croatia (2013). For the remaining excluded countries (Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta), no information was available for some of our outcome variables for all firms. Despite not being part of the EU28, three countries (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) participate to the EU ETS but only since 2008 and therefore are excluded from our analysis.

  8. “Grandfathering” is one of the possible methods of allocation of the pollution permits from the central authority to the emitters, at the beginning of the compliance period. Grandfathering consists in the free allocation of pollution permits, as opposed to auctioning of permits. Auctioning increases the stringency of the policy as it entails a net transfer of monetary resources from firms to the government. The rationale for grandfathering has been, indeed, to decrease the stringency of the policy in order to alleviate possible risks of completion losses.

  9. It is useful to summarize how we get to our final operative sample. We initially linked 5093 manufacturing EU ETS installations to 3503 firms in our 19 European countries (Table 1). By excluding those firms for which no information on any of our outcome variables is available, we reduce our sample to 2798 EU ETS firms (4307 installations). We further excluded firms for which the primary NACE code does not belong to the manufacturing sector, leading to a sample of 2542 EU ETS firms (3756 installations). Then we selected firms with more than 10 employees (on average) and firms for which at least one of the outcome variables is observed at least once in each of our three relevant time windows (pre-treatment, first phase and second phase). Finally, we selected firms whose installations are always present in all the three time windows, we obtain our operative sample of 1636 firms (2667 installations).

  10. To estimate the propensity score, implement the matching algorithm and estimate standard errors as in Abadie and Imbens (2006) we employ the user-written STATA command psmatch2.

  11. Given that the yearly panel is unbalanced, variables were interpolated and extrapolated within the firm to obtain a balanced panel.

  12. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach for quantifying the impact on marginal cost. To compute the expected increase in marginal cost (for given physical output) we take the ratio (−1) of 1 plus the predicted relative increase in turnover for ETS firms and the predicted relative increase in markup for ETS firms. More specifically, we compute the following equation:

    $$\begin{aligned} \widehat{{\Delta }MC} \frac{e^{\widehat{{\beta }_{TURN}}}}{1 + \left( \beta _{MARKUP} /E\left( {Markup} \right) \right) }- 1. \end{aligned}$$
  13. Results for employment are confirmed when using total compensation paid to employees instead of the number of employees. The ’employment’ variable reported in the Amadeus database is sometimes estimated or interpolated rather than collected from administrative data. For this reason, it is useful to evaluate alternative proxies such as total compensation to employees. The EU ETS had no effect on total compensation paid to employees in the two phases, with point coefficients of −0.0157 in the first phase (p value 0.24) and −0.0061 in the second phase (p value 0.79). The point estimates are similar to the ones estimated for employment.

  14. Differences in outcome for entrant firms during Phase I have no influence on the assessment of the impact of the ETS on performance as these firms were not assigned to treatment in 2005–2007.

  15. GMM estimates of the production function and estimates of markup and TFP are performed with STATA building on the companion codes of the article by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).

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Correspondence to Claudia Pellegrin.

Appendix A: Estimation of Markup and Total Factor Productivity

Appendix A: Estimation of Markup and Total Factor Productivity

Market power is the ability of a firm to profitably raise the market price of a good or service over the marginal cost of production (i.e. in charging a markup on marginal costs). As discussed in De Loecker (2011), the empirical search for estimates of markup has mostly focused on estimating demand side components for markup. It has been noted, however, that the “demand approach” to markup is extremely demanding in terms of data requirement (consumers’ preferences, market prices, quantities sold and bought, information on production technology of firms, etc.) and is characterized by methodological difficulties when estimating demand elasticity and cross-elasticities.

De Loecker (2011) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) propose a “production approach” to recover firm-level and time-varying markup, starting from firm-level production data and the mild assumption of cost minimization. In presence of two types of production inputs—variable inputs that freely adjust in the short term (e.g. materials and labour) and dynamic inputs that can be considered fixed in the short term (e.g. fixed capital)—it is possible to derive a marginal cost function for the variable inputs for given levels of the dynamic inputs. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), by simply assuming cost minimization, derive the markup \(\mu _{it} \) for firm i in time t. The markup results then in being equivalent to the wedge between the elasticity of output with respect to the variable input (in their case, labour), \(\theta _{it}^L \), and the cost share over total revenues of the same input, \(\alpha _{it}^L \):

$$\begin{aligned} \mu _{it} =\theta _{it}^L /\alpha _{it}^L \end{aligned}$$
(A1)

The elasticity is calculated from estimates of the production function (starting from production data) under the only assumption of cost minimization, whereas cost share of labour can be retrieved directly from the P&L account of firms.

We recover estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to input by estimating sector-specific (capital letters of the NACE Rev. 2 classification, 2 capital letters for manufacturing sectors) translog production functions. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) suggest using a translog production function rather than a Cobb–Douglas production function to allow the elasticity to vary across firms, otherwise a constant elasticity for all firms would result in measures of markup that will solely depend on the cost share of employees. We estimate the following translog production function:

$$\begin{aligned} \log \left( {VA_{it} } \right)= & {} \gamma _{jt} +\phi _s +\beta ^{1}\log \left( {L_{it} } \right) +\beta ^{2}\left[ {\log \left( {\hbox {L}_{\hbox {it}} } \right) } \right] ^{2}+{\upbeta } ^{3}\log \left( {K_{it} } \right) +\beta ^{4}\left[ {\log \left( {K_{it} } \right) } \right] ^{2}\nonumber \\&+\,\beta ^{5}\log \left( {L_{it} } \right) \times \log \left( {K_{it} } \right) +\omega _{it} +\epsilon _{it} \end{aligned}$$
(A2)

where \(\log \left( {VA_{it} } \right) \) is the log of gross value added in euro for firm i in year \(t, \log \left( {L_{it} } \right) \) is the log of total employees, \(\log \left( {K_{it} } \right) \) is the log of total fixed assets in euro, \(\omega _{it} \) is total factor productivity and \(\epsilon _{it} \) is the idiosyncratic error term.

Table 14 Estimated elasticities of value added with respect to labour and capital and estimated markup (by sector, NACE rev 2)

To consistently estimate the production function as well as total factor productivity and the idiosyncratic error term (that is required for the calculation of the markup), we adopt the estimator proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2006). Following Ackerberg et al. (2006) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we first estimate a pooled OLS regression in which log value added is a non-parametric function of labour and capital. This is needed to retrieve the estimate of the idiosyncratic error from the production function. We then estimate with generalized method of moment the translog production function, where we use ’potential value added’ (partialled out of the idiosyncratic error component) as dependent variable and where we instrument the flexible input (labour), in all its interactions, with its lag. From this estimate, as a residual, we retrieve our measure of total factor productivity.Footnote 15

Following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), to estimate markup we first need to estimate firm-specific elasticity of value added with respect to labour is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \log \left( {VA_{it} } \right) }{\partial \log \left( {L_{it} } \right) }=\widehat{\theta }_{it}^L =\widehat{\beta ^{1}}+2\times \widehat{\beta ^{2}}\times \log \left( {L_{it} } \right) +\widehat{\beta ^{5}}\times \log \left( {K_{it} } \right) \end{aligned}$$
(A3)

As pointed out by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012, p. 2449), what we observe is not \(VA_{it} \) but \({\widetilde{VA_{it}} } =VA_{it} /\exp \left( \hat{\epsilon }_{it}\right) \) where \(\hat{\epsilon }_{it}\) is the idiosyncratic error term component of the production function. The share of labour costs over total revenues to be inserted into equation 1 therefore is (we refer to equation 16 of De Loecker and Warzynski 2012):

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\alpha } _{it}^L =\frac{P_{it}^L L_{it} }{VA_{it} /\hbox {exp}\left( \hat{\epsilon }_{it} \right) } \end{aligned}$$
(A4)

with \(P_{it}^L L_{it} \) being unitary labour cost, \(VA_{it} \) being total observed gross value added and \(\hat{\epsilon } _{it} \) being the idiosyncratic error term of the estimated production function.

Table 14 reports some descriptive statistics (by sector, NACE rev 2) about our estimates. We report average and median elasticities of value added with respect to, respectively, labour and capital, as well as average and median estimated markup.

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Marin, G., Marino, M. & Pellegrin, C. The Impact of the European Emission Trading Scheme on Multiple Measures of Economic Performance. Environ Resource Econ 71, 551–582 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0173-0

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