Abstract
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of a form of violence that represents a potential barrier to the development of a nonviolent criminology. Using several contentions drawn from Emile Durkheim’s theory of crime and punishment, it is proposed that persuasive arguments entail a component of violence where they contradict strong collective sentiments. The general nature and normality of this form of violence are outlined. In addition, it is suggested that although neglect of this violence may allow progressive researchers to maintain nonviolent self-conceptions, such neglect also may serve the interests of “intellectuals” while undermining the power of “nonintellectuals.” The violence of persuasive argument thus constitutes a problematic paradox for scholars who embrace nonviolence and equitable distributions of power.
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Notes
To avoid potential misunderstandings, the limits of this article need to be acknowledged. Specifically, it does not provide, and was never intended to provide, a complete overview of Durkheim’s theory of crime and punishment. We simply have selected a few of Durkheim’s more plausible arguments and have applied them in another context; indeed, at times we apply them in a way that may have been unacceptable to Durkheim.
Liazos credits Garver (in Rose 1969, p. 6) for this conception of violence.
This definition is implied in Pepinsky’s (1988, p. 546) description of “responsiveness.”
It may be claimed that we are “misusing” the concepts of “physical force” and “violence” and, therefore, the position taken in this article should be dismissed. However, it has never been demonstrated that the unconventional use of language is necessarily damaging in all or most instances, and there is reason to believe that it may help facilitate positive developments from time to time (see Feyerabend 1975; Rorty 1989). For example, some of the most interesting developments in criminology have been generated by critical criminologists who have “misused” the concept of crime (e.g., Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970; Quinney 1991; Reiman 1998).
Despite similarities among these concepts, they are not synonymous. Foucault (1980, pp. 118, 132–133) explicitly separates regimes of truth from ideologies. Likewise, Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence seems to have a distinctive emphasis. It refers to “gentle, hidden” forms of domination and exploitation including “the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety—in short, all the virtues honoured by the code of honour” (Bourdieu 1977, p. 192). Moreover, it “is only exerted through the communication in which it is disguised” (Bourdieu 1977, p. 237) and is “exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 167).
Violent arguments may of course take a third form where they cause suffering both indirectly and directly.
What changes through the process of social development are the collective sentiments protected by criminal law. As societies advance, “domestic,” “sexual,” “traditional,” and “religious” sentiments generally weaken, but at the same time collective sentiments concerning “the dignity of the human person” become stronger and “the individual becomes the object of a sort of religion” (Durkheim [1893] 1984, pp. 105–125).
Durkheim ([1893] 1984, pp. 53–54) also mentioned that there is “nothing very painful” about a conflict between “abstract ideas.” We interpret “abstract ideas” to mean ideas that are associated with relatively weak sentiments (or no sentiments at all) in that he contrasts them with “cherished beliefs” (the violation of which he implies can be painful) and refers to their “locus” as being “at one and the same time the most elevated and yet the most superficial area of the consciousness.”
Durkheim ([1893] 1984, p. 55) asserted that the opposition to a strong collective sentiment “rises to a peak” when “it asserts itself not only in words but deeds.” Yet, as just noted, he did not clearly separate words from deeds. In fact, not only did he imply that words entail action. He also implied that deeds, like words, can represent particular ideas or feelings.
Durkheim ([1893] 1984, p. 61) held that within each individual, there exists two different kinds of consciousness that are “solidly joined together”—a common consciousness that we internalize and which represents society and a personal consciousness comprised of unique sentiments that represent our “individual personality.” However, he also acknowledged that this two-part conception of human consciousness is not a complete description since “we form a part of several groups and there exist in us several collective consciousnesses” (Durkheim [1893] 1984, p. 67n).
Rorty (1989, p. 90) draws a distinction between redescription and argument. He implies that where a redescription is disguised “under the cover of argument,” it may not be very painful if, because of the argument, the people who are being redescribed see themselves as being educated and empowered. We accept this but wish to add that if the people being redescribed see themselves as being educated and disempowered, the argument could cause some pain.
Using the “language of physical injury” to describe “linguistic injuries” is not problematic; it may even be desirable. As noted above and elaborated more fully below, a representation, in the form of “words” or “deeds,” is a “force” that can affect us physically. Moreover, the practice of restricting the “language of physical injury” to cuts, bruises, broken bones, and other such injuries may be little more than a subtle way of concealing or discounting the actual harm of “linguistic injuries.” On this latter point, it may be useful to consider Orwell’s (1949) description of “Newspeak,” where he suggests that one way to control how we think and act is by reducing the meanings and use of words.
There is a fairly prominent body of legal literature that addresses the harms associated with hate speech as an aspect of the larger related problem of racism (see Matsuda et al. 1993). Evidence of direct psychological harms from hate speech continues to be reported in the literature (e.g., Landrine and Klonoff 1996; Boeckmann and Liew 2002; Leets 2002; Nielsen 2002). Moreover, hate speech has been related to higher rates of suicide among some groups (Mullen and Smyth 2004).
For readers who are tempted to conclude that our manuscript embraces an excessive degree of reductionism, we wish to emphasize several points. First, we are not suggesting that every social phenomenon is simply the sum of the individual parts that comprise it, that a social phenomenon can have no qualities beyond those which can be found in the biological constitution of individual human beings. Second, we are not suggesting that for any given effect there can be only one cause. In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim embraced this idea, but it is not our position; it is not one of the contentions we abstracted from Durkheim’s work. Third, our emphasis on the physical nature of persuasive arguments does not deny the significance of a broader social context, since the social context influences the form of the argument (e.g., by influencing language and scholarly norms) and the physical consequences (e.g., by influencing the content and strength of sentiments).
However, Durkheim ([1895] 1982) did suggest that certain crime rates may be pathological where they become exceptionally high or low in view of the social type in question.
Durkheim referred to this relationship as “indirect,” but his description as translated by Halls (see Durkheim [1895] 1982) and Solovay and Mueller (see Durkheim [1895] 1950) appears to be more consistent with a spurious relationship. In other words, it is not that crime creates opportunities to think and act in original ways and, subsequently, progressive changes in morality; rather opportunities to think and act in original ways entail occasions to commit criminal acts on the one hand and initiate progressive changes in morality on the other. Given this spurious relationship, criminal acts in themselves do not necessarily serve a social function; they are simply the side-effects of healthy social conditions. Moreover, Durkheim suggests that most criminal acts are of this nature. In his words, “…occasionally, but only occasionally, the criminal has been the harbinger of a morality to come” (Durkheim [1895] 1983, p. 96—emphasis in original).
Although we emphasize a segment of Durkheim’s functional reasoning (here and in a later section), we are not suggesting that he outlined an entirely consistent position on the relationship between causal and functional explanations.
In his description of the emotional nature of punishment, Durkheim ([1893] 1984, pp. 47–48) commented, “we need only observe how punishment operates in the law-courts to acknowledge that its motivating force is entirely emotional. For it is to the emotions that both prosecuting and defending counsel address themselves. The latter seeks to arouse sympathy for the guilty person, the former to stir up the social sentiments that have been offended by the criminal act…”
Implicit in Durkheim’s reasoning is another function of punishment. By reaffirming the importance and righteousness of a violated sentiment, punishment alleviates some of the social psychological distress that is created by its violation. It helps to restore a sense of well-being among the average members of society as it restores strength to the offended sentiment.
Where the sentiments of many people are offended, the mutual expression of contempt for the act can intensify the reaction (Durkheim [1893] 1984).
In view of this argument, Newman’s proposal to limit the use of imprisonment and utilize corporal punishment embraces a concern for human dignity.
Newman (1995, p. 4) refers to his book as an effort “to pursue an idea to its conclusion,” but also comments that it is a “polemic, intended to inflame and provoke…” Consequently, it may strike sentiments more openly and intensely than arguments created without this intent.
If intellectuals constitute a distinct social stratum, the popular conception of violence seemingly constitutes an important part of their particular ideology.
In his analysis of modern penality, Garland (1990) has suggested that disguised violence is often tolerated in modern societies, whereas blatant violence generally will not be tolerated.
Unlike Bourdieu’s (1977, p. 192) concept of “symbolic violence,” a form of violence “which is never recognized as such,” direct violent argument is not necessarily “gentle,” “chosen” (by the social agent upon whom it is exercised), or tied to “virtues honoured by the code of honour.”
See Foucault (1980) for a discussion of “subjugated knowledges.”
Another substantial weakness of Durkheim’s theory concerns his anthropological and historical descriptions which, for example, appear to exaggerate the predominance of criminal law in premodern societies. “His deficiencies in this respect,” to borrow Coser’s (1984, p. xxiii) words, “are glaring to the modern reader.”
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DiCristina, B., Gottschalk, M. The Violence of Persuasive Argument: Using Durkheim to Outline a Latent Barrier to a Nonviolent Criminology. Crit Crim 16, 17–38 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-007-9043-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-007-9043-3