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Fraudulent Financial Reporting and Technological Capability in the Information Technology Sector: A Resource-Based Perspective

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Abstract

Motivated by the disproportionately high incidence of fraudulent financial reporting in the IT sector where technological capability is a major source of competitive advantage, this study investigates the possible relationship between technological capability and fraud probability in the IT sector. Technological capability is measured by a firm’s technical efficiency relative to peers in transforming cumulative R&D resources into innovative output, which is a source of competitive advantage, according to the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. Technical efficiency is estimated via data envelopment analysis. A sample of fraud firms taken from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases is matched with control samples of non-fraud firms. Consistent with the RBV, technological capability is found to have a negative and economically significant effect on fraud probability. Moreover, fraud probability is insignificantly associated with the scale efficiency of innovative activities, as investment in R&D resources per se is not a source of sustainable competitive advantage.

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Notes

  1. For instance, Cyberkey Solution Inc. announced a fictitious USD24.5 million purchase order from the Department of Homeland Security in 2005 (SEC litigation release no. 20171). In another case, during 2000–2002, AOL Time Warner funded its own online advertising revenues by round tripping (SEC litigation release no. 19147).

  2. See, for example, US Code § 41 Credit for increasing research activities.

  3. Refer to Griliches (1990) for a comprehensive review of the use of patent statistics in past research.

  4. The sample excludes unsuccessful patent applications.

  5. A firm’s book value increases with retained earnings and asset appreciation. The market-to-book ratio thus indicates whether investors are paying more/less than what is left if the firm is liquidated.

  6. Managerial incentives can be alternatively measured by VEGA, which is the sensitivity of a CEO’s option-based wealth to the firm’s stock return volatility (Core and Guay 2002). However, data required for computing VEGA are no longer available from ExecuComp after 2005.

  7. In order for Rule 10(b)-5 to be invoked, an intentional fraud or deceit must be committed by the party charged with the violation.

  8. It turned out that the 17 fraud firms missing from the USPTO database also have observations missing from Compustat and ExecuComp.

  9. Those control firms missing from the USPTO database also have observations of other variables missing from Compustat and/or ExecuComp.

  10. Lucent Technologies Inc., a leading IT company, filed a total of 891 patents in 2000 and fraudulently reported USD 1.148 billion in revenue in the same year (SEC litigation release no. 18715).

  11. For instance, Lucent Technologies Inc.’s PAT-to-RND ratio was only 0.11 in 2000 when the company fraudulently reported its revenues.

  12. Using option value to measure the CEO’s option-based compensation yielded similar findings.

  13. TEVi,t = 0 if the firm has RNDi,t > 0 and PATi,t = 0 in year t.

  14. The same logic applies to stock prices that reflect the firm’s earnings power.

  15. In 2014, Apple, Google, Intel, and Adobe Systems paid USD 415 million to settle a lawsuit accusing them of conspiring to prevent hiring each other’s employees during 2005–2009.

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Acknowledgements

The work described in this article was financially supported by a PolyU Research Grant (grant number: GYBS4). The author is grateful to Prof. Steven Dellaportas (Editor) and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Michael K. Fung.

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Appendix

Appendix

DEA compares the relative efficiencies of “decision-making units (DMUs)” (e.g., firms) in using similar resources to generate similar output. The efficiency score of each DMU ranges from 0 to 1. The most efficient DMUs have an efficiency score of 1 which is the benchmark of “best practice” (i.e., the frontier) among peers. The lower a DMU’s efficiency score is below 1 (i.e., below the frontier), the more inefficient the DMU relative to the best practice.

Based on the work of Banker et al. (1984), Fare et al. (1994), and Ruggiero (1996, 1998), this study specifies an output-oriented DEA model controlled for exogenous technological progress as the following linear programming problem:

$$\begin{array}{*{20}l} {{\text{Max }}\theta_{h} } \hfill & {} \hfill \\ {{\text{Subject to}}:} \hfill & {Y\lambda \ge \theta_{h} PAT_{h} } \hfill \\ {} \hfill & {X\lambda \le RND_{h} } \hfill \\ {} \hfill & {\lambda j = \, 0{\text{ if }}t_{j} > t_{h} {\text{ for all }}j \ne h} \hfill \\ {} \hfill & {I_{N\prime } \lambda = \, 1} \hfill \\ {} \hfill & {\lambda \ge \, 0} \hfill \\ \end{array}$$

where 1 ≤ θh ≤ ∞; Y = (PAT1,…, PATN); X = (RND1,…, RNDN); t1,…, tN is the time trend capturing exogenous technological progress; λ is a N × 1 vector of weights; and IN is a N×1 vector of ones. By imposing the constraint of λj = 0 if tj > th for all jh, this model excludes observations with more advanced technologies (i.e., a more favorable environment) from the reference set (Ruggiero 1996, 1998). INλ = 1 imposes variable returns to scale (VRS) on the solution (Banker et al. 1984).

The interpretation of  ≥ θhPATh and  ≤ RNDh is as follows. Choose a weighted combination of all input observations () that uses at most the input observation under evaluation (RNDh) to produce the largest possible multiple of the output observation under evaluation (θhPATh). The input–output observation under evaluation is efficient if its output is best produced using its own input, i.e., one cannot find any λ that generates θh > 1. This efficient observation with θh = 1 defines a point on the frontier because its efficiency cannot be further improved relative to the other observations. If θh > 1, θh − 1 is the proportional increase in PATh without increasing RNDh. 1/θh therefore defines an efficiency score varying between 0 and 1.

The value of θ for each input–output observation can be obtained by solving the preceding linear programming problem N times. To separate scale efficiency from technical efficiency, the former can be calculated as the difference between θ and θ′, where θ′ is the solution without the VRS constraint.

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Fung, M.K. Fraudulent Financial Reporting and Technological Capability in the Information Technology Sector: A Resource-Based Perspective. J Bus Ethics 156, 577–589 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3605-4

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