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The bargaining set for almost-convex games

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Abstract

We generalize the well-known result of the coincidence of the bargaining set and the core for convex games (Maschler et al. 1972) to the class of games named almost-convex games, that is, coalitional games where all proper subgames are convex.

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Acknowledgements

Institutional support from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación and FEDER under grant ECO2011-22765, and Generalitat de Catalunya under grant 2009SGR0960 is acknowledged.

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Correspondence to Josep M. Izquierdo.

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Getán, J., Izquierdo, J.M., Montes, J. et al. The bargaining set for almost-convex games. Ann Oper Res 225, 83–89 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1226-y

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