Abstract.
We consider an economy with two agents, “firm” and “worker.” The firm owns a technology which transforms a single input into a single output and the worker owns a limited amount of input good, for example, leisure. The firm is interested in profit measured in terms of output and the worker's preferences are defined over the input-output space. Manipulability comes not only from a lack of information about the (worker's) preferences but also about the technology. With a possibility for manipulation, can we still obtain efficient allocations? We show that there is no allocation mechanism which is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial.
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Received: 30 March 1998/Accepted: 06 July 1999
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Shin, S., Suh, SC. Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 523–532 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050176
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050176