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Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: Some rules of the mean

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Abstract.

This paper studies by means of reciprocal fuzzy binary relations the aggregation of preferences when individuals show their preferences gradually. We have characterized neutral aggregation rules through functions from powers of the unit interval in the unit interval. Furthermore, we have determined the neutral aggregation rules that are decomposable and anonymous. In this class of rules, the collective intensity of preference is the arithmetic mean of the values assigned by a function to the individual intensities of preference. We have also considered the neutral aggregation rules based on quasiarithmetic means. We have established that this class of rules generalizes the simple majority, when individuals have ordinary preferences and collective preferences are reciprocal.

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Received: 23 April 1999/Accepted: 25 September 1999

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García-Lapresta, J., Llamazares, B. Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: Some rules of the mean. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 673–690 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000048

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000048

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