Abstract
Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.
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Feix, M.R., Lepelley, D., Merlin, V.R. et al. On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members. Soc Choice Welfare 28, 181–207 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0171-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0171-6