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The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union

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Fig. 1
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Notes

  1. It is worth noting that this happened despite the incredible privileges given to members of the commission. E.g., a member could not be sentenced to death whatever the crime.

  2. This democratic period in Russia did not last long–parliament was dismissed in 1908.

  3. These were the districts in which less than five members of the Constituent Assembly were to be elected.

  4. Perhaps the only exception is the work of Ostrogorski, where can be found the Ostrogorski paradox (see, e.g., [43]). Ostrogorski worked in Russia’s Ministry of Justice for many years, then left for Paris where he attended the School of Political Studies until 1885, after which he lived in Great Britain and the USA. On returning to Russia in 1906, he was elected to the Parliament as the member of Constitutional Democrats Party. Some scientists, however, would classify his work as political theory rather than social choice theory.

  5. In [23], this representation is called ‘decisive structure.’

  6. In the same period, Russian scientists produced many papers on the analysis and axiomatic characterisation of solutions in game theory, in particular bargaining problems (see, e.g., [62]). However, these belong rather to the history of game theory, and are not discussed here.

  7. Similar reasoning, with lower contour sets, was first presented by Maskin [33], using his Monotonicity condition.

  8. Cybernetics in Russia was another case. In 1949, this was also called a bourgeois science and many scientists, including for example Kolmogorov, ended their activities in the field. By way of comparison with the above account of Arrow's Theorem, I give just a short quotation [15]: “Cybernetics is a reactionary pseudo-science...”

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Maurice Salles for his kind invitation to participate in the Conference on the History of the Theory of Social Choice (October 1–3, Caen, France). I appreciate many suggestions by Professor Elena Yanovskaya who attracted my attention to the activity of some colleagues in the USSR in 1970s, and many helpful comments by Professor Hannu Nurmi. I am very thankful to Professors Richard Barrett and Maurice Salles who improved the text.

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  1. State University High School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow, 101990, Russia

    Fuad Aleskerov

  2. Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, 65 Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russia

    Fuad Aleskerov

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Aleskerov, F. The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union. Soc Choice Welfare 25, 419–431 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0011-0

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