Abstract
We provide a new axiomatization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution, which replaces the axiom of individual monotonicity by disagreement point monotonicity and a restricted version of Nash’s IIA.
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Rachmilevitch, S. A characterization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity. Int J Game Theory 40, 691–696 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0260-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0260-8