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On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium

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Abstract

Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable strategy vector implies the existence of an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies that is also expost stable. Through examples we demonstrate the ‘bounds obtained on the approximation’ are tight.

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Correspondence to Edward Cartwright.

Additional information

The main results of this paper first appeared in University of Warwick Department of Economics Discussion Paper #710. 2004.

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Cartwright, E., Wooders, M. On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium. Int J Game Theory 38, 127–136 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0149-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0149-y

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