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An Asymmetric Shapley–Shubik Power Index

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Abstract

This paper extends the traditional “pivoting” and “swing” schemes in the Shapley–Shubik (S-S) power index and the Banzhaf index to the case of “blocking”. Voters are divided into two groups: those who vote for the bill and those against the bill. The uncertainty of the division is described by a probability distribution. We derive the S-S power index, based on a priori ignorance about the random bipartition.

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Correspondence to Xingwei Hu.

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Hu, X. An Asymmetric Shapley–Shubik Power Index. Int J Game Theory 34, 229–240 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0011-z

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