Abstract
By taking into account factor market interactions, the theory of strategic trade policies can consistently explain the fact that less efficient countries offer greater export subsidies to the most technologically advanced industries because in these countries there may be greater differences in efficiency of production technology between industries than in more efficient countries.
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Tanaka, Y. The incentive for export subsidies under imperfect competition. Open Econ Rev 2, 275–284 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01886145
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01886145