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Climate policy and interest Groups—A Public choice analysis

  • Climate Policy
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Intereconomics

Abstract

Climate policy is particularly prone to the activities of interest groups. How have these shaped the development of policy targets and instruments?

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References

  1. See the seminal works of A. Downs: An economic theory of democracy, New York, 1957; J. Buchanan, G. Tullock: The calculus of consent, Ann Arbor, 1962; M. Olson: The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, Cambridge 1965; W. Niskanen: Bureaucracy and representative government, Chicago 1971.

  2. See e.g. K. Holzinger: Umweltpolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft am Beispiel der Pkw-Abgase, Berlin 1994.

  3. E.g. M. Zürn: Die Implementation internationaler Umweltregime und “positive Integration”, MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/3, Cologne 1996.

  4. For the EU level see A. Michaelowa: Impact of interest groups on EU climate policy, in: European Environment, Vol. 8, No. 5, 1998, p. 152–160.

  5. See the 24 country poll by R. Dunlap and A. Mertig: Weltweites Umweltbewußtsein, in: A. Diekmann, C. Jaeger (eds.): Umweltsoziologie, Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Cologne 1996, pp. 194–218; and the correlation of Green Party results with income in: Jens Horbach: Neue Politische Ökonomie und Umweltpolitik, Frankfurt 1992, p. 158.

  6. See M. Toman, M. Tebo, M. Pitcher: A summary of US positions on climate change policy, Washington 1997, p. 10.

  7. J. Krosnick and P. Visser; The impact of the fall 1997 debate about global warming on American public opinion, Washington 1998.

  8. See Greenpeace International: The climate time bomb, Signs of climate change from the Greenpeace database, Amsterdam, updated regularly.

  9. See e.g. European Round Table of Industrialists: The climate change debate: Seven principles for practical policies, Brussels 1994.

  10. Anonymous: Energy efficiency slips down boardroom agenda, in: ENDS Report 274, pp. 7–8.

  11. For links see The Corporate Planet: The weather gods—how industry blocks progress at Kyoto climate summit, 1997, URL: http://www.corporateplanet.org. For a typical site see American Petroleum Institute (URL: http://www.api.org/globalclimate.

  12. See leaked memo cited in Greenpeace International: The oil industry and climate change, Amsterdam 1998, p. 62ff.

  13. American Automobile Manufacturers Association: America's car companies react to outcome of Kyoto climate change negotiations, Washington 1997.

  14. See AFL-CIO Executive Council: Statement on UN Climate Change Negotiations, Washington, February 20, 1997.

  15. See Anonymous: Schmoldt: Die Ökosteuer gefährdet Arbeitsplätze, in: Handelsblatt, 23. 10. 1998.

  16. Ibid., See Anonymous: Schmodt: Die Ökosteuer gefährdet Arbeitsplätze, in: Handelsblatt, 23. 10. 1998.

  17. See the detailed report in Greenpeace International, op. cit., See Greenpeace International: The climate time bomb, Signs of climate change from the Greenpeace database, Amsterdam, updated regularly. p. 41 f.

  18. See Greenpeace International, op. cit., See Greenpeace International: The climate time bomb, Signs of climate change from the Greenpeace database, Amsterdam, updated regularly, pp. 43–49.

  19. They also try to make the emitters' lobies' action publicly transparent. See Greenpeace U.S.: Governments: the puppets of industry?, Washington 1997; and Greenpeace International, op. cit., See Greenpeace International: The climate time bomb, Signs of climate change from the Greenpeace database, Amsterdam, updated regularly.

  20. See the history of the debate in A. Michaelowa, S. Greiner: Public choice aspects of Joint Implementation, in: World Resources Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1996, pp. 231–252.

  21. See e.g. P. Bernstein and D. Montgomery: How much could Kyoto really cost? A reconstruction and reconcillation of administration estimates, Washington 1998.

  22. See e.g. Union of Concerned Scientists and Tellus Institute: A small price to pay, Cambridge 1998.

  23. C. Böhringer, J. Jensen and T. Rutherford: The costs of carbon abatement in six EU countries: implications of alternative baseline energy projections, 1997, URL: http:/www.gams.com/projects/dk/mobidk.htm.

  24. For a good overview of the negotiating process up to Rio see I. Mintzer, A. Leonard (eds.): Negotiating climate change, Cambridge 1994.

  25. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Climate Change 1995, The IPCC Synthesis, Geneva 1995.

  26. The 1996 report has three volumes of together more than 1800 pages: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change (vol. 1) Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change (vol. 2), The Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change (vol. 3), Cambridge 1996.

  27. S. Boehmer-Christiansen: A winning coalition of advocacy: climate research, bureaucracy and “alternative” fuels, in: Energy Policy, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1997, pp. 439–444 suggests that this is due to the wish to create higher research budgets.

  28. See J. Daley: The empire strikes back, URL: http://www.vision. net.au/~daley/empire.html, 31. 7. 1997.

  29. See E. Jochem, H. Herz, W. Mannsbart: Analyse und Diskussion der jüngsten Energiebedarfsprognosen für die großen Industrienationen im Hinblick auf die Vermeidung von Treibhausgasen, Bonn 1994.

  30. See the vivid account of the last dramatic scenes in Kyoto after 30 hours of non-stop negotiations in: Germanwatch: Verhandlungskrimi in Kyoto, Bonn 1998.

  31. See UNFCCC: Report of the Conference of the Parties on its first session, held at Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995, Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its first session, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add. 1, Geneva 1995.

  32. For an excellent compilation of NGO statements during the Kyoto Conference see A. Taalab: Voices against global warming, Frankfurt 1998.

  33. To give an idea of the type of argument: “The inclusion of legally binding targets on Annex 1 Parties will affect economic (trade) competitiveness—and contribute to the transfer (“flight”) of emissions, investments and jobs to countries where these restrictions or limits do not exist” (World Coal Institute: Climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, London 1998).

  34. Global Climate Coalition: Climate change: your passport to the facts, Washington 1995.

  35. A. Taalab, op. cit., Voices against global warming, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 42–47.

  36. Ibid., A. Taalab, Voices against global warming, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 57–97.

  37. See the papers of the Environmental Defense Fund lobbying hard for emissions trading, e.g. EDF: Cooperative mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol—the path forward, New York 1998.

  38. See for example the very well researched Greenpeace briefing papers such as Greenpeace: Kyoto Protocol—key issues, Amsterdam 1997.

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  1. Saint Cloud, France

    Axel Michaelowa

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Michaelowa, A. Climate policy and interest Groups—A Public choice analysis. Intereconomics 33, 251–259 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02929886

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