This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
J. Rawls,A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
Rawls's reliance on a Kantian subject is documented in M.J. Sandel,Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
See J. Rawls,Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
C. Taylor,Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
Hegel covers much of the same ground in the earlierPhenomenology of Mind, translated asThe Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). My reconstruction concentrates entirely on thePhilosophy of Mind account, although I believe that each throws light on the other.
References to the EncyclopediaPhilosophy of Mind 3rd ed. [1830] (E3) are given by paragraph number. R=remark to the paragraph. A=addition (Zusatz) to the paragraph by Bouwmann, compiled from various sets of students' lecture notes in 1840. G=Griesheim's lecture notes relevant to the paragraph, from the 1825 lecture course. K=Kehler's lecture notes relevant to the paragraph, from the same course. After the paragraph number I have given the page number of the English translation inHegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, 3 vols., ed. and tr. M.J. Petry (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978), which is a bilingual edition with Griesheim's and Kehler's lecture notes included as an appendix. For §§388–412 the pagination is from Petry's volume 2, and for §§413–482 from volume 3. Petry republished §§413–439, with Griesheim's and Kehler's lecture notes appended directly to the relevant paragraphs, asThe Berlin Phenomenology, ed. and tr. M.J. Petry (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981). I have modified all translations from Hegel's works.
“Particular” (besonder) in Hegel has the sense “part of”, whereas “singular” (einzeln) simply has the sense “individual”. See M. Inwood,A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 303.
Hegel uses two terms for “object”:das Objekt andder Gegenstand. Gegenstand literally means “standing-against”, and using it emphasises the idea of the object as what stands opposite to the subject. In quotations from Hegel I have translated both terms as “object”, and the corresponding adjectives as “objective”, but where the German word isGegenstand I have signalled this by adding “[g.]” to the translation.
Cited Petry, notes toThe Berlin Phenomenology, supra n.6 ed. and tr.. at 161. Hegel's note is attached to that paragraph which becomes §429 in the third edition of thePhilosophy of Mind.
Hegel's own phrase for this joint form of subjectivity is “relating [Verhalten] of one self-consciousness to another self-consciousness” (E3 428G, 329).
Hegel does not distinguish these two senses of freedom, or explain the transition from the first to the second. I have assumed that it must occur in desire.
The Germananerkennen generally means “recognise” in the sense of “publicly acknowledge as having a positive normative status”, rather than in the sense of “identify as an individual or as a member of a kind”. So the mere identification of an object as “another I” that occurs in related selfconsciousness does not count asAnerkennung, and Hegel does not use that term to describe it. See Inwood,supra n. 7,. at 245.
The Germanallgemein, translated here as “universal”, also means “general”, and elsewhere Hegel usesallgemeine Wille to translate Rousseau's “general will” (for example in thePhilosophy of Right at PR §258R, 277).
Here and above, I have translated Hegel'sGeist as “mind” rather than the more common ‘spirit”.
References to thePhilosophy of Right [1821] (PR) are given by paragraph number. R=remark to the paragraph. A=addition (Zusatz) to the paragraph compiled by Gans from various sets of student's lecture notes in 1833. After the paragraph number I have given the page number of the translation asElements of the Philosophy Right, ed. A.W. Wood, tr. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie [1818–31], 4 volumes, ed. K.-H. Ilting (Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1973-), vol 4, at 105. A version of this lecture note is included in thePhilosophy of Right (PR §4A, 35).
Supra n.3,Phenomenology of Mind, translated asThe Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), at 110.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Chitty, A. On hegel, the subject, and political justification. Res Publica 2, 181–203 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02340091
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02340091