Notes
John Rawls, “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,”Philosophical Review, 60: 177–79 (1951).
P. 59 of “A Remark on Good Reasons,”Philosophical Studies, 4:58–63 (1953).
The following situation may serve to illustrate this point. Tort's aunt is afflicted with dlypsitis (an imaginary disease whose principal feature is that pear juice is fatally poisonous to its victims). Both Tort and his poor aunt are quite unaware of her unforunate state. The aunt, being thirsty, asks Tort for a drink. Only orange and pear juice are available in the house. Tort hesitates for a moment. There is, of course, excellent reason why Tort should select the orange juice—the other ispear juice! Of this, Tort is perfectly aware. Yet, although there is a good reason—known to Tort—for selecting the orange juice, it cannot be said that Tort has a good reason for doing so. He knows the fact which is a reason without realizing its import.
P. 39 of “Proving a Moral Judgment,”Philosophical Studies, 4: 33–44 (1953).
E. D. Sprague, Jr., “A Note on Proving Moral Judgments,”Philosophical Studies, 5: 15–16 (1954).
P. 15 of “Good Reasons,”Philosophical Studies, 4:1–15 (1953). My italics.
P. 59 of “A Remark on Good Reasons.”
Although explicit use of “reasonableness” in place of “rationality” would make some of the assertions of Messrs. Baier and Terrell sound more prosaic, it would strengthen their arguments at several points. Thus Baier's position-would be less vulnerable to criticisms presented by D. Sachs (“On Mr. Baier's ‘Good Reasons’,”Philosophical Studies, 4: 65–69 (1953).
P. 560 of “The Rational versus the Reasonable,”Philosophical Review, 62: 554–60 (1953).
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Rescher, N. Reasonableness in ethics. Philos Stud 5, 58–62 (1954). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02223218
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02223218