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A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension

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Abstract

The yolk, developed in Ferejohn, McKelvey and Packel (1984) and McKelvey (1986), is a key solution concept in the Euclidean spatial model as the region of policies where a dynamic voting game will tend to reside. However, determining the yolk is NP-hard for arbitrary dimension. This paper derives an algorithm to compute the yolk in polynomial time for any fixed dimension.

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Research supported by a Presidential Young Investigator Award from the National Science Foundation (ECS-8451032), and a Senior Research Associateship from the National Research Council.

During the academic year 1990–1991.

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Tovey, C.A. A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension. Mathematical Programming 57, 259–277 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581084

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581084

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