Abstract
In the 1930's the Tennessee Valley Authority developed several methods to allocate the costs of multipurpose water projects. One of these methods is the alternate cost avoided method. This paper provides two characterizations of the alternate cost avoided method, one on a class of cost games with a fixed player set, the other on a class of cost games with a variable player set using a reduced game property.
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The author is indebted to P. Borm, T. Driessen, Y. Funaki, S. Tijs and J. Zarzuelo for helpful discussions and useful suggestions.
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Otten, GJ. Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method. ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research 38, 175–185 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01414213
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01414213