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The results of this essay I presented in a lecture July 2, 1980, at Berkeley in the 1980 Summer Institute on Phenomenology and Existentialism (“Continental and Analytic Perspectives on Intentionality”), sponsored by the Council for Philosophic Studies with aid from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
An earlier draft was written while I held a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship in 1979–1980.
For helpful comments on two earlier drafts, ca 1978 and 1979, I am grateful to Romane Clark, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Izchak Miller, and Peter Woodruff. And I thank Ronald McIntyre, qua editor of this issue, for helpful suggestions about the penultimate draft.
The present essay relates closely to Smith [1979] and Miller [1984], both of which argue for the “demonstrative” structure of perception, and McIntyre [1982], which poses a challenge that is hopefully answered here for the case of perception. A relation with Clark [1973] is evident in the text below. A similar view of perception re causation is found in Searle [1983]: see note 28 below. And a sophisticated, apparently contextualist account of perception has been developed in Barry Smith [forthcoming], which I have received as this paper is going to press.
The results here developed serve as a foundation for an intentionalist semantics or pragmatics for demonstratives that I have outlined in Smith [1981b] and [1982c].
I argue here that perceptual acquaintance does not depend on the external context of perception in the way a strong causal theory of perception holds. It should be observed at the onset, however, that I hold that perceptual acquaintance does depend in other ways on various external features of perception, on various types of “conditions of the possibility” of perception. See Smith [1982b].
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Smith, D.W. Content and context of perception. Synthese 61, 61–87 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485489
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485489