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An incompatible pair of subjunctive conditional modal axioms

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This paper was made possible by National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship No. FB-20706-81-1510 and a leave from Hamilton College; my thanks to both institutions for their support.

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Butcher, D. An incompatible pair of subjunctive conditional modal axioms. Philosophical Studies 44, 71–110 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353416

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