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The Nyāya proofs for the existence of the soul

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Notes and references

  1. The Nyāya term for presupposition in this sense is “Abhyupagama” (c.f. Appendix) But sometimes Uddyotakara thinks, like Russell, that The Self is so and so not only posits but asserts (says = Abhidhatte) that the self exists. [See Appendix P-3].

  2. See, Kusumānjali, 3rd Stavaka and the discussion thereof.

  3. See, Ātmatattva Viveka, 1st chapter, the relevant portion is translated by B. K. Matilal in his section on Udayana in “Nyāya Vaiśe\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s} \)ika” (A History of Indian Literature Series) Otto Harrassowitz, 1977, pp. 97–100.

  4. See Fellowship Lectures (Vol. II) 2nd Edition 1906, by C. K. Tarkālankāra P-87.

  5. E.g.: “My mother was barren”.

  6. E.g.: “I am silent or dumb”. Interestingly, enough, Hintikka thinks that for Descartes “I think” is a performatory certainty, because “I am not thinking”, perhaps - would be “Svakriyā Virodhī” - if stated consciously. Compare some one's saying “I am absent” - in a roll-call, which is Bernard Williams's illustration of self-refuting statement (Descartes, P-74) or Prior's illustration of somebody answering a phone-call by saying “I'm not here”.

  7. Thus Udayana at the beginning of the 3rd Chapter of the Ātmatattvaviveka “Asti täbadiha darśana-sparśanābhyāmekārtha Pratisandhāna\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \) tadidam (a) ekaikavi\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s} \)aya\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \) (b) Vā Syāt Samudāya Vi\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s} \)aya\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \) Vā, (c) tadatirikta Vastu vi\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s} \)aya\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s} \) Vā ... ”.

  8. Gautama does not usually speak of the possibility of a direct perception of the self. Later, of course, Uddyotakara - through Udayana and after him most Naiyāyikas admitted the possibility of a direct perception of the self. Apart from the case of a Yogic-meditation, of course, such perception is not an experience of the pure ego as such but is more like a logically presupposed component of our reflective after-cognition when it takes the form of the knowledge that I have known a jar. The Naiyāyika analyses it, like Russell (cf. Problem of philosophy, Chapter 5, on acquitance with the self) as a direct cognition of a complex object “my-cognition - of a jar” - where, as an elment, the self must also have been an object of cognition. Thus although the general Nyāya strategy is to infer the abiding self as the only explanation of our capacity to reidentify objects across the data of different senses (from the fact of “Pratisandhāna” or recognition) Uddyotakara speaks also of a separate “Ahamiti Vijñānam” which might be something like Kant's notion of the “I think” that accompanies all our representations (Critique of Pure Reason. B, 132).

  9. See, Bernard Williams, Descartes (Pelican, 1978), P-89.

  10. Strawson, Individuals P-95.

  11. See, S. V. Keeling - Descartes (Oxford, 1968), P-105.

  12. Ibid., pp. 105–106.

  13. Icchādayo Gu\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n} \)ah, gu\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n} \)āsca dravyasa\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \)sthānah, tad yade\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s} \)ā\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \) sthanam sa ātmā iti (N.S.B. 1/1/5).

  14. The official argument of Descartes admittedly fails the moment “I” is substituted by any non-first-person nominative.

  15. Except, that about pleasure and pain the Nyāya view is that they are objects of consciousness, not conscious states themselves. Vātsyāyana's analysis of Icchā shows that he thought memory and recognition as essential to it.

  16. Here, for the sake of example, we have to provisionally forget the Nyāya notion of the very inseparable relation between parts and their whole. Because the standard Nyāya theory would take the whole really as a completely new and distinct entity.

  17. “Varnānā\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \) Śrava\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n} \)a\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \) Kramena Samayasm\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{r} \)tyā tadarthagrahah. / Tatsamskārajam antyavar\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n} \)a kalanākale tadālocana\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \)/ Ākānk\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s} \)ādi nibandhanānvaya K\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{r} \)ta\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \) Vākyārtha Sampindana\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \) / / Jñātraikena Vinātidurgha\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t} \)amato Nityātma siddhir dhruva\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} \).”

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Chakravarti, A. The Nyāya proofs for the existence of the soul. J Indian Philos 10, 211–238 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00240665

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