Abstract
The nuclear balance of terror is examined from the perspective of utilitarian ethics. A superpower's decision about whether or not to practice nuclear deterrence against its rival is analyzed as a choice, under conditions of uncertainty, between (i) a smaller risk of bringing about a graver disaster for mankind (i.e., nuclear war), and (ii) a greater risk of bringing about a lesser disaster for mankind (i.e., domination by the rival superpower). It is argued that the expected utility and maximin principles cannot very plausibly be applied to problems with this structure, but that a novel principle of rational choice can be. This principle is defended, and is used to reach the conclusion that nuclear deterrence is, from the utilitarian viewpoint, permissible.
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A remote ancestor of this paper was presented to the Jacob Marschak Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences, at UCLA, in the spring of 1976. I am grateful to the members of that group, and to Robert M. Adams, for their helpful comments. My work was partly supported by a Regent's Faculty Research Fellowship from the University of California.
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Kavka, G.S. Deterrence, utility, and rational choice. Theor Decis 12, 41–60 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154657
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154657