Abstract
In order to maximize votes, incumbent politicians design and implement redistributional programs. These programs benefit some voters at the expense of others. In the simple two group (or tax payers and beneficiaries) case we identify the nature of vote maximizing transfer policies. This model's basic approach is shown to hold for multiple group models as well. Strategic implications for the organizers of sub groups of the population (or group leaders) are developed. Other extensions of the model are discussed.
qu]Where the budget is clever is in its detail. Each little measure is designed to hurt (but not too much) people who are not politically important, while tossing a bone to people who are. You can see this in a host of different ways.
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We are indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the US National Science Foundation for their generous support of this project. We would also like to thank Nuffield College, Oxford University for making its facilities available to us and offering a wonderfully supportive environment for our initial work on this project. Thank also are owed to Giacomo Bonnano and David Austen-Smith who offered us a number of useful suggestions.
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Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. Redistributive politics: A theory of taxation for an incumbent in a democracy. Public Choice 64, 135–153 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153160
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153160