Abstract
As demonstrated by the recent revelations of Edward Snowden on the extent of pervasive surveillance, one pressing danger is in the vast centralization of unencrypted messages by centralized silos such as Microsoft, Facebook, and Google. Peer-to-peer alternatives for messaging have failed to reach massive uptake amongst users. In response, we argue for a client-service federated model of messaging service providers that provide automatic encryption of messages such as email. We then present the threat model and design of LEAP, which currently provisions opportunistic email encryption combined with a VPN and cross-device synchronization. We also outline how the next steps for LEAP could allow massive deployment of mix networks and be extended to new services such as chat, file-sharing, and social networking.
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Notes
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Although Tribler itself does not use encryption or anonymization techniques, but instead seems to mistakenly uphold that a peer-to-peer architecture is enough to be resistant to censorship threats.
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To try, follow instructions on http://demo.bitmask.net
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Note that parts of Sects. 15.2 and 15.4 are modified versions of material available on the LEAP wiki at http://leap.se/en/docs (Accessed May 23rd 2014).
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Note that we do understand reasonable people may disagree over the exact values, and furthermore, that we are describing only a class of deployed systems rather than particular hypothetical systems or systems that do not have mass deployment.
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For example, monitoring the patterns of communication in an IRC channel that allows anonymous identifiers can eventually reveal the identities of users of the IRC channel.
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TOFU stands for “Trust On First Use,” which assumes the first transfer and use of a key is not compromised.
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An Android version, with has considerable differences due to being coded in Java, is under development.
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Such as Thunderbird, Evolution, or Outlook.
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Sparrow, E., Halpin, H. (2015). LEAP: The LEAP Encryption Access Project. In: Gutwirth, S., Leenes, R., de Hert, P. (eds) Reforming European Data Protection Law. Law, Governance and Technology Series(), vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9385-8_15
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