Abstract
The bargaining model I propose to discuss in this paper2 is a simplified and, as I hope, improved version of my bargaining model published in the Princeton Contributions (see [3]). Like my earlier model, this one is also a generalization of the Nash solution for the two-person cooperative game [6, 7] to the n-person cooperative game; and it is at the same time also a generalization of (a somewhat modified form of) the Shapley value [8] from the transferable-utility3 case to the general case.
Manuscript received November 28, 1960, revised July 31, 1962.
An earlier version of this paper was written while the author was at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. It was read at the Stanford meeting of the Econometric Society in August, 1960. The author is indebted to Professor Leonid Hurwicz, of the University of Minnesota, and to Professor Gerard Debreu, now of the University of California at Berkeley, for helpful comments.
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References
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© 1982 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Harsanyi, J.C. (1982). A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game. In: Papers in Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2527-9_3
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