Abstract
Like all other Soviet philosophical disciplines, IFN had its specific nature and background: rather than being a mere ‘application’ or ‘extension’ of the ‘system of dialectical and historical materialism’, it had a status of its own as a professional discipline. IFN was an historiography and a theory of the history of philosophy, and should be seen not only as part of Soviet philosophical culture, but also from the general perspective of historiography of philosophy. Therefore, the first part of this chapter assesses the status and central issues of history of philosophy as a discipline [1.i].
Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the dialectical elaboration of the history of human thought, science, and technology.
Vladimir I. Lenin, 19141
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References
Lenin, PSS XXIX, p.131.
Cf. Wetter 1964 and Grujić 1969.
Peperzak 1989, p.19.
Cf. Geldsetzer 1968; for a general survey of positions, see Hösle 1984, pp.22–43; for an introduction to the problems involved: Schneider 1988.
Cf. Gouhier 19482, E. Castelli 1956, Braun 1973 and 1985, Guéroult 1984–1988 and 1979, Ehrhardt 1967, Hösle 1984, Schneider 1990 and 1992, Copleston 1979, Rorty 1984, Holland 1985, Peperzak 1981, Lavine 1989, Gracia 1992, and Holz 1992.
Cf. Hösle 1984, p.12, and Gracia 1992, who does refer to Bréhier, Braun and Guéroult, but not to Hösle, Schneider or Düsing.
The only extensive study of Soviet historiography of philosophy so far was the dissertation by M.L. Rybarczyk (Rybarczyk 1975); Hösle limits himself to a brief mention of that text, thereby totally ignoring the much more interesting work done by Soviet scholars after 1975 (cf. Hösle 1984, p.30, n.20); Braun, Rorty, Holland, Peperzak, Gracia, and even the Marxist Holz do not mention the subject.
Cf. Hösle 1984, pp.17–22, Kamenskij 1984, pp.113–125, idem 1992, pp.5–8, and Gracia 1992, pp.42ff.
Cf. Guéroult 1979 and 1984–1988, Braun 1973 and 1985, Hösle 1984, Schneider 1990, and Gracia 1992.
Cf. Geldsetzer 1968.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics A 3 [983b].
Cf. H.S. Long, ‘Introduction’, in: Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, with an English translation by R.D. Hicks [Loeb Classical Library, vols. 184 – 185] (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP & London: Heinemann, (1925) 1980), p.xvi; cf. also the subtitle of Thomas Stanley’s Historia philosophiae (1655): ‘vitas opiniones, resque gestas et dicta philosophorum’.
Cf., for example, Thomas Stanley’s The History of Philosophy (London 1655, fourth edition in 1743), several times translated into Latin, and the standard history of philosophy for nearly a century.
J. Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabilis ad nostram aetatem perducta (Leipzig 1742; a shorter version was reprinted several times).
Kant, Preisschrift..., A 21 [Werke VI, p.595]; cf I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 852 / B 880 [Werke IV, p.709].
Kant, Preisschrift..., A 21 [Werke VI, p.595].
Cf. Geldsetzer in Gründer et al. 1990, p.914f, and Guéroult 1984–1988, vol.2, p.399.
Thus, in the Enzyklopädie..., philosophy as historically developing is assigned a place in the system of philosophy itself (cf. Hegel, Werke VIII, p.58 [Enz. § 13]); cf. also Walsh 1965, p.72.
Two incomplete manuscript versions have survived (cf. Helferich 1979, p.93); Hegel taught history of philosophy 9 times between 1805 and 1831 (cf ‘Anmerkung der Redaktion zu Band 18, 19 und 20’, in: Hegel, Werke XX, p.520, and Helferich 1979, p.93).
Cf. Düsing 1983, p.1.
Cf. Passmore 19722, p.226, and Hösle 1984, pp.17–22.
Cf. Peperzak 1989, p.24, and Gracia 1992, pp.253–276.
Cf. Gracia 1992, pp.234–252.
Cf. Peperzak 1989, p.31.
Cf. Hösle 1984, pp.38–41, and Geldsetzer in Gründer et al. 1990, p.905.
Cf. Gracia 1992, pp.1–11, and pp.318–323; cf. also Passmore 19722, p.228.
Cf. Passmore 19722, p.229.
Cf. Hösle 1984, pp.43–50, and Gracia 1992, pp.318–323.
Cf. on various types of reductionism Passmore 19722, p.228f, Hösle 1984, pp.26–38 and pp.51–54, Geldsetzer in Gründer et al. 1990, p.907, and Gracia 1992, pp.225–233.
Cf. Helferich 1979, p.90, and Geldsetzer 1990, p.906.
Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 880 [Werke IV, p.709], Hegel, Werke X, p.393 [§ 574], XVIII, p.46 and p.134f.
Both have been the subject of numerous studies: a bibliography, composed by Flay in 1974, mentions no less than 787 publications dealing with Hegel’s theory and practice of history of philosophy (J.C. Flay, ‘Bibliography’, in: O’Malley et al. 1974, pp. 194–236.), while Düsing gives 226 titles (Düsing 1983, pp.250ff.). In the two decades since Flay’s bibliography, the number of studies no doubt has grown considerably. Moreover, only a few of the many Russian and Soviet sources are included by Flay and Düsing (cf. Düsing 1983, p. 14.).
Making use of Hollak 1962, Walsh 1965, Geldsetzer 1968, Hay 1974, Helferich 1979, Düsing 1983, and of course Hegel himself, viz of the ‘Einleitung’ to his Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, and the concluding paragraphs (§§ 572–577) of the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften; I use the most accessible edition, which comprises, as far as the Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie are concerned, the compilation of Nachschriften by Michelet, already criticized as cut-and-paste work by Hoffmeister (cf. Helferich 1979, p.93); the critical edition of both Hegel’s manuscripts and of the so-called Nachschriften is currently being published, and any serious scholarly discussion must take these into account.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.24, and XX, p.467.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.36, and XX, pp.471ff.
Cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.34f.
Cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, pp.28ff, and XX, p.473.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.37, XX, p.473; cf. Walsh 1965, p.71f.
Cf. Caponigri 1974, p.3.
Cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.25f, p.29, and p.37.
“Wenn wir nun so diese Bestimmungen von Konkret und Entwicklung festhalten, so erhält die Natur des Mannigfaltigen einen ganz anderen Sinn...” (Hegel, Werte XVIII, p.52); cf. also Geldsetzer 1968, p.49f, Düsing 1983, p.25f, and Hegel, Werke XVIII, pp.39ff, pp.42ff.
Hegel, Werke XX, p.461; cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.38 and p.57, and Werke VIII, p.58 [§ 13]).
Hegel, Werke XX, p.455.
Hegel, Werke XX, p.476.
Hegel, Werke X, p.393 [Enz. § 574].
Hegel, Werke X, p.379 [Enz. § 573].
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.48.
Cf. Helferich 1979, p.91, Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.70, XX, p.485, and XVIII, p.117: “In der Geschichte tritt daher die Philosophie nur da auf, wo und insofern freie Verfassungen sich bilden.”
Hegel, Werke XX, p.478; cf. also XVIII, p.49, Düsing 1983, p.34, and Hegel, Werke VIII, p.59 [Enz. § 14]: “Dieselbe Entwicklung des Denkens, welche in der Geschichte der Philosophie dargestellt wird, wird in der Philosophie selbst dargestellt, aber befreit von jener geschichtlichen äußerlichkeit, rein im Elemente des Denkens.”
Cf. Hösle 1984, p.87, Lauer 1974, p.22, and Helferich 1979, p.94.
Cf. Hösle 1984, p.85f, Düsing 1983, p.26 and p.30, Henrich 1971, and Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.49: “Ferner underscheidet sich allerdings auch nach einer Seite die Folge als Zeitfolge der Geschichte von der Folge in der Ordnung der Begriffe. Wo diese Seite liegt, dies näher zu zeigen, würde uns aber von unserem Zwecke zu weit abführen” (cf. also XX, p.478f).
Hegel, Werke VIII, p.58 [§ 13]; cf. also XVIII, p.21 and 61, and XX, p.455, 465, and 510.
Hegel, Werke XX, p.455.
Hegel, Werke XX, p.461; on the historian’s perspective cf. Hegel, Werke XII, p.114.
Hollak 1962, p.355.
Ibid., p.354, and Hösle 1984, p.90.
According to Hösle, this is indeed the case (Hösle 1984, p.744); the idea that Hegel indeed concluded the Modern stage (Descartes — Hegel) in the historical development of philosophy is not only present in Hösle: we can find it in encyclopedia entries, like H. Berger, entry ‘Zekerheid’, in: Willemsen 1992, p.490, and also in VI. Solov’ev: “... his general meta-philosophical conclusion is that Hegel was to philosophy what Louis XIV was to the nation-state: both led to the decline of what they stood for — rationalist philosophy and absolute monarchy (Kline 1974, p. 162).”
Cf. Caponigri 1974.
Cf. especially Düsing 1983, p.31f.
Cf. Hegel, Werke X, p.353 [Enz. § 552]: “Der denkende Geist der Weltgeschichte aber, indem er zugleich jene Beschränktheiten [as the concrete, bestimmte incarnation of Weltgeist, EvdZ] der besonderen Volksgeister und seine eigene Weltlichkeit abstreift, erfaßt seine konkrete Allgemeinheit und erhebt sich zum Wissen des absoluten Geistes, als der ewig wirklichen Wahrheit, in welcher die wissende Vernunft frei für sich ist und die Notwendigkeit, Natur und Geschichte nur seiner Offenbarung dienend und Gefäße seiner Ehre sind.”
Cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.73f, and XX, p.482.
Cf. Hegel, Werke XX, p.508f, and XVIII, pp.54ff; cf. also Hay 1974, p.56f.
Cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.74f: “...die Philosophie... ist Wissen des Substantiellen ihrer Zeit. (...) Die Philosophie steht jedoch andererseits der Form nach über ihrer Zeit, indem sie als das Denken dessen, was der substantielle Geist derselben ist, ihn sich zum Gegenstande macht.”
Cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.131f and Hösle 1984, p.749.
Hegel, Werke VII, p.26, and XVIII, p.73.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.38, and p.54: “Die große Präsumption, daß es auch nach dieser Seite in der Welt vernünftig zugegangen -was der Geschichte der Philosophie erst wahrhaftes Interesse gibt...”
Cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, pp.25ff, and Düsing 1983, p.31.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.54f.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.53.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.56.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.57.
Cf. Düsing 1983, p.30f, and Hösle 1984, p.169f.
“Die Zufälligkeit muß man mit dem Eintritt in die Philosophie aufgeben (Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.55).”
Hegel: “...man muss... diese reinen Begriffe in dem zu erkennen wissen, was die geschichtliche Gestalt enthält (WerkeXX, p.478),” and: “...um in der empirischen Gestalt und Erscheinung, in der die Philosophie geschichtlich auftritt, ihren Fortgang als Entwicklung der Idee zu erkennen, muss man freilich die Erkenntnis der Idee schon mitbringen (ibid. p.479);” cf. also Werke XVIII, p.49 and p.67.
Cf. Hegel, Werke XX, p.479f.
Cf. Passmore 1972, p.228.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.56f: “Das Verhalten gegen eine Philosophie muß also eine affirmative und eine negative Seite enthalten; dann erst lassen wir einer Philosophie Gerechtigkeit widerfahren.”
“Die Gegenwart ist das Höchste (Hegel, Werke XX, p.456)”; cf. Hösle 1984, p.94.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.65.
Hegel, Werke XVIII, p.65; cf. also XX, p.461, Düsing 1983, p.36, Walsh 1965, p.74 and Geldsetzer 1968, p.52.
Likewise, Hösle does not do justice to the “tremendous diversity of philosophies” in past and present (Oger 1985, p. 177).
Hösle 1984, p. 159.
Cf. Marx / Engels, MEW, Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, pp.257–373, MEW XXI, pp.259–307, Lenin, PSS XVIII, and PSS XXIX, pp.219–278.
Cf. also Kamenskij 1992, p. 15.
K. Marx an F. Lassalle (1858), [MEW XXIX], p.549; cf. Marx, Die Doktordissertation, [MEW Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil], p.261.
F. Engels an C. Schmidt (1891), [MEW XXXVIII], p.204.
Lenin, PSS XXIX, p.263, 267, 261, 250.
Cf. Irrlitz et al. 1985, p.5f; cf. also Bocheriski 1967b, p. 192.
Irrlitz et al. 1985, p.14, 16.
Irrlitz et al. 1985, p.9, 12, 16.
Kamenka 1965, p.84; cf. also Irrlitz et al. 1985, p.40, the ‘Vorwort’ in MEW Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, p.vi, ibid., p.664, n.31, and Ojzerman 19863, pp.39–57 [translation: Ojzerman 1980b, pp.58–83].
In his doctoral dissertation we find Marx’ famous dictum “Prometheus ist der vornehmste Heilige und Märtyrer im philosophischen Kalender” [MEW Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, p.263]; cf. also Irrlitz et al. 1985, p.39.
Marx, MEW Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, p.261f; cf. Irrlitz et al. 1985, p.42.
Kamenka 1965, p.84f.
Marx, MEW Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, p.305.
Cf. MEW III, pp.5–7.
Marx & Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie [MEW III], p.27.
Op.cit., p.8f; the concept of ‘social consciousness’ was deduced from this text by orthodox Marxism, but is not present in it: Marx speaks of ‘gesellschaftliche Bewußtseinsformen’, i.e. ‘social forms of consciousness’, not of ‘forms of social consciousness’ (’Formen des gesellschaftlichen Bewußtseins’).
Cf. Lenin, PSS XXVI, p.56, Aleksandrov 1937, p.38, and Scanlan 1985, p.184f.
Kamenka 1965, p.92.
Marx & Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie [MEW III], p.26f.
Op.cit., p.90.
Cf. also Marx’ defence of the “dead dog [toter Hund]” Hegel in the ‘Preface’ of Das Kapital [MEW XXIII], p.27, Marx’ letter to Kugelmann of 1870 [MEW XXXII], p.685f, and Engels, Dialektik der Natur [MEW XX], p.334f.
Kamenka 1965, p.92.
Engels, MEW XXI, p.274f.
Cf. Engels’ famous remark, concluding his Ludwig Feuerbach... : “Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung ist die Erbin der deutschen klassischen Philosophie” [MEW XXI, p.301].
Engels, MEW XXI, p.302.
Engels, MEW XXI, p.270: “Mit Hegel schließt die Philosophie überhaupt ab; einerseits weil er ihre ganze Entwicklung in seinem System in der großartigsten Weise zusammenfaßt, andrerseits weil er uns, wenn auch unbewußt, den Weg zeigt aus diesem Labyrinth der Systeme zur wirklichen Erkenntnis der Welt”; cf. ibid., p.306.
Cf. MEW XXI, p.294.
Kamenka 1965, p.92f.
Ballestrem 1963a, p.113.
Kamenka 1965, p.93.
Engels, MEW XX, p.330; the quotation occurs from Iovčuk 1970, p. 14 to the draft version of the last Soviet učebnik in philosophy, Vvedenie..., FN 1988, p.96; in the final version the reference to Engels was replaced by a neutral “as is well known” (Frolov et al. 1989, I, p. 12).
Irrlitz & Liibke limit themselves to this development, bracketing the Totalitätsgesichtspunkt (p. 6).
Cf. Kamenka 1965, p.93.
Cf. Petrović 1972, p.349.
Cf. op.cit., p.348.
Plekhanov 1976, p.358.
Ibid., p.358f, and Petrovič 1972, p.348.
Plekhanov 1976c, p.365; cf. Edie et al. 19762, III, p.356: “In reply to Populist criticism that Marxist determinism destroys freedom and therefore moral responsibility, Plekhanov turns to Spinoza and Hegel and argues that freedom in fact exists: it is the recognition of necessity”; cf. also Kolakowski 1981, III, p.380.
Cf. also Iovčuk et al. 1973–1974, III, pp.5–18.
Plekhanov 1976a, p.366f.
Cf Lenin, PSS XVIII, p.356; cf. also p.359: “Either materialism that is consistent to the end, or the lie and confusion of philosophical idealism, — there you have the formulation of the question, that is given in every paragraph of ‘Anti-Dühring’, and which only people with brains long since spoiled [podporčennye] by reactionary professorial philosophy, could fail to notice”; ibid., p.360: “Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from beginning to end, they were capable of uncovering deviation from materialism and indulgences [poblažki] to idealism and fideism in each and every ‘latest’ trend”; cf. ibid., p.361.
V.I. Lenin, Filosofskie tetrady, ‘Konspekt Nauki logiki Gegelja’, in: PSS, XXIX, p.215.
Althusser was right, I believe, to draw this conclusion (cf. Althusser 1969, especially pp.42ff).
Cf. Lenin, ‘Tri istočnika i tri sostavnykh časti marksizma’, in: PSS XXIII, p.43.
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van der Zweerde, E. (1997). Three Perspectives on IFN . In: Soviet Historiography of Philosophy. Sovietica, vol 57. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8943-7_1
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