Skip to main content

Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games

  • Chapter
Book cover Models of Strategic Rationality

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C ((TDLC,volume 2))

Abstract

The concept of a perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames [Selten 1965 and 1973]. Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game. It is necessary to reexamine the problem of defining a satisfactory non-cooperative equilibrium concept for games in extensive form. Therefore a new concept of a perfect equilibrium point will be introduced in this paper2).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Burger, E.: Einführung in die Theorie der Spiele, Berlin 1958.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, H. W.: Extensive Games and the Problem of Information, in: H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tuckek (eds.): Contribution to the Theory of Games, Vol. II, Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28, pp. 193 — 216, Princeton 1953.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nash, J. F. : Non-cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54, 155 —162, 1951.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neumann, J. v., and O. Morgenstern: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton 1944.

    Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R.: Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 301 — 324 and 667 — 689, 1965.

    Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R.: A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many, International Journal of Game Theory 2 141 —201, 1973.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bielefeld, R.S. (1988). Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. In: Models of Strategic Rationality. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8446-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7774-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics