Abstract
It is time we reconsidered the relations between justice and utilitarianism. Thanks to a convergence of political and philosophical developments, interest in political philosophy and the problem of justice is greater than it has been for many years. Significant contributions have recently been made to the field.2 But our understanding of the political face of utilitarianism is, by contrast, rather crude. By re-examining Mill’s theory, I shall try in this paper to help us gain a better grasp upon the utilitarian view of justice.
This paper is a sequel to ‘Mills’s Theory of Morality’, Nous 10 (1976) 101-120. An earlier version was presented at the University of Texas; I am grateful for the comments I received on that occasion. I would also like to thank Stephen Massey and Robert Summers for their comments and suggestions. (Somewhat similar problems were explored, from a different point of view, in ‘Human Rights and the General Welfare’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1977) 113-129.) For a somewhat different reading of Mill, see Jonathan Harrison, ‘The Expedient, the Right and the Just in Mill’s Utilitarianism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume I, Part 1 (1974) pp. 93-107, which I did not have an opportunity to study before completing this essay.
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Notes
See, for example, Joel Feinberg, ‘Justice and Personal Desert’, Nomos VI: Justice, ed. by Friedrich and Chapman (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1974), pp. 69–97, and ‘Noncomparative Justice’, Philosophical Review 83 (1974) 297-338
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971)
Robert Nozick, ‘Distributive Justice’, Philisophy and Public Affairs 3 (1973) 45–126.
All references in the text are to paragraphs of Utilitarianism — Chapter V, unless otherwise noted.
Bentham’s views are discussed in my In the Interest of the Governed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
Even here Mill distinguishes between the utilitarian theory of morality and ‘the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded.’ The theory of life is the principle of utility that Mill defends in Chapter IV; the theory of morality is the one under discussion, presented in Chapter V.
Mill’s characterization of his ‘doctrine’ at the start of Chapter V, cited above, comes soon after this longer statement. I suggest the former be read as short for the latter.
‘Mill’s Theory of Morality’, op. cit., Sec II.
A recent theory that somewhat resembles Mill’s is to be found in R.B. Brandt,’ some Merits of One Form of Rule-Utilitarianism’, University of Colorado Studies, Series in Philosophy (1967), pp. 39-65; see pp. 57f for a brief discussion of Mill. This paper is complemented by ‘A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses’, Philosophical Review 68 (1969) 337-361.
Though I arrived at the interpretation of Mill that is being presented in this paper by considering Mill’s remarks about sanctions and their relation to Bentham’s theory of punishment, which Mill embraced, the development of my hypothesis has undoubtedly been stimulated by Brandt’s significant work in this area.
For these three types of theory, see, respectively, Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 64–67
H.L.A. Hart, ‘Bentham on Legal Rights’, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Second Series, ed. by A.W.B. Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 171–201; and my ‘Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries’, American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969) 173-185.
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Lyons, D. (1978). Mill’s Theory of Justice. In: Goldman, A.I., Kim, J. (eds) Values and Morals. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7634-5_1
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